[EM] Strategy-proof vs Monotone

[Daniel Carrera]

So recently I've been posting a lot about using simulations to estimate
which voting systems are most vulnerable or resistant to strategy. That was
certainly interesting. But as Colin pointed out, strategy resistance is not
the only goal. One issue that keeps coming to mind is that, I think..., all
the Condorcet-IRV systems are non-motone. Am I right about that? I think
all (most?) runoff-based methods non-monotone.

So I guess I have two questions:

1) How important do you think monotonicity is? I'm not comfortable with the
idea that you can harm a candidate by ranking him higher, but I would say
the same thing about failing the participation criterion yet all Condorcet
methods fail (for reasons I still don't fully understand).

2) Does anyone know a different class of Condorcet systems that are also
resilient to strategy?

Cheers,
-- 
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
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