[EM] Fwd: agenda landau winner
km_elmet at t-online.de
Wed Jul 28 13:13:06 PDT 2021
On 28.07.2021 21:28, Susan Simmons wrote:
> We work from an agenda of alternatives listed in order of “promise.” The
> agenda is “monotone” if increasing ballot support for an alternative
> moves it towards the promising end of the agenda without altering the
> relative order of the other candidates in the list.
Of note here is that this monotone agenda criterion (strong mono-raise?)
is much stronger than ordinary mono-raise. For instance, Plurality fails
it but passes ordinary mono-raise.
Also: I don't think the relation above is iff; there are looser criteria
that, if met, guarantee monotonicity of the agenda method. For instance,
if the winner W is raised, then the property only has to hold for
candidates ranked below the winner on the agenda, because (by assumption
that W was the original winner), W covers everybody ranked higher.
When the agenda method is Smith rather than Landau, I think an even
looser criterion can be phrased in the term of beatpaths, or in that
raising A should not swap the position of any pair of candidates B and C
ranked below A where B beats A pairwise and C is beaten pairwise by A.
These looser criteria are much harder to reason about, though.
And finding a burial immune strong mono-raise compliant method would be
very nice :-)
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