[EM] Manual Construction of Smith Set
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Thu Jan 27 03:05:34 PST 2022
On 27.01.2022 11:46, Colin Champion wrote:
> I agree with Kristofer and Forest that Smith compliance is easy to
> attain, eg. through Copeland's method. I understood Richard as saying
> that explicit reference to the Smith set in the definition of a voting
> algorithm (eg. Smith/IRV, Smith/Minimax) puts it outside the class of
> methods which most voters can be expected to grasp (and I agree with
> that too).
Right. While I'm not sure it would be too difficult to calculate the
Smith set on stage, it would make the method considerably more complex
than one where Smith compliance happens more naturally.
So "on stage", Smith//IRV may not be a good method. I don't think that
IRV itself would be a good method for on-stage voting, but if you had to
do it then I would imagine either Benham (if you need strategy
resistance) or BTR (otherwise) would be better than Smith//IRV.
As for generally strategy resistant on-stage methods... I don't know,
it's a very tough constraint. UncAAO, perhaps, or something else making
use of implicit approval? I'm not sure. If it's not strategy resistant
then Copeland-elimination is as good as any. But if you need
monotonicity, perhaps minmax?
-km
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