[EM] majority tyranny (was proof idea for non-summability of STV)

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Mon Dec 7 12:52:00 PST 2020

On 04/12/2020 02.25, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>> On 12/03/2020 7:57 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>> An insight of Jobst Heitzig has made a big difference in my 
>> thinking about this topic ... namely that all of the supposedly
>> democratic deterministic consensus-building techniques must (in
>> order to guarantee reaching a full formal consensus compromise in
>> every case) sometimes resort to some kind of more or less subtle
>> group pressuring of some participants.
>> Once this insight gets lodged in the brain of someone who is
>> categorically opposed to coercion, compulsion, or abuse of
>> conscience in any form, in any degree, such a person must wonder if
>> there exist non-deterministic, abuse-free methods for achieving
>> consensus.
>> To Jobst we also owe the insight that in the context of "lottery
>> methods" a non-coercive, proportionately fair, full consensus solution
>> always does exist!
> but it's not repeatable, if it's truly a random lottery selection.
> if you were to base any random numbers (to make a decision) on a
> PRNG (that's repeatable), then it's not really random.  you will know
> in advance which candidate is getting picked.

You can make a random election repeatable by first recording the
entropy, then doing the count, then once everybody is satisfied that the
deterministic numbers are correct, only *then* reveal the entropy (and
seed a PRNG with it or something).

You can even get this entropy without explicit use of randomness by
cryptographic means. E.g. ask a group of people to submit a number of
(arbitrary) quotes, record them in sealed envelopes, then once the
deterministic variables are set, hash the quotes together and use the
hash as a PRNG seed.

The only difficulty relies in keeping the entropy secret until the count
is done.

Alternatively, you could allow for recounts after the entropy has been
unveiled, but then the recount has to be scrutinized more closely;
otherwise the different factions could try to only do recounts where it
would change the (now determinized) decision procedure in their favor.

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