[EM] X-ASM

[Forest Simmons]

Ted,

I'm anxious to see how it does in simulations.

Thanks!

El mié., 6 de oct. de 2021 11:42 a. m., Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com>
escribió:

> X-ASM! I like it.
>
> I'll see if I can modify my ASM code to do X-ASM as well. Should be a
> small change.
>
> On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 4:32 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Steve,
>>
>> Great questions and suggestion!
>>
>> However, in some venues not every voter has the patience to grade
>> potentially dozens if not hundreds of candidates as in past California
>> governor recall elections which were plenty cumbersome with FPTP style
>> ballots (which should have been voted and tallied under Approval rules). In
>> that context many more voters will have enough patience to vote in the
>> final round.
>>
>> In my opinion MJ is a great improvement on most Cardinal Ratings/Score
>> based methods, but the certainty of tied median grades is a drawback
>> despite its signature clever method for resolving such ties.
>>
>> A closely related but more robust method invented by Andy Jennings makes
>> ties vanishingly rare while preserving all of the advantages of MJ
>> including use of familiar, easy to understand grade style ballots with
>> minimal strategic incentive for grade inflation/exaggeration.
>>
>> The voter instructions and other features of the voter interface
>> environment for Jennings' method are identical to those of MJ.
>>
>> The method is called Chiastic Approval  (XA) because of an X shaped (i.e.
>> Chi shaped) graphical interpretation showing how MJ, Approval, and XA are
>> related to the candidates' grade distributions.
>>
>> [Those distributions are discontinuous graphs that stair step down
>> through the six grade levels. A vertical line through the middle of such a
>> graph crosses at the midrange approval cutoff point between acceptable and
>> poor. An horizontal line through the middle of the graph crosses it at the
>> median ... which illustrates the ambiguity of the median, since an
>> horizontal line will either miss the stair stepping graph entirely, or will
>> intersect it along an entire line segment. On the other hand, a diagonal
>> line of unit slope will cross the graph at precisely one point .. at the
>> instant it crosses from below to above the graph. The descending
>> distribution graph and the ascending diagonal line (segment) form the shape
>> of the Greek letter chi.]
>>
>> It is pleasant for election geeks to contemplate such schematic diagrams,
>> but the beauty will be lost on anybody else ... best to save it for those
>> who might appreciate it :-)
>>
>> The algebraic representation will be even more of an imposition ... best
>> to shred any  reference to it except as documentation of the software:
>>
>> The distribution function F whose graph forms the descending staircase
>> alluded to above is defined as follows:
>>
>> F(x) is the percentage of ballots that rate  candidate C greater than or
>> equal to x ... as x increases F(x) decreases.
>>
>> So the chiastic approval of candidate C is the greatest value of x such
>> F(x) is no greater than x.
>>
>> Putting it all together we have ...
>>
>> The chiastic approval for candidate C is the greatest value of x such
>> that x is less than or equal to the percentage of ballots that rate (i.e.
>> grade) candidate C at or above x.
>>
>> I warned you!
>>
>> How many of you understand the Huntingto-Hill method of apportionment?
>> Yet that is the official method for determining how many representatives
>> each state gets in Congress and the Electoral College. And people trust in
>> it unquestioningly just as they implicitly trust the medical pharmaceutical
>> complex.
>>
>> Chiastic Approval is arguably easier to explain than MJ except perhaps at
>> a superficial level that avoids the tie breaking details of MJ.
>>
>> Once you understand the beauty and efficiency of both Chiastic Approval
>> and Approval Sorted Margins it becomes apparent that no Condorcet compliant
>> deterministic social order (single winner order of finish) can surpass
>> XASM,  Chiastic Approval Sorted Margins, IMHO:-)
>>
>> Forest
>>
>> El mar., 5 de oct. de 2021 11:33 a. m., steve bosworth <
>> stevebosworth at hotmail.com> escribió:
>>
>>>
>>> Today's Topics: Replacing Top Two primaries
>>>
>>> From: Steve Bosworth
>>> TO: Kevin Venzke
>>>
>>> Kevin Venzke wants to replace Top Two Primaries.
>>>
>>> Could not the objections to top two primaries be optimally satisfied by
>>> removing such primaries altogether, and instead electing the winner in the
>>> general election by using Majority Judgment (MJ)?  Regardless of the
>>> number of candidates, MJ guarantees that the winner has received the
>>> highest median grade from at least 50% plus 1 of all the ballots cast. As
>>> you know, MJ invites each voter to judge the suitability for office of
>>> at least one of the candidates as either Excellent (*ideal*), Very
>>> Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (*entirely unsuitable*). Voters
>>> may give the same grade to any number of candidates. Each candidate who is
>>> not explicitly graded is counted as a ‘Reject’ by that voter. As a result,
>>> all candidates have the same number of evaluations but a different set of
>>> grades awarded from all voters. The MJ winner is the one who receives an
>>> absolute majority of all the grades equal to, or higher than, the highest *median
>>> grade* given to any candidate. This median grade can be found as
>>> follows:
>>>
>>>    1.
>>>
>>>    Place all the grades given to each candidate, high to low, left to
>>>    right in a row, with the name of each candidate on the left of each row.
>>>    2.
>>>
>>>    The median grade for each candidate is in the middle of each row.
>>>    Specifically, the middle grade for an odd number of voters, or the grade on
>>>    the right in the middle for an even number of voters.
>>>    3.
>>>
>>>    The winner is the candidate with the highest median grade. If more
>>>    than one candidate has the same highest median grade, remove the current
>>>    median grade from each tied candidate and start again at step 1 with those
>>>    tied candidates.
>>>
>>>    4. What do you think?
>>>    5. Steve Bosworth (stevebosworth at hotmail.com
>>>
>>>
>>> ----
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>>> info
>>>
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>
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