[EM] RCV Challenge

[Forest Simmons]

I agree with Kristofer .... as he said, "... we only get one shot ..."

So why take any unnecessary chances?

And truly the risk is unnecessary, because there are many perfectly good
manipulation resistant methods that are uniformly better and much simpler
than the 2nd rate kluges that, out of ignorance, are routinely proposed.

We need to educate the teachable, while advocating only for the best
possible methods.

Let the reactionary pooh-bahs defend their pet recycled 2nd rate methods
... leave to them the opportunity to reveal their own ignorance and
arrogant disregard for what we has been learned in the last 25 years
(thanks to Rob Lanphier's cultivation of nitty-gritty election science) ...
about election methods in general and Condorcet methods in particular.

El mar., 28 de dic. de 2021 1:55 a. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at t-online.de> escribió:

> On 28.12.2021 06:56, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Robert,
> >
> > You wrote ...
> >
> > "I'm just a Condorcet guy.  How cycles get resolved is less motivating
> > to me than insuring that the Condorcet winner is always elected"
> >
> > But "how cycles get resolved" has a big influence on whether or not they
> > come into existence.  And when these cycles are created, the sincere
> > Condorcet Winner goes out the window ... no longer showing up as a
> > "beats-all" candidate on the ballot set. Can the cycle resolution method
> > reconstruct the lost CW? All bets are off.
> >
> > The easier it is to game the cycle resolution method, the more incentive
> > for the gamers to create the cycles.
> >
> > It seems that most Condorcet cycles are artificially created.
> >
> > For example, one way to create a cycle is by an insincere rank reversal
> > technique called "burial".
> >
> > If the cycle resolution method has no built in disincentive/negative
> > feedback for this (or any other) kind of cycle creation, over time the
> > gamers find out that they can manipulate elections to their advantage
> > with impunity, so that artificially created cycles become more and more
> > common, giving the false impression that cycles are a normal fact of
> nature.
>
> There's still a question of just how much coordinated strategy will
> happen. If the voters are mostly honest, then insisting on strategic
> resistance will only be giving up honest performance for nothing
> important in return. On the other hand, something like Borda obviously
> collapses because it can't handle *any* kind of strategy.
>
> I suspect that the initial amount of strategy depends on the voters -
> that some voters are more inclined to strategize than others. Probably
> voters who are used to FPTP would be more strategically inclined,
> although I don't have any proof of this (it just seems intuitive). But
> Debian used Schulze however many years without having any trouble with
> burial (that they could detect, at least), and most places that use STV
> nowadays don't seem to have much of a problem with vote management even
> though it was pretty common in New York and some Canadian elections that
> used to use STV.
>
> In the face of this uncertainty, it's reasonable to want to have a
> method that resists strategy well so that it doesn't get repealed after
> a disastrous result. But that doesn't mean that it's strictly necessary
> - only that we can't tell if it is, and we only get one shot.
>
> -km
>
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