[EM] Quick and Clean Burial Resistant Smith, study

[Forest Simmons]

Thanks for the valuable perspective and insights!

El sáb., 8 de ene. de 2022 2:07 p. m., Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
escribió:

> Hi Forest,
>
> Le vendredi 7 janvier 2022, 15:57:27 UTC−6, Forest Simmons <
> forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> a écrit :
> > Very true, and I would have said err on the side of VSE until Robert B-J
> > convinced me that sincere cycles are practically non-existent with an
> occurrence
> > of less than 0.5 percent.
> >
> > He got that statistic from Fair Vote's analysis of over 400 elections,
> and they
> > have no particular reason to exaggerate that statistic. So suppose
> they're
> > right, then do we conclude that any old Condorcet method is as good as
> another?
>
> I would think that I wouldn't trust a study of IRV elections to talk about
> voted
> CWs across all methods, for the same reason I wouldn't trust a study of FPP
> elections to tell me that most elections will have a voted majority
> favorite
> across all methods. The incentives aren't the same.
>
> IRV has no truncation strategy. (In Burlington, we see truncation anyway;
> how
> much more would we see if the method could actually reward truncation?) If
> there
> is usually a *sincere* CW (which I think is likely), then it's easy to
> imagine
> that more complete rankings might lead to finding that CW.
>
> IRV also has among the highest compromise incentive, which I believe
> translates
> directly to nomination disincentive. Meaning, those 400 elections probably
> could have had more candidates nominated under a different method.
> Particularly
> if these were not very viable candidates, I think this could definitely
> lower
> the rate of seeing a voted CW.
>
> If we enact a Condorcet method and find that, indeed, there is almost
> always a
> voted Condorcet winner, I would be inclined to wonder if there is something
> wrong. Because given a couple of assumptions:
>
> 1. Voters feel inclined to truncate the candidates they feel they are
> trying to
> defeat, or that they don't care to worry about for whatever reason.
> 2. Candidates feel free to enter the race even if they can't win, and their
> supporters feel free to vote for them despite this possibility.
>
> Then, this should create an environment where voted cycles are certainly
> possible. In particular, cases where a less viable candidate manages to
> get a
> pairwise win over a more viable candidate, due to considerable abstentions
> of
> voters who either were not interested in that contest, or perceived it as
> unsafe
> to support the lesser evil between the two.
>
> Kevin
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20220108/a5c44051/attachment.html>