[EM] STAR

[fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com]

On Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 12:09 AM C.Benham wrote:

> >   I think this is an interesting point. We can ask at a philosophical
> level what makes a good voting method. Is it just one that ticks the most
> boxes, or is it one that most reliably gets the "best" result?
>

The one that most reliably gets the best result in the real world. The
difficulty with this approach is accurately modeling human voting behavior
and the consequent utility experienced from the winner, but it's still the
better answer philosophically.

(Note that VSE predates Jameson Quinn by decades, and has had several
different names: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_utility_efficiency)

> And that's partly because the premise of Condorcet is essentially built
> on a logical fallacy - basically that if A is preferred to B on more
> ballots that vice versa then electing A must
> > be a better result than electing B.
>
> I'd be interested in reading your explanation of why you think that is a
> "logical fallacy".  What about if there are only two candidates?
>

Ranked ballots can't capture strength of preference. It's possible for a
majority-preferred candidate to be very polarizing (loved by 51% and hated
by 49%), while the minority-preferred candidate is broadly-liked and has a
much higher overall approval/favorability rating.  Which candidate is the
rightful winner?

https://leastevil.blogspot.com/2012/03/tyranny-of-majority-weak-preferences.html

"Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and
one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable
options, but you both also really, *really* like pepperoni. Your other
friend also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other
options, but they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?

Clearly the answer is mushrooms, and there is no group of friends worth
calling themselves such who would conclude otherwise. It's so obvious that
it hardly seems worth calling attention to. So why is it, that if we put
this decision up to a vote, do so many election methods, which are
otherwise seen as perfectly reasonable methods, fail? Plurality, top-two
runoffs <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-round_system>, instant runoff
voting <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting>, all variations
of Condorcet's method <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method>,
even Bucklin
voting <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucklin_voting>; all of them,
incorrectly, choose pepperoni."
(And strength of preference is clearly a real thing in our brains.  If you
prefer A > B > C, and are given the choice between Box 1, which contains B,
and Box 2, which has a 50/50 chance of containing A or C, which do you
choose?  What if the probability were 1 in a million of Box 2 containing
C?  By varying the probability until it's impossible to decide, you can
measure the relative strength of preference for B > C vs A > C.)
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