[EM] Sorted Approval Margins (plus two other Condorcet methods)

[Forest Simmons]

I thought perhaps DMC with an explicit approval option would be better than
vanilla DMC based on Implicit Approval ... but I never looked at it closely.

On Wed, Aug 9, 2023, 6:31 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> Forest,
>
> If I had to narrow it down to three for public proposal, I would probably
> choose the same three. DMC would be right up there too ... in the form of
> approval based Benham ... eliminate low approval candidates until an
> undefeated candidate remains.
>
> I am very pleased that we are in such agreement.  But I think "DMC" is
> quite a bit worse than ASM and UncApproval.   I thought about it quite a
> bit a few years ago.
>
> Beyond being maybe a bit easier to explain and a bit more appealing to
> those that love one-at-a-time eliminations, I can't see any  argument that
> it is better than Smith//Approval.
>
> I used to sometimes suggest a method that featured trying to help voters
> by sometimes "moving" their approval cut-offs.  For example a version of
> Smith//Approval where ballots
> that make no approval distinction among the Smith set candidates have
> their cut-offs moved the smallest distance so they do.
>

This is a very appealing DSV idea that reminds me of an idea I once toyed
with ... to move the approval cutoff (on each ballot) the minimum amount to
make it adjacent to the ballot's lowest ranked candidate that pairwise
defeats every candidate ranked ahead of it on that ballot.

Now I would say just move the ballot's cutoff adjacent to the MMPO
candidate, which would be much simpler, but not simple enough, and would
still confuse the naive voter about the strategic  vs intuitive role of the
cutoff.

(In other words those that originally approved all of
> them would now approve all but those they rank above none of the others
> and and those that originally originally approved none of them would now
> approve those they rank below
> no others).
>
> But now I think (at least for ASM and UncApp) it is better for a public
> proposal to pretend that "approval"  is sincere and on some absolute scale
> and not relative and tactical.
>

 Very true!

>
> Another idea I had was to use say 0-100 scoring ballots and interpret a
> higher than average score (on the individual ballot) as approval and an
> exactly average score as half-approval.
>
> But needless to say, that would slow down hand-counting a lot. Also
> probably a bit too fancy for a public proposal.
>
> Chris B.
>
>
> On 9/08/2023 9:43 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> If I had to narrow it down to three for public proposal, I would probably
> choose the same three. DMC would be right up there too ... in the form of
> approval based Benham ... eliminate low approval candidates until an
> undefeated candidate remains.
>
> We called the chain building method
> Uncovered Approval or unc(approval). Thanks for dusting it off!
>
> For those not familiar with "chains" ...in the election methods context a
> chain is a transitive beatpath ... so each member of the beatpath is beaten
> by each of its predecessors ... not only by its immediate predecessor.
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Aug 6, 2023, 2:59 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>
>>
>> I think Condorcet methods that don't allow voters to enter an approval
>> threshold have to choose between trying to
>> minimise Compromise incentive or trying to reduce Defection incentive.
>>
>> The methods I like in this category allow voters to rank however many
>> candidates they like and also approve all but
>> one or only one or any number in between of the candidates (consistent
>> with their rankings). Equal-ranking is allowed.
>>
>> Default approval goes only to candidates ranked below no other candidate.
>>
>> I suggest that voters can just mark one of the candidates as the lowest
>> ranked one they approve (i.e. only that candidate
>> and those ranked higher or equal to it are approved).
>>
>> But other ways of doing it could be fine.
>>
>> Regarding which algorithm, I very much like Forest's  Sorted Approval
>> Margins.
>>
>
> Or more commonly, "Approval Sorted Margins"
>
> [A rose by any other name ...]
>
>>
>> I also like another method of his, the exact name of which I've
>> forgotten (something about "Chain" building or climbing):
>>
>> *Begin the chain with the most approved candidate.  Then add the most
>> approved candidate that covers that candidate.
>> Then add the most approved candidate that covers all the candidates
>> already in the chain.
>>
>> Keep doing that as many times as possible, and then elect the last added
>> candidate*.
>>
>> I think nearly always this will elect the same candidate as
>> Smith//Approval, but is more elegant and ensures that the
>> winner is Uncovered.
>>
>> For a practicable Condorcet method that uses plain ranked ballots
>> (equal-ranking and truncation allowed), I like
>> Smith//Ranked below none minus ranked above none.
>>
>> *Eliminate all the candidates not in the Smith set. Give each remaining
>> candidate a score equal to the number of ballots
>> on which it is ranked (among remaining candidates) below no other
>> candidate minus the number of ballots on which it
>> is ranked (among remaining candidates) above no other candidate.
>>
>> Elect the candidate with the highest score."
>>
>> Given how rare top cycles will likely be, I think this is probably good
>> enough.
>>
>> Obviously it meets Plurality.  It fails both Minimal Defense and Chicken
>> Dilemma, but never both at once :)
>>
>> It looks fair and gives a pretty-enough winner.  I'll be back later with
>> some examples.
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>>
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