[EM] Arrow's theorem and cardinal voting systems

[robert bristow-johnson]

> On January 9, 2020 11:12 PM Faran, James <jjfaran at buffalo.edu> wrote:
> 
>  
> About Score voting failing Unrestricted Domain:
> 
> Part of the confusion of those advocating score and you is not a confusion on anyone's part, but rather a difference in what each considers a preference.  (It's not possible to have a good reasoned argument until both sides agree on what the words mean.)  Score voters would say
> 
> A:100; B:95; C:0
> 
> and
> 
> A:100; B:5; C:0
> 
> are different preferences, but you seem to say that these are both A>B>C and so are the same.  I would say the Electowiki page on Unrestricted Domain needs to be edited to include both possibilities, but I can't be bothered.
> 
> You also seem to think that most voters would not be able to understand that sort of nuance.  You may be right there, especially in today's political climate (especially in the United States?), where there are two sides and the other side is always demonized.
> 
> Note that any new voting system will almost always try to be replaced by the loser under the new system.  ("The current government is illegitimate!  If it wasn't for the biased voting system we would have won!" -- cf. the recently revived call for the elimination of the U. S. Electoral College after Mr. Trump won with a minority of the popular vote.)  If the winner can't keep support, the losing side will be able to push through a change.
> 
> However, a question:  If we had the following score ballots:
> 
> 9000:  A:100; B:95; C:0
> 1000:  B:100; C:85; A:0
> 
> giving A a score of 900,000 and B a score of 955,000, hence a victory for B, would there really be enough antipathy to B to cause outrage?  All the A voters seemed to think B was pretty good.  Of course (see above), the losing side could always complain.  Anyone wedded to Condorcet winners would be outraged.  And, of course, no real world election would end up like this.  Score may be a little too ripe for manipulation.  Gibbard-Satterthwaite, anyone?
>

words have meaning.  "preference" without a quantitative adjective is Ranked ballot.

"strong preference" vs. "weak preference" implies a Score ballot.

my question that i have asked the Score Voting or Approval Voting advocates years ago remains: "How much should I score my second choice?"  or "Should I approve my second choice or not?"  that tactical question faces the voter in a Score or Approval election the second he/she steps into the voting booth.  but not so for the ordinal Ranked ballot.

--
 
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
 
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."