[EM] Asset/DSV, Method X

[Forest Simmons]

Assets in the general sense that potentially transferable first place votes
can be considered as assets as opposed to liabilities.... and proxy in the
sense of easing the strategic burden on the voters via (for example) voting
for a public ranking ... it seems like creative use of DVV in conjunction
with these other burden reducing  features might side step the main problem
of plain asset voting... in the spirit of brainstorming inspired by your
creative Method X.

On Wed, Aug 2, 2023, 1:54 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> Responding to both DSV posts in one message...
>
> On 8/2/23 14:46, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Aug 1, 2023, 4:21 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> > <km_elmet at t-online.de <mailto:km_elmet at t-online.de>> wrote:
> >>
> >>     This is method X, the monotone burial-resistant method from the
> >>     previous
> >>     post: (It doesn't really have a name yet.)
> >>
> >>     - Each candidate A obtains his score by eliminating candidates in
> >>     rounds, one candidate per round, until one other candidate (B)
> remains
> >>     or A himself is forced to be eliminated. In the former case, A's
> score
> >>     is A>B. In the latter case, A's score is zero.
> >>
> >>     - When figuring out A's score, the method chooses the sequence of
> >>     candidates to eliminate so as to maximize that score.
> >
> > This DSV feature could be the key to overcoming our main objection to
> > Asset Voting ... the loose cannon proxy.
>
> I'm not entirely sure how, could you explain? I can maximize for A
> because I can infer what A's trying to maximize (his score) and the
> means by which it can be done (choosing a particular sequence of
> eliminations).
>
> But in Asset Voting (and delegable proxy) it would seem like the main
> benefit is that you can't specify your preferences in exact detail, so
> you instead choose to give your voting power to someone who can.
>
> Then the loose cannon is a problem where someone you trusted goes and
> does the wrong thing. Because the system doesn't know your preferences
> (if it did, you wouldn't need to use a proxy), it can't preemptively
> optimize around the "glitches".
>
> Or am I thinking of something entirely different?
>
> > Restricting to Smith requires lots of first place vote transfers ...
> > right?
>
> Yeah, that's right; that's why it's so surprising that Smith//X would
> stay monotone. Dropping a bunch of non-Smith candidates changes the lay
> of the land in unpredictable ways -- yet apparently not so unpredictable
> that monotonicity is affected. "Where is the deeper pattern in this chaos?"
>
> > So what about (for each candidate X) just bequeathing all of X's
> > first place assets to the Smith member Y against which X has the
> > fewest losing votes?
>
> You mean for making a simpler method that still passes Smith and ISDA?
> Smith//X would automatically remove all non-Smith members before doing
> X, and method X itself finds a maximally beneficial elimination order
> for each candidate, thus doing something disadvantageous to candidate X
> wouldn't seem to have a place in that procedure.
>
> -km
>
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