[EM] Asset-MMP

[Richard Lung]

That's a rather large assumption that nobody answered because everybody 
could see it was wrong. It doesn't bode well for the rest of your 
reasoning. I am saying there is an isomorphism or one-to-one relation 
between the preference vote and the proportional count, that extends 
from single to multiple winners. Yes, you are reading it incorrectly. 
(It is perhaps a minimum not a maximum condition.) Indeed, my own system 
of binomial STV uses the number of candidates for the ranking number.

As our old school maths teacher used to say: No, no , no, no.... There 
should be no single and multi "components." As I've explained, in 
detail, but by no means completely, they are at odds with each other. An 
example, I didn't mention, in previous post, is "the tail wags the dog 
effect" the small party king-makers, like the Free Democrats in the 
German post-war era, and the likes of New Zealand First, also the 
current New Zealand coalition. The FPTP supporters can argue: Why not 
cut out the middle-man? (Not my argument.)

Ive heard that claim, for 40 to 50 years, that /AMS/MMP can do without 
party lists. The Blake report best losers system was demolished by 
Robert Newland and also Vernon Bogdanor, and never seriously contended 
after-wards. I am not suggesting that is your solution,  but whatever 
your assertion, it fails to meet vote-count consistency, which you 
apparently do not understand, very clever man, tho you and your 
colleagues undoubtedly are.

HG Wells understood it perfectly well in 1916. "The vote" cannot express 
more than a single preference. Unless a preference vote (giving a 
multiple preference) is used, the vote cannot determine more than a 
single majority, and not a multiple majority or proportion.

Regards,

Richard Lung.



On 13/07/2022 21:25, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> On 13.07.2022 20:42, Richard Lung wrote:
>> Kristofer,
>>
>> The short answer is:
>>
>> You can't make a silk purse out of a sows ear.
>>
>> (I have already given you a long answer.)
>>
>> With regard to single members and multi-members, I've already dealt with
>> this relation, in a post called "vote-count consistency" -- which nobody
>> has answered.
> I think that's because it seems clearly wrong, unless I'm reading it
> incorrectly. As I read it, you suggest that an election for k winners
> should accept ranked ballots of exactly k ranks. But that suggestion
> would immediately make every voting method, single- or multi-winner,
> fail independence of clones by being introducing a vulnerability to
> vote-splitting.
>
>> I regard single members as the least democratic and least stable form,
>> much to be avoided, which I wrote about in a post on "the monarchic
>> principle: too much power to one man."
> You said the problems with MMP are its party list component, the
> objections to Plurality as the constituency component, and that it's
> susceptible to manipulation that makes it degrade to parallel voting.
> The variant I proposed has no party list component, can be combined with
> multi-winner methods like STV, and should not degrade to parallel
> voting. Why is it still unsatisfactory?
>
> -km