[EM] Yet Another Simple Way to Find Smith Set
Gervase
gervase at group.force9.co.uk
Fri Apr 7 18:18:48 PDT 2023
I've been perusing the Election Methods archive and noticed that more or
less recently there was the need for simple legislative language to
define Condorcet and/or Smith (Subjects: "Hay guys, look at this..." and
"Another Simple Way to Find Smith"). Apologies if what I write
following this paragraph has already been explored in the mailing list.
Looking at the Wikipedia page for "Smith Set", it seems to contain a
simple algorithm for finding the Smith Set...
(1) Start with a set D (Dominating/Smith Set) with no candidates in it.
(2) Add all candidate(s) who are in the Copeland (Winner) Set to D.
(3) Add to D the candidate(s) who are NOT currently in D and who also
pairwise beats any candidate currently in D.
(4) Repeat step (3) until no candidate(s) are added by step (3).
RESULT: Set D is the Smith Set.
Copeland (Winner) Set are set of candidate(s) with the highest Copeland
score.
That's it! Read further if you want more details...
The Wikipedia page for "Smith Set" (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith_set) uses propositional(?) logic to
determine that any candidate in the Smith Set D will have at least a
Copeland Score of θD (i.e. the threshold score for set D). If there is
a θD, then there will be a maximum Copeland Score θW (i.e. the Copeland
Winner(s) Score). θD and θW can be equal.
I will sort of translate the propositional logic used in the Wikipedia
page into something more layman like.
> Choose d as an element of D with minimum Copeland score, and identify
> this score with θD.
Choose any candidate d in a pre-defined Smith Set D. This candidate d
will have a Copeland Score of θD.
> Now suppose that some candidate e ∉ D has a Copeland score not less
> than θD.
Now suppose there is some candidate e who is not in the Smith Set D and
also has a Copeland Score equal to or more than θD.
> Then since d belongs to D and e doesn't, it follows that d defeats e;
Because candidate d is in the Smith Set D and candidate e is not,
candidate d defeats candidate e.
> and in order for e's Copeland score to be at least equal to d's, there
> must be some third candidate f against whom e gets a better score than
> does d.
All the candidates in Smith Set D defeat candidate e. That is,
candidate e's maximum possible Copeland Score is being eaten into.
With candidate d being in Smith Set D, it will beat all candidates
outside of Smith Set D. This sets the "high" threshold which candidate
e needs to match.
Therefore, for candidate e to at least equal candidate d's (threshold)
Copeland Score, there will need to exist a candidate f who (1) candidate
e defeats and (2) defeats candidate d.
> If f ∈ D, then we have an element of D who does not defeat e,
If candidate f was in the Smith Set D, then by definition, candidate f
defeats candidate e. But we said in (1) that candidate e needs to
defeat candidate f.
> and if f ∉ D then we have a candidate outside of D whom d does not
> defeat, leading to a contradiction either way.
If candidate f was not in the Smith Set D, then by definition, candidate
d defeats candidate f. But we said in (2) that there needs to be a
candidate f who defeats candidate d.
Thanks,
Gervase.
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