[EM] Honest equal-rank/truncation?
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Sun Jun 19 03:45:25 PDT 2022
On 6/19/22 1:09 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
>
> El sáb., 18 de jun. de 2022 6:29 a. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> <km_elmet at t-online.de <mailto:km_elmet at t-online.de>> escribió:
>>
>> A thought about how honest equal-rank might be defined. Earlier I've
>> said that a good way to define a honest ballot is to find a randomized
>> strategyproof system that induces it (e.g. Random Ballot for
>> single-mark, Random Pair for strict ranked, possibly some transformation
>> of Hay for VNM utility ballots).
>>
>> How about this as a starting point?
>>
>> "Random Approval": Voters provide Approval-style ballots. Choose a
>> ballot at random. If this ballot approves a single candidate, then elect
>> that candidate. Otherwise eliminate every non-approved candidate and
>> draw another ballot (without replacement). Ignore ballots only approving
>> eliminated candidates. If every ballot is visited, choose at random a
>> candidate from the winning set.
>>
>> The optimal strategy seems to be to just designate your favorite,
>
>
> Not neccessarily.
>
> Suppose honest preferences are
>
> x: A>C>>>B
> y: B>C>>>A,
>
> where x-y is the voter's subjective random variable with estmated mean
> near zero and estimated standard deviation at about 2 percent of x+y.
>
> If that by itself is not enough to make the voter approve C, what if
> less than 51 percent approval for the winner required fallback from
> random approval to random favorite?
I think I see your point. If your preference is A>C>>B and the other
guy's is B>C>>A, then if the other guy gets picked first, then a
favorite-only ballot of yours won't be counted because A intersect {B,C}
is empty.
So perhaps I was being too clever. What I was thinking of was that
equal-rank honestly (regardless of other votes) makes sense if:
- You have dichotomous preferences (Mike Ossipoff's u/a model),
- you have tiered preferences (e.g. these candidates are all excellent,
these candidates are all good, these candidates are all poor), or
- you don't have time to find the exact ordering, e.g. your preferences
are something like A>B>>>>C>>>>>>>>D and you vote A=B>C>D.
I think just random favorite with equal rank would preserve this on the
top end (e.g. preserve equal-rank among the top candidates). That's the
method that picks a random candidate among a random voter's top-voted ones.
But the method is secondary. Are there other reasons to honestly
second-rank? If so, then the mechanism should be adapted to reveal those
as well.
-km
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