[EM] RCV Challenge
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sat Dec 25 00:05:10 PST 2021
Le samedi 25 décembre 2021, 00:29:30 UTC−6, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com> a écrit :
> I'm just a Condorcet guy. Everyone's vote counts the same. If a simple majority
> of voters agree that A is preferred to B, then when at all possible, B is not
> elected. After that add whatever contingency you think best for the case of a
> cycle. I, personally, believe that cycles will be very rare and perhaps the
> simplest process in lieu of a Condorcet winner would be the plurality winner of
> first-preference votes. I know everyone will say that's the worst, most gameable
> Condorcet "completion process", but I think in a government election that the
> rules should be well known and well understood.
In the three-candidate case Condorcet//FPP should be the same thing as BTR-IRV,
except with greater clarity, as you point out, about how the method will play out
in general. I value that a lot.
It won't be my own favorite method, just because my main interest is in reducing
compromise incentive (or: minimizing the appearance that some candidate was a
The question of how gameable it is, vs. certain other methods, is interesting.
I'll leave it for now. But it didn't occur to me to think it was the worst or
most gameable rule.
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