[EM] Truncation (was re: Defeat Strength)

[Forest Simmons]

The approval eliminatiion method would have the same complexity as IRV,
since the current approval cutoff on a ballot can change at any step, just
like the current first choice can change at any step in IRV.

In fact IRV is precisely ranked-rankings elimination where all of the
ballots are (by fiat) of the form ...

A>>>>B>>>C>>D>E

So why not give the voters a little credit or (as Steve Brams calls it)
"voter sovereignty", by letting them prioritize their own rankings.

-Forest

On Wed, Sep 14, 2022, 12:36 AM Juho Laatu <juho.laatu at gmail.com> wrote:

> In addition to that, I still have some interest in the ranked rankings
> style votes (A>>B>C) where one preference step is considered more important
> than another step (forming a tree of preferences or something like that). I
> have not done my homework on this (been lazy for the last decade). Do you
> know if that approach would likely suffer from some (strategic voting or
> vote counting complexity related) problems that would make it unusable?
>
> Juho
>
>
> > On 12. Sep 2022, at 12.39, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> wrote:
> >
> > On 9/11/22 16:31, Juho Laatu wrote:
> >> It is an interesting theoretical area of study to see what kind of
> >> additional information we could use (up to free form algorithms), but
> >> for large competitive single winner elections with independent voters
> >> the basic approach of ranking + "equal last" seems to be a stable basis.
> >> (Different strength preferences (A>>B>C) might be useful somewhere - or
> >> seriously - maybe not really :-) .)
> >
> > I would probably say that we can define honesty for ranked ballots and
> for von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, but anything beyond that and it gets
> really hard. And if we can't define honesty, then methods can get away with
> externalizing their burden on the voters the way Range does.
> >
> > As for different strength prefereces, it feels kind of like "neither
> this nor that". I'd rather have an automatically normalized rated ballot
> (if utilities are important) or MJ-style grades or plain rankings (if not).
> >
> > (Personally, I'd imagine what voters can reliably answer lies somewhere
> between rankings and vNM utilities. Just where, I don't know, though.)
> >
> > -km
>
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