[EM] RCV Challenge
rbj at audioimagination.com
Mon Dec 27 19:35:34 PST 2021
> On 12/26/2021 1:38 PM Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:
> Le samedi 25 décembre 2021, 21:06:28 UTC−6, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com> a écrit :
> > If there are conditions that can make a candidate a spoiler, can't that be used in
> > some way to swing the election?
> Yes, I think by definition.
> > I mean, it depends on what you call "gaming" an election.
> So the voter tells the method what he wants, and the method should represent his
> interests. In theory the voter then doesn't need to misrepresent preferences by
> prematurely compromising.
> Burlington looks much the same to me. ... you could call it
> "gaming" on their part, but any Condorcet advocate will sooner argue that they
> shouldn't need to do this, that the result they gain from strategizing in this
> IRV election is actually what they are entitled to naturally.
Kevin, I **totally** agree.
I'm just a Condorcet guy. How cycles get resolved is less motivating to me than insuring that the Condorcet winner is always elected. (And the simplest legislative language that accomplishes that goal is usually what I advocate.)
BTW, my little RCV paper about Burlington 2009 has been getting more developed. Now with figures in color sorta spelling out the Center Squeeze effect.
I hope some of you guys might take a look at it, if you hadn't before.
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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