[EM] Condorcet Enhancement

Magosányi Árpád m4gw4s at gmail.com
Sun May 19 23:57:22 PDT 2019

I would add Modified D21 to the list.
D21 is genially simplifies the ballot for human use compared to
preferential voting. The voters give (partial) preferences, which can be
evaluated using Condorcet. (I have found at least one inconsistency and
one factual error about the evaluation method in the D21 paper. While I
think the method is actually better than Majority (not a big feat in
itself), that undermines the claims of the paper significantly.)

What does "Chicken Resistant" mean? Google failed to give me any
relevant results.

On 5/20/19 12:10 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> There are various ways to enhance a given method to make it Condorcet
> compliant:
> 1.  One can elect the ballot CW if there is one, and otherwise fall
> back on the given method.
> 2. One can apply the given method to the Smith set.
> 3. One can use the given method winner as the starting point in a
> seamless process that leads to a member of the Smith Set (or better).
> Here is such a process:
> First, create a directed graph whose vertices are the candidate names
> as follows:
> For each covered candidate X, draw an arrow to that candidate Y (among
> those that cover X) which is ranked or rated strictly below X on the
> fewest number of ballots.
> To enhance the winner A of any method, start at candidate A and follow
> the arrows as far as possible in the directed graph.  The enhanced
> winner W' is the one at the end of the directed path.
> This W' covers W, but is itself uncovered (a member of the Landau
> Set), and so also a member of Smith.
> If the original method elects monotonically, then so does the enhanced
> method.
> If the original method satisfies the FBC or in any case lacks
> vulnerability to compromise, then the enhanced method gives little
> incentive for burying Favorite because when there is an arrow from
> Favorite to Y, candidate Y is already the natural compromise candidate
> for the supporters of Favorite, the one that is rated strictly below
> Favorite on the fewest ballots among those that cover Favorite.
> Suggestions:
> A.  Enhanced Approval.
> B.  Enhanced Majority Judgment
> C.  Enhanced Random Ballot
> D.  Enhanced Asset Voting (different possible versions)
> E.   Enhanced Chiastic Approval
> Other versions?
> If method M is Chicken Resistant, does it follow that the Enhanced
> version of Method M also Chicken Resistant?
> Other thoughts?
> ----
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