[EM] Approval-enhanced IRV

[C.Benham]

Kevin,

>> Otherwise elect the winner of the pairwise comparison between the IRV
>> winner and the candidate
>> with the most approval opposition to the IRV winner.*
> Just a comment on this aspect. I'm concerned that on its face it may seem a little unfair
> to choose two finalists, such that one finalist has some specific merit, and the other
> finalist is someone specifically expected to have high odds of beating the first
> finalist.

Do you think this method "seems a little unfair" to the IRV winner?

It could be that there is an Approval winner who is ranked above the IRV 
winner on a lot of ballots that also
approve the IRV winner, but the IRV winner is spared that pairwise 
comparison.

Chris


On 7/08/2023 5:58 am, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Chris,
>
> Le dimanche 6 août 2023 à 01:37:25 UTC−5, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> a écrit :
>> The MD criterion has gone a bit out of fashion because it directly contradicts the
>> Chicken Dilemma criterion.
> I'm not sure if MD (even as SDSC) was ever in fashion exactly, but what it is, as you
> know, is a special case of trying to minimize compromise incentive. If you say that has
> gone out of fashion too, well, maybe you'd be right. I don't think CD is the reason for
> that though. In any case I think it would be a mistake for a Condorcet advocate to omit
> compromise incentive from their vocabulary.
>
> CD doesn't seem like much of an alternative to me. It has a high cost, and the proposed
> benefit is speculative, dependent on one set of its resulting incentives prevailing over
> another.
>
>> Otherwise elect the winner of the pairwise comparison between the IRV
>> winner and the candidate
>> with the most approval opposition to the IRV winner.*
> Just a comment on this aspect. I'm concerned that on its face it may seem a little unfair
> to choose two finalists, such that one finalist has some specific merit, and the other
> finalist is someone specifically expected to have high odds of beating the first
> finalist. It makes one wonder if the merit of the first finalist is being penalized
> sometimes.
>
> This isn't to say I haven't proposed such designs myself.
>
> Kevin
> votingmethods.net