[EM] IRV Finisher DSV

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Jun 16 09:36:53 PDT 2022

With Forest's idea, the sense seems to be that the IRV winner can win as long as that
is somewhat reasonable. I.e. that there isn't some eliminated candidate who can defeat
all the final-round support for the IRV winner.

If the IRV winner will be considered below all cutoffs, it looks like we want the IRV
winner to be defeated if at all possible. That doesn't sound good from a monotonicity

That said, I'm not seeing how the two rules give a different treatment of the "Z>X>..."
ballot in that scenario, where X was the IRV winner and Z was the other finalist.


Le mercredi 15 juin 2022, 21:34:38 UTC−5, Andy Dienes <andydienes at gmail.com> a écrit :
> It is an interesting idea but I think it would be more fair if it were like:
> IRV winner X, approval winner Y where X is (exclusive) cutoff on all ballots, then
> pairwise of X and Y wins
> Otherwise, what if the final round of IRV is X and Z, but my preferences happen to be
> Z > X > (everything else), seems like my vote would be mostly ignored.
> On Wed, Jun 15, 2022 at 10:22 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
> > One Approval step determines the winner W after the IRV winner X has been found:
> >
> > The IRV winner X is the approval cutoff on all ballots ... inclusive only on the
> > ballots whose transferred vote went to X on the final IRV round.

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list