[EM] STAR

[Forest Simmons]

What I was trying to say is that STAR is easily fixable whereas Copeland is
not.

If you have STAR ballots and an initial chain member C1, you can build an
uncovering chain by repeatedly augmenting the chain with the highest
approval candidate that covers every member of the chain ... as far as
possible.

My mistake was my misguided attempt at diplomacy ... allowing the top two
runoff winner to serve as C1.

On Fri, Aug 11, 2023, 7:45 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> I see from the "STAR Voting" advocates' website they propose using 0-5
> scoring ballots.
>
> STAR Voting it seems to me is just awful. It fails almost every desirable
> criterion you can think of.
>
> It meets Condorcet Loser and Plurality and that's about it.  Their
> propaganda that it is somehow better
> than IRV is very very dumb and/or dishonest.
>
> Forest wrote:
>
> But Copeland suffers from two fatal defect that STAR does not have ... Copeland is neither Decisive nor Clone
> Independent.
>
>
> What gives you the idea that STAR is Clone Independent?   It obviously
> fails Clone-Loser.  Say  the score winner pairwise loses to
> the score runner-up. If we add a clone of the score-winner then the
> previous winner will be displaced out of the run-off.
>
> One of the silly things about it is that all the major factions will have
> incentive to field two candidates (in the hope of capturing
> both run-off spots).
>
> Chris Benham
>
> https://www.starvoting.org/
>
>
>
> Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 17:19:15 -0700
> From: Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
> To: EM <Election-methods at lists.electorama.com> <Election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: [EM] STAR
> Message-ID:
> 	<CANUDvfoOeBgZAgWiKPFG+UU0fcoDi771ZHHRTmkCEzVx-mLVyQ at mail.gmail.com> <CANUDvfoOeBgZAgWiKPFG+UU0fcoDi771ZHHRTmkCEzVx-mLVyQ at mail.gmail.com>
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>
> Score Then Automatic Runoff (STAR) elects the pairwise winner between the
> two candidates with the highest score totals.
>
> One of the biggest problems with this method is that there is an
> appreciable likelihood that the winner W will be a candidate that is
> pairwise dominated by some other candidate C, which means that C not only
> scores higher than W on more ballots than not, but if there even exists  a
> beatpath from W back to C, it will take at least three steps.
>
> Most other extant methods have this same defect, but almost all of them are
> hard to fix compared to STAR. This fact makes it easy for a tweaked version
> of STAR to become arguably superior to any of these other methods.
>
> 1. Initialize a set S of candidates with the STAR winner.
> 2. If any candidate pairwise dominates the newest member of S, from among
> such candidates add in to S the one with the highest score.
> 3. Repeat step 2 until the set S cannot be enlarged any further in this way.
> 4. Elect the last candidate to be added to the set.
>
> Usually step 2 will be invoked only one or two times if at all ... so this
> is not a big tweak.
>
> With this tweak STAR becomes arguably superior to any method currently in
> use.
>
> The only other method currently in use that always elects pairwise
> undominated candidates is Copeland.  But Copeland suffers from two fatal
> defect that STAR does not have ... Copeland is neither Decisive nor Clone
> Independent.
>
> Will STAR proponents take advantage of this opportunity? ... or will they
> pass it up?
>
> fws
>
>
>
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