[EM] Deterministic Epsilon Consensus Idea stimulated by a question of Steve Bosworth

[Forest Simmons]

Yes, I fully agree on that point; nobody I know likes it when the nurse
asks how much it hurts on a scale of one to ten!

El mié., 6 de oct. de 2021 9:49 p. m., steve bosworth <
stevebosworth at hotmail.com> escribió:

> TO: Forest
> FROM: Steve
>
> Thank you for forcing me to see that no voting method, including MJ, can
> "guarantee" that its winner will be supported by an absolute majority of
> all the ballots cast. MJ guarantees this only if an absolute majority of
> all the ballots cast for at least one candidate have awarded them a grade
> of at least Acceptable. Otherwise, the MJ winner is the candidate who has
> received a plurality of such grades.
>
> In these circumstances, electing this plurality candidate is justified by
> the democratic assumption that other things being equal, a candidate with
> more votes than other candidates is probably more suited for office. For
> the same reason, an absolute majority candidate is probably more suited
> than a winning candidate with less support than a majority.
>
> At the same time, do you disagree with me that compared to voting by using
> marks, numbers, or rankings; grading candidates allows voters more
> meaningfully and informatively to express their qualitative judgments about
> the candidates?
>
> I look forward to our next dialogue.
> Steve
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 6, 2021 7:38 PM
> *To:* steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>
> *Cc:* EM <Election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> *Subject:* Deterministic Epsilon Consensus Idea stimulated by a question
> of Steve Bosworth (was Election-Methods Digest, Vol 207, Issue 9)
>
> Steve's query about Chiastic Approval included the following ....
>
>  Also, correct me if I'm mistaken that XA does not guarantee that its
> winner will be elected with the support of a majority of all the votes
> (ballots) cast.
>
> The short answer is "no" ...  no method can guarantee majority voter
> support for its winner, unless they can guarantee that at least one
> candidate is ranked, rated, scored, or graded above bottom on more than
> half of the ballots submitted.
>
> The long answer is, "Why stop at half or two-thirds, as some methods
> require ... why not go for full 100% consensus?"
>
> But, you may object, full consensus is not always possible. Well, neither
> is forty percent support always possible, but that doesn't stop the
> Constitution from requiring two-thirds of the voters' support for certain
> kinds of amendments, etc.
>
> One expedient that has been suggested is the NOTA option for the case when
> the quota is not met.  This option gives new meaning to the word "approval"
> ... as Mike Ossipoff used to say, you approve a candidate if you would
> rather see her elected than have to come back next month to vote for
> someone else.
>
> I would like to suggest another option based on the standard MJ grade
> ballot ...
>
> Each candidate X gets a score that is given by the sum ..
>
> S(X) = Sum (over j from zero to five) of the product
>
> a(j)*epsilon^j,
>
> where epsilon is a value to be determined by the voters ... and the
> respective values of a(j), for j in {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} are the number of
> ballots on which candidate X is graded strictly above reject, poor,
> acceptable, good, or very good, respectively.
>
> Also each voter has the option of voting for a value of epsilon in the set
> {.01, .02, ... .99, 1.00}. The median of the distribution of these votes
> determines the value of epsilon.
>
> Elect the candidate X with the max value of S(X) (once the epsilon value
> has been determined).
>
> Note that if, for some j, the coefficient a(j) is the total number of
> ballots, then we can say candidate X is a full consensus candidate at level
> j.
>
> If there are several full consensus level j candidates, then the higher
> degree terms will determine the winner.
>
> Thanks!
>
> FWS
>
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