[EM] Proof idea that IRV can't be summable

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Dec 3 10:04:40 PST 2020

Le jeudi 3 décembre 2020 à 04:20:54 UTC−6, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> a écrit : 
>If told to create something democratic without concern to current
>constraints, I'd probably just skip right to sortition. This would not
>just invalidate single-winner methods, but voting altogether; except,
>possibly, the method the assembly itself uses to decide.

In this exchange "democratic" must mean that the assembly's seats are allocated proportionally. This leaves the issue of allocation of actual policy-making power as you suggest.

Maybe there is a way to determine policy proportionally, and without using randomness. I don't think it can be based on decay of individual delegates' voting power (because if you use your power sub-optimally you may fail to influence policy) or on how many things you vote on (because proposals could be clones of each other etc.). So it might have to be based on time... A faction gets an amount of time in power.

But realistically there is probably a minimum faction size you would want to allow to wield power. And to prevent whiplash you'd probably want a minimum amount of time that a faction could be in power. Could a faction representing 25% of the voters be allowed to set policy for even a year? If not, can we defend that without invoking the principle of majority rule? (I doubt it... And for me that is always the limitation, that no matter what, you have to implement majority rule somewhere in the process.)


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