[EM] Revised: Instant Pairwise Elimination (IPE)
VoteFair
electionmethods at votefair.org
Mon Jan 13 16:03:06 PST 2020
On 1/13/2020 7:56 AM, C.Benham wrote:
> I missed the earlier discussion on this.
> ...
> And what exactly is a "pairwise-losing candidate"?
My apologies. For brevity I omitted the first paragraph of the
description, which is here:
"Instant Pairwise Elimination (IPE) eliminates one candidate at a time.
During each elimination round the candidate who loses every pairwise
contest against every other not-yet-eliminated candidate is eliminated.
The last remaining candidate wins."
Hopefully now the second paragraph will make sense:
"If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate, then the
method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition
count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of
not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and
adding those numbers across all the ballots. If there is a tie for the
largest pairwise opposition count, the method eliminates the candidate
with the smallest pairwise support count, which similarly counts support
rather than opposition. If there is also a tie for the smallest pairwise
support count, then those candidates are tied and all those tied
candidates are eliminated in the same elimination round."
> Just curious.
Curiosity is what led me to election-method reform. Thanks for asking.
Richard Fobes
On 1/13/2020 7:56 AM, C.Benham wrote:
> I missed the earlier discussion on this.
>
> So what if an elimination round /does /have a "pairwise-losing
> candidate", what then?
>
> And what exactly is a "pairwise-losing candidate"?
>
> Just curious.
>
> Chris Benham
>
> On 13/01/2020 12:14 pm, VoteFair wrote:
>> Based on a suggestion from a user on Reddit, I have revised the
>> definition of the Instant Pairwise Elimination method that previously
>> I published at Democracy Chronicles and then discussed here.
>>
>> The method still successively eliminates pairwise (Condorcet) losers.
>>
>> Now, instead of resolving Condorcet (rock-paper-scissors) cycles using
>> an "upside-down" version of instant-runoff voting (IRV), it uses
>> pairwise counts as described here:
>>
>> "If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate, then the
>> method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition
>> count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of
>> not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and
>> adding those numbers across all the ballots. If there is a tie for the
>> largest pairwise opposition count, the method eliminates the candidate
>> with the smallest pairwise support count, which similarly counts
>> support rather than opposition. If there is also a tie for the
>> smallest pairwise support count, then those candidates are tied and
>> all those tied candidates are eliminated in the same elimination round."
>>
>> Below are my guesses for which fairness criteria it fails and passes.
>> Please tell me which guesses are not correct.
>>
>> Condorcet: fail
>> Condorcet loser: pass
>> Ranks equal: pass
>> Ranks greater than 2: pass
>> Polytime: pass
>> Resolvable: pass
>> Majority: fail
>> Majority loser: fail
>> Mutual majority: fail
>> Smith/ISDA: fail
>> LIIA: fail
>> IIA: fail
>> Cloneproof: fail
>> Monotone: fail
>> Consistency: fail
>> Reversal symmetry: fail
>> Later no harm: fail
>> Later no help: fail
>> Burying: fail
>> Participation: fail ?
>> No favorite betrayal: fail ?
>> Summable: O(N!) ?
>>
>> As I've said many times, it's the frequency with which the failures
>> occur that is much, much more important than simply counting how many
>> criteria it fails. I suspect that its frequencies of failure will be
>> quite low compared to most other single-winner methods, and may
>> approach the low frequencies that I believe characterize the
>> Condorcet-Kemeny method.
>>
>> I've created a page for this method on Electowiki. You are welcome to
>> edit that page with any corrections.
>>
>> BTW, I realize that it's possible that the alternate elimination
>> method always identifies the pairwise/Condorcet loser (if there is
>> one). If so, this would mean that the description could be
>> "simplified" to a single step (actually two steps in case there is a
>> tie). However, for the benefit of most voters who are not comfortable
>> with mathematics it's important to explicitly state that the first
>> priority is to eliminate the pairwise loser.
>>
>> Of course software that implements the method would do the
>> calculations using a much faster method than the counting method
>> described above. The description above is written to be understandable
>> to people who are not already familiar with pairwise counting.
>>
>> In advance, thank you for any feedback.
>>
>> Richard Fobes
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