[EM] Improvement on Jobst's Chain climbing method
Richard Lung
voting at ukscientists.com
Tue Mar 5 10:43:34 PST 2019
More than anyone could possibly want to know about the terminology in
question is found in my (Smashwords or Amazon kdp) book -- FAB STV: Four
Averages Binomial Single Transferable Vote.
from Richard Lung.
On 04/03/2019 21:56, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Greetings again EM list friends:
>
>
> I appreciate the response from Toby, P., Chris B., R. Lung, Kevin V.
> and Jobst H.
>
>
> All of your observations are very close to my own thoughts, and I
> heartily agree with them all, except perhaps from Richard Lung who
> used some terminology with which I am unfamiliar. [I do not doubt its
> value, but I am not qualified to judge.]
>
>
> Unfortunately, a rather subtle effect destroys mono-raise winner.There
> is no problem if the only improvement in status of the winner is from
> increased approval.But when the winner W adds another pairwise defeat
> (say candidate W over candidate X) this X may newly qualify for a
> position at the bottom of the chain, thus preventing some candidate Y
> lower down the approval list from occupying that bottom chain position
> any more, thus removing the only impassable obstacle from the rise of
> (even lower approval) candidate Z to the very top of the chain,
> thereby electing Z instead of W.
>
>
> Right now I do not see any way around this, so chain climbing (taught
> to us by Jobst) is the only monotone Banks method that I know of.
>
> Sorry to get your hopes up in vain.For me trying to improve on chain
> climbing is a kind of isometric exercise;by straining against a hard,
> perhaps impossible problem, you get stronger (if it does not kill you).
>
>
> And Chris is right; the idea for the covering chain method that starts
> at the top of the approval order and works its way down was inspired
> by my attempts at finding a monotone Banks method.I do not have the
> time here to tell you about some of the other spinoff from these attempts.
>
>
> Thanks Guys,
>
>
> Forest
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 2, 2019 at 1:20 PM Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu
> <mailto:fsimmons at pcc.edu>> wrote:
>
> A few years back Jobst suggested "chain climbing" as a seamless,
> Condorcet compliant way of selecting an alternative from a given
> ordered list.
>
> For example electing a winner from a list of candidates c1, c2,
> ... given in decreasing order of approval.
>
> Chain Climbing initializes a chain of candidates with the last
> (least approved in this case) candidate in the list. Then moving
> up the list each successive candidate "climbs the chain" as far it
> can before being bumped off by a chain member that defeats it. If
> it makes it all of the way to the top, it is added to the top of
> the chain.
>
> The candidate who ends up at the top of the chain is elected.
>
> Since a beats all candidate will never be defeated, the method is
> Condorcet compliant. It also turns out to be clone resistant and
> monotonic.
>
> Another nice property is that it always selects from the Banks
> set, a nice game theoretic subset set of the set of uncovered
> candidates.
>
> The biggest objection to this method is that when applied to a
> list a list where c1 beats c2 beats c3, and c3 beats c1, it elects
> c2.
>
> Here's my proposed improvement:
>
> Initialize the chain with c1. Move down the list instead of up.
> For each successive candidate x (as we move down the list) if
> possible, insert that candidate into the chain at a point where it
> is beaten by every candidate above it and is not defeated by any
> candidate below it. If not possible, discard it.
>
> After going through the entire list (top to bottom) inserting new
> candidates where possible into the totally ordered chain, we end
> up with a maximal totally ordered chain of candidates (ordered by
> pairwise defeat) The candidate at the top fo the completed chain
> (the one who is not defeated by any of the others) is elected.
>
> It is easy to show that this method has all of the nice properties
> of chain climbing, but retains more of the spirit of the original
> list..
>
> For example in the A>B>C example above it elects A.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Forest
>
>
>
>
> ----
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