[EM] Method X

[Forest Simmons]

On Tue, Aug 1, 2023, 4:21 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> This is method X, the monotone burial-resistant method from the previous
> post: (It doesn't really have a name yet.)
>
> - Each candidate A obtains his score by eliminating candidates in
> rounds, one candidate per round, until one other candidate (B) remains
> or A himself is forced to be eliminated. In the former case, A's score
> is A>B. In the latter case, A's score is zero.
>
> - When figuring out A's score, the method chooses the sequence of
> candidates to eliminate so as to maximize that score.
>

This DSV feature could be the key to overcoming our main objection to Asset
Voting ... the loose cannon proxy.

>
> - In a round, the method can never eliminate a candidate who has more
> than 1/n of the total number of (non-exhausted) first preferences, where
> n is the number of remaining candidates in the round in question.
>
> - Unlike IFPP, it never eliminates more than one candidate per round.
>
> - Highest score wins.
>
> That's it!
>
> Now for the bad news:
>         - it's not summable (a summary takes O(n2^n) space),
>         - it's not polytime (ditto),
>         - its use of quotas means it would probably fail IIB,
>         - and I have no idea why it works.
>
> I can't say I wasn't tempted to name it after myself since it's kind of
> a big deal (if I can verify its monotonicity), but given its drawbacks,
> maybe it's not a good idea? It's like the Kemeny of monotone
> burial-resistant methods: slow and impractical, but it shows what's
> *possible*.
>
> I would very much like some independent verification or replication,
> though.
>
> -km
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>
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