[EM] Truncation (was re: Defeat Strength)

[Forest Simmons]

Here's the Benham version:

Proceed with Ranked-Rank Approval Elimination until there is a candidate
(to elect) that defeats pairwise each of the other remaining candidates.

Whether the voters vote sincerely or with sophisticated strategy, the
resulting VSE should be at least as good as ordinary Benham's VSE, in my
opinion.

Sincere voting means sincere order with rank symbols beefed up to reflect
subjectively felt stronger preferences where there are any.

For me personally this voting method would be easier and more satisfying
than either ordinary Benham or Score Based Benham.

Retrofitting with a Covering Embarrassment Protection Afterburner, would be
the frosting on the cake.

-Forest






On Wed, Sep 14, 2022, 12:49 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> The approval eliminatiion method would have the same complexity as IRV,
> since the current approval cutoff on a ballot can change at any step, just
> like the current first choice can change at any step in IRV.
>
> In fact IRV is precisely ranked-rankings elimination where all of the
> ballots are (by fiat) of the form ...
>
> A>>>>B>>>C>>D>E
>
> So why not give the voters a little credit or (as Steve Brams calls it)
> "voter sovereignty", by letting them prioritize their own rankings.
>
> -Forest
>
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2022, 12:36 AM Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> In addition to that, I still have some interest in the ranked rankings
>> style votes (A>>B>C) where one preference step is considered more important
>> than another step (forming a tree of preferences or something like that). I
>> have not done my homework on this (been lazy for the last decade). Do you
>> know if that approach would likely suffer from some (strategic voting or
>> vote counting complexity related) problems that would make it unusable?
>>
>> Juho
>>
>>
>> > On 12. Sep 2022, at 12.39, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 9/11/22 16:31, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> >> It is an interesting theoretical area of study to see what kind of
>> >> additional information we could use (up to free form algorithms), but
>> >> for large competitive single winner elections with independent voters
>> >> the basic approach of ranking + "equal last" seems to be a stable
>> basis.
>> >> (Different strength preferences (A>>B>C) might be useful somewhere - or
>> >> seriously - maybe not really :-) .)
>> >
>> > I would probably say that we can define honesty for ranked ballots and
>> for von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, but anything beyond that and it gets
>> really hard. And if we can't define honesty, then methods can get away with
>> externalizing their burden on the voters the way Range does.
>> >
>> > As for different strength prefereces, it feels kind of like "neither
>> this nor that". I'd rather have an automatically normalized rated ballot
>> (if utilities are important) or MJ-style grades or plain rankings (if not).
>> >
>> > (Personally, I'd imagine what voters can reliably answer lies somewhere
>> between rankings and vNM utilities. Just where, I don't know, though.)
>> >
>> > -km
>>
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>>
>
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