[EM] Definite Approval/Disapproval

[Richard Lung]

Post-script correction:
In last paragraph, I should have said that the election and exclusion counts consolidate each other when a candidate gets a good election count (proximate to a quota) but below a quota of exclusion.




Kristofer,  

Werner Heisenberg said that if in the end you cannot say what you have found, then all your finding is worthless.
Fortunately, voters only need to know how to do the vote. Those who expect the count also to be understandable by everyone - typically claimed by anti-reformers - talk as if elections were an exception to the division of labor.
("Complicated, that word of fear," as HG Wells described a refrain to STV.)
My system is an example. I doubt anyone understands FAB STV (I don't understand it, or even the much simpler hand count, because it hasn't been tested and modified in the light of experience.) 
But all voters need to know is that: You have a preference vote equal to the number of candidates. The first preference counts as much to elect a candidate, as the last preference counts to exclude a candidate. A blank paper ( "white paper" as they call it in France, same as NOTA) is one vote towards a seat remaining vacant. Individual preferences left blank also contribute, in their degree, to a vacancy.

For example, 10 candidates contest 5 seats. The first five preferences count more or less to 5 seat elections. The last 5 preferences count less or more, to the exclusion of the other 5 candidates.

Note that the election counts and exclusion counts need not count against each other. An exclusion quota consolidates an election quota. In other words, a candidate is helped both by popularity and lack of unpopularity.

Regards,
Richard Lung.




On 7 May 2022, at 6:20 am, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:

That's a good template for all of us to imitate in our outreach to the proletariat!

Let me see how well I can imitate it for my latest attempt in the fpA-gpC vein:

Candidates are arranged into
one-on-one match-ups like runoffs where the candidate who would win a
runoff with only the two wins. If there is a candidate who wins every
runoff he's part of, he is elected. 

Otherwise candidates get reward value for every matchup they win or tie, but lose value for every matchup they lose.

The candidate with the greatest net reward value is elected.

Specifically, a candidate's prize/reward value is proportional to its estimated formidability as an opponent in these matchups. You get your opponent's prize value when you defeat or tie him in a matchup. Otherwise, you pay out that value.

The formidability of a candidate is gauged as a function of its respective first and last place showings on the ballots.




El vie., 6 de may. de 2022 3:02 a. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> escribió:
> On 06.05.2022 06:19, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > There were several 3-slot methods I was considering when I started this
> > thread, but the main one was a version of median judgment first proposed
> > by Andy Jennings in his dissertstion more than a decade ago. A few years
> > ago Adrien Fabre  independently published the method as "Usual
> > Judgment." And last month I discovered the method independently in the
> > case of three judgment categories. 
> > 
> > As soon as I made a graphic available showing the helical ramp
> > interpolation that characterizes the method, the versions of Jennings
> > and Fabre were brought to my attention. Both of them contemplated more
> > than three categories. 
> > 
> > A Wikipedia article (Highest Median Voting Rules) comparing various
> > median judgment methods (rightly) affirms that among the known median
> > judgment methods, Usual Judgment dominates the others in criteria
> > compliances  ...  resolving nagging imperfections (lack of Reverse
> > Symmetry and Participation compliances) of Majority Judgment, for example.
> > 
> > However, the article pointed out that the perfection of Usual Judgment,
> > especially in the intricacies of its general case tie breaking
> > procedure, might put too high a demand on the attention span of the
> > average voter.
> > 
> > This kind of "problem" is a public relations problem only for methods
> > whose proponents make too big a deal of the elegance of the arcane
> > intricacies that do not concern the lay citizen. 
> > 
> > When someone picks up a proposal like MAM, for example, from this EM
> > list and tries to sell it to the public without filtering out the
> > technical discussions designed to persuade the other EM experts ... Big
> > Mistake!
> 
> For MAM, I think I would put it like this: Candidates are arranged into
> one-on-one match-ups like runoffs where the candidate who would win a
> runoff with only the two wins. If there is a candidate who wins every
> runoff he's part of, he is elected. Otherwise, landslides count more
> than close runoffs in determining the winner.
> 
> It would probably be a good idea to also mention that there's been a
> beats-all candidate in every ranked election known so far. (Except
> possibly one actual runoff election in Romania, maybe? -- but that
> wasn't a ranked election.)
> 
> I'm a theoretician, not a public activist, so I imagine my description
> could be polished further :-)
> 
> The truly tough methods to describe would be things like fpA-fpC where
> the rules seem to be just pulled out of the air with no rhyme or reason,
> unless you happen to know that it makes the method satisfy some
> desirable criterion. Or Sinkhorn or Keener, which are incomprehensible
> without a lot of linear algebra.
> 
> -km

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