[EM] Condorcet/Score

[Magosányi Árpád]

I am thinking about similar lines. The preferential voting methods
undoubtedly have a presentation problem: it is hard to sort a lot of
candidates, especially on paper.
Cumulative/approval voting is easily presented, and can be used to give
preferences (at least partially).
I would throw the following into the mix however:
- to avoid the effect tht rage voting reduces to plural voting when voters
vote fully tactically (I know, that IRL they do not. not all, and not yet),
I would use cumulative vote
- to handle not just the positive preferences, but also the negative ones,
I would allow for negative votes.

So the ballot would look like:

Please distribute at most 6 marks at likes, and at most 1 mark at dislike..
likes  candidate   dislike
OOO candidate 1 O
OOO candidate 2 O
OOO candidate 3 O
...

the overall number of likes would be sum(1 to n) where n is the max likes
per one candidate, and n < number of candidates.
number of dislikes would be similar, with n << number of candidates,
probably only one.

This would be useable o reconstruct a partial preference. My suspicion is
that psychology could prove that what someone actually knows for sure (if
anything) is whom they prefer most and whom they dislike most), so not much
information actually lost.
Using the preferences, a Condorcet method can be run.



Curt <accounts at museworld.com> ezt írta (időpont: 2019. jan. 4., P, 20:47):

>
> Hi, I was wondering what you all thought of the following reasoning.
>
> 1) Start with the assumption that for a single-winner election, if one
> candidate would defeat all others head-to-head, that candidate must be the
> winner. This requires the method to be Condorcet-compliant, and, I believe,
> disregards the later-no-harm criterion.
>
> 2) Acknowledge the “one-person one-vote” principle that means that if, in
> a two-candidate election, candidate A has 50 votes and candidate B has 49
> votes, then candidate A *must* win, even if B’s voters are wildly more
> enthusiastic.
>
> 3) Acknowledge that score or range voting *does* have an advantage in
> recognizing overall utility society when taking into account voter
> enthusiasm - *if* the enthusiasm is scored/recorded honestly.
>
> 4) Acknowledge the occasional (and probably rare) phenomenon of A->B->C->A
> loops in Condorcet-style voting, which must be resolved somehow.
>
> 5) Accept that the presence of such loops is not a “bug”, but instead the
> measurement of some level of indecisiveness among the electorate, such that
> further voter data is required.
>
> And end up with the following:
>
> 1) Present the ballots as score/range ballots
> 2) When tabulating, use the scores/ranges to deduce an ordinal
> (ranked-choice) ranking for each ballot, ignoring the scores/ranges
> otherwise
> 3) Use the rankings to determine if there is a Condorcet Winner. If so,
> STOP HERE. This makes the voting method Condorcet-Compliant.
> 4) If not, determine the Smith Set
> 5) Use the scores/ranges to determine the winner from within the Smith
> Set. This makes the method Smith-compliant.
>
> I am not well-versed in voting criteria, but it seems to me this bypasses
> the worst criticisms of score/range voting, while also taking in account
> some of their advantage. While score/range voting is susceptible to
> strategic voting, there should be little incentive for a voter to
> strategically adjust their scores *to the point of changing their ordinal
> ranking*, due to the emphasis on finding the Condorcet Winner first. And so
> then, since people will be scoring/rating relatively honestly, greater
> social utility is met in the case where there is not a Condorcet Winner.
> Finally, we know that the winner is (ordinally) preferred over all other
> candidates outside of the Smith Set, making it Smith-compliant.
> Score/Range/Star voting are not Condorcet-compliant (nor Smith-compliant, I
> think), but this voting method is.
>
> I conjecture that if scores/rankings were measured for all other Condorcet
> methods (and then similarly ignored to deduce ordinal rankings), this
> method would offer greater social utility as measured by the scores, by
> definition. And, I believe this is superior to pure range/score/star voting
> *when* starting with the axiom that the voting method must be
> Condorcet-compliant.
>
> Thanks,
> Curt
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20190105/655e9fcb/attachment.html>