[EM] Best Ranked Preference Deterministic Method?

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Tue Dec 22 18:21:22 PST 2020

I'm not familiar with Stensholt, but here's my attempted proof of

Raise the winner W on ballot B. Then W pairwise beats or ties a superset of
the same candidates as before, so its score does not decrease.

Suppose some other candidate W' increases it's score without W also
increasing its score. This can only happen if W (by moving to top) becomes
the only top ranked candidate on B that does not beat W' and is not itself
beaten by every other top ranked candidate on B ...

I suppose that is possible ...

Is there a simple fix?

On Tuesday, December 22, 2020, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>

> On 22/12/2020 22.01, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Elect the alternative that on the greatest number of ballets ballots,
> > pairwise beats or ties the top choice.
> Isn't that Stensholt's BPW? And isn't BPW nonmonotone?
> (I'm not sure what you mean by "top choice" if it isn't the Plurality
> winner.)
> -km
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