[EM] So I got an email... / IIA

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Kristofer,

Le mardi 12 avril 2022, 03:23:18 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> a écrit :
> Do you (or any EM readers) have a name proposal for these methods? I was
> thinking possibly "Top Opposition", because it's about some quality of
> the candidate being evaluated, being compared to some quality of an
> opposing candidate - a candidate who beats the first one pairwise. But
> perhaps that's too hard to understand. Any better ones? :-)

I'm not sure, names like fpA-max(fpC) are more descriptive than we usually get.
It might be hard to top.

To me "opposition" usually suggests that it may not be a pairwise win.

> As for the methods themselves (sum and max): according to Kevin's
> simulations, they're pretty similar. Mine has a lesser compromising
> incentive, his has a lesser burial incentive.

I think the Plurality criterion difference is noteworthy. With "max," at least
one candidate will have a positive score, and any candidate disqualified by
Plurality will have a negative score.

Plurality isn't a strategy criterion, but at least in the example I sent you
there was an appearance that the Plurality-disqualified "sum" winner could have
been using a random fill strategy:

0.327: D
0.322: B>A>C>D
0.186: A
0.164: C

> The reason I constructed
> mine is that (I think?) it's less susceptible to crowding.
> 
> E.g. suppose that A wins (B is the candidate with most first prefs who's
> beating A pairwise), and for C, D is the candidate with most first prefs
> beating him pairwise. We clone D (so that each clone has fewer first
> preferences). Then the penalty term to C's score decreases, which could
> lead C to win. On the other hand, the sum is unaffected because it'll
> just sum the clones' first preferences up no matter how many there are.
> 
> Both are vulnerable to vote-splitting, though, because of the fpA term.

Yes, you seemingly can't get away from Clone-Winner issues with these.

Kevin