[EM] Manipulation Resistant Voting

[robert bristow-johnson]

> On 07/17/2021 5:12 PM Susan Simmons <suzerainsimmons at outlook.com> wrote:
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> ...
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> The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem states roughly that every deterministic voting rule is manipulable, except possibly in two cases: if there is a distinguished voter who has a dictatorial power, or if the rule limits the possible outcomes to two options only.
> 
> 

Could someone demonstrate here how, well outside a cycle, an insincere vote can bring in a tactical advantage with a Condorcet rule?

Say when would it be advantageous to bump your Number 2 to Number 1?  Or when would it be advantageous to bury your Number 2?

And without going anywhere near a cycle.

--

r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

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