From rbj at audioimagination.com Mon Dec 2 22:00:58 2019 From: rbj at audioimagination.com (robert bristow-johnson) Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2019 01:00:58 -0500 (EST) Subject: [EM] testing... 1,2,3 Message-ID: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> ... does this thing work? 'cuz i got news from Burlington Vermont regarding ranked-choice voting (after all we went through a decade ago) and i might could use a little bit of help. -- r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." From km_elmet at t-online.de Tue Dec 3 01:03:43 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2019 10:03:43 +0100 Subject: [EM] testing... 1,2,3 In-Reply-To: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> On 03/12/2019 07.00, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > ... does this thing work? > > 'cuz i got news from Burlington Vermont regarding ranked-choice voting (after all we went through a decade ago) and i might could use a little bit of help. Yes, it does work. I've just been busy with non-voting things (as well as finding out how to design voting methods with desired properties). What are the news from Burlington? -km From rbj at audioimagination.com Tue Dec 3 07:54:47 2019 From: rbj at audioimagination.com (robert bristow-johnson) Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2019 10:54:47 -0500 (EST) Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> Message-ID: <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> > On December 3, 2019 4:03 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > > > On 03/12/2019 07.00, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > > > i got news from Burlington Vermont regarding ranked-choice voting (after all we went through a decade ago) and i might could use a little bit of help. > > > What are the news from Burlington? > okay, Burlington is pretty liberal. While there is one Republican in City Council (who also happens to preside over the council and even more coincidently was the Republican candidate for mayor in the 2009 IRV election, gathering the most 1st-choice votes but losing to the Prog candidate in IRV) the Progs in City Council have reintroduced a Charter Change resolution to return to IRV, now they are calling it "RCV" but it is the same Single Transferable Vote procedure used in RCV elections everywhere. The language of the Charter Change is posted below. But there was a little pushback from other councilors (and myself) for Burlington to not repeat mistakes from the past, namely that of electing a candidate other than the clearly shown Condorcet Winner. This is all in a hurry. In two weeks Council will make the decision whether or not to include the question to the ballot for Town Meeting Day in March 2020. On Monday Dec 9th, the Charter Change Committee will consider the language of the bill and vote on what shall be brought to the whole Council to include on the ballot. I want to figure out some good language to change this from regular-old IRV to Bottom-Two Runoff, Single Transferable Vote, BTR-STV . If someone is good at writing legal language or if this BTR-STV has had legislative language written for it somewhere else, I would like to see it. The language that needs to be changed, to make this RCV Condorcet-compliant is: "... The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated ..." How can we clearly and concisely change that to Bottom-Two Runoff? -- r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. From km_elmet at t-online.de Tue Dec 3 12:44:40 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2019 21:44:40 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> Message-ID: On 03/12/2019 16.54, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > >> On December 3, 2019 4:03 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> >> >> On 03/12/2019 07.00, robert bristow-johnson wrote: >>> >>> i got news from Burlington Vermont regarding ranked-choice voting (after all we went through a decade ago) and i might could use a little bit of help. >> >> >> What are the news from Burlington? >> > > okay, Burlington is pretty liberal. While there is one Republican in City Council (who also happens to preside over the council and even more coincidently was the Republican candidate for mayor in the 2009 IRV election, gathering the most 1st-choice votes but losing to the Prog candidate in IRV) the Progs in City Council have reintroduced a Charter Change resolution to return to IRV, now they are calling it "RCV" but it is the same Single Transferable Vote procedure used in RCV elections everywhere. The language of the Charter Change is posted below. > > But there was a little pushback from other councilors (and myself) for Burlington to not repeat mistakes from the past, namely that of electing a candidate other than the clearly shown Condorcet Winner. > > This is all in a hurry. In two weeks Council will make the decision whether or not to include the question to the ballot for Town Meeting Day in March 2020. On Monday Dec 9th, the Charter Change Committee will consider the language of the bill and vote on what shall be brought to the whole Council to include on the ballot. > > I want to figure out some good language to change this from regular-old IRV to Bottom-Two Runoff, Single Transferable Vote, BTR-STV . If someone is good at writing legal language or if this BTR-STV has had legislative language written for it somewhere else, I would like to see it. > > The language that needs to be changed, to make this RCV Condorcet-compliant is: > > "... The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated ..." > > How can we clearly and concisely change that to Bottom-Two Runoff? My first stab would be: "After each round, of the two candidates with the fewest votes, the candidate ranked below the other by the most voters shall be eliminated". Alternatively "on the most ballots". Or "among the two candidates". Or "of the two candidates with the fewest votes in that round". Presumably there has to be some tie-breaking language for the case where more than one candidate is last or next-to-last. But I suppose there is some similar language for IRV as is. If there is no equal-rank or truncation, you can also say "the candidate ranked below the other by a majority of the voters". The strategy to turn IRV into BTR-IRV is probably the best one. Woodall is better than BTR-IRV, and you could turn the method into Woodall by checking for a CW before a round starts, but then you'd have to define what a CW means in a way that doesn't confuse people who are unfamiliar with Condorcet. Looking again at the language, point (3) is already rather convoluted. Perhaps it would be better to split up the definition. Something like: (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and subsidiarily to determine what candidate to eliminate. After each round, the two candidates with the fewest votes shall be considered for elimination. Of these two candidates, the candidate ranked below the other by the most voters shall be eliminated in that round. The counting in rounds shall continue until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. (Maybe also call it something else than "instant runoff re-tabulation" because it's no longer IRV, but I can't think of a better name at the moment.) I'm much less certain about Woodall. See below for something I cooked up. (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds, for which the counting shall be conducted according to the following three points. (4) If there exists a continuing candidate so that for every other continuing candidate, the former candidate is ranked ahead of the latter by a majority of the voters, the former candidate is elected. (5) If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated, which marks the end of the current round and the beginning of the next. (6) The counting in rounds shall continue until a candidate is elected or only one candidate remains, with the remaining candidate then being elected. (7) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. (Strictly speaking, the latter half of point 6 is redundant because when only two candidates remain, the winner beats the loser pairwise and would be elected by point 4. But a potentially infinite loop looks more dangerous than a finite one.) I haven't written legislative language before, but maybe it can serve as a starting point for others who have. -km From juho.laatu at gmail.com Tue Dec 3 14:13:02 2019 From: juho.laatu at gmail.com (Juho Laatu) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 00:13:02 +0200 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> My simple thoughts on this: - You ask: Do you agree that in problematic situations, like what happened in 2009, the result should be different? - They answer: Yes. - You say: This is a problem that is fortunately quite easily to fix. The most straight forward way to enhance the method is to use the Bottom-Two Runoff. The losing candidate one of the two candidates with least votes will be eliminated. - They say: Ok, let's see if that would be our ideal solution. - You say: Ok, let's start from there. BR, Juho > On 03 Dec 2019, at 17:54, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > > >> On December 3, 2019 4:03 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> >> >> On 03/12/2019 07.00, robert bristow-johnson wrote: >>> >>> i got news from Burlington Vermont regarding ranked-choice voting (after all we went through a decade ago) and i might could use a little bit of help. >> >> >> What are the news from Burlington? >> > > okay, Burlington is pretty liberal. While there is one Republican in City Council (who also happens to preside over the council and even more coincidently was the Republican candidate for mayor in the 2009 IRV election, gathering the most 1st-choice votes but losing to the Prog candidate in IRV) the Progs in City Council have reintroduced a Charter Change resolution to return to IRV, now they are calling it "RCV" but it is the same Single Transferable Vote procedure used in RCV elections everywhere. The language of the Charter Change is posted below. > > But there was a little pushback from other councilors (and myself) for Burlington to not repeat mistakes from the past, namely that of electing a candidate other than the clearly shown Condorcet Winner. > > This is all in a hurry. In two weeks Council will make the decision whether or not to include the question to the ballot for Town Meeting Day in March 2020. On Monday Dec 9th, the Charter Change Committee will consider the language of the bill and vote on what shall be brought to the whole Council to include on the ballot. > > I want to figure out some good language to change this from regular-old IRV to Bottom-Two Runoff, Single Transferable Vote, BTR-STV . If someone is good at writing legal language or if this BTR-STV has had legislative language written for it somewhere else, I would like to see it. > > The language that needs to be changed, to make this RCV Condorcet-compliant is: > > "... The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated ..." > > How can we clearly and concisely change that to Bottom-Two Runoff? > > -- > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > > > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info From rbj at audioimagination.com Tue Dec 3 14:56:14 2019 From: rbj at audioimagination.com (robert bristow-johnson) Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2019 17:56:14 -0500 (EST) Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> Message-ID: <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> > On December 3, 2019 5:13 PM Juho Laatu wrote: > > > My simple thoughts on this: > > - You ask: Do you agree that in problematic situations, like what happened in 2009, the result should be different? > - They answer: Yes. > - You say: This is a problem that is fortunately quite easily to fix. The most straight forward way to enhance the method is to use the Bottom-Two Runoff. The losing candidate one of the two candidates with least votes will be eliminated. > - They say: Ok, let's see if that would be our ideal solution. > - You say: Ok, let's start from there. > Juho, this is **exactly** my strategy. But there is a little bit of an issue about "let's start from there". Here is the latest news regarding yesterday's Council meeting and RCV: https://vtdigger.org/2019/12/03/burlington-considers-instant-runoff-voting-for-most-city-races/ What has happened is that the Progs have "succeeded" in fending off an amendment to take more time and investigate alternatives to the IRV method of RCV. They want, really badly, to get this on the ballot for this coming Town Meeting Day in March 2020. The latest that the Council can decide to include this on the ballot is in 13 days. And in 6 days is when the Charter Change Committee will consider this proposed ballot item, fix any language, and recommend it to the Council on Dec 16. I am afraid that putting this on the ballot "half-baked", with effectively no change from what we had in 2009 and acknowledging no error from the 2009 election, will result in March in rejection by the majority of voters and will, again, set back voting reform for another decade. So I want to make a good effort at changing the language from regular-old IRV to BTR-STV. And hopefully get that change adopted by the Charter Change Committee and sent up to the Council to consider for inclusion on the ballot. Then we can tell voters that this IRV is different from the 2009 IRV and would have corrected the failure of IRV we had in 2009. I believe that Schulze is technically the best RCV, but since Schulze and Ranked-Pairs will elect the same candidate when the Smith set is 3 candidates or fewer, my favorite would be RP using margins for a governmental election because its method is easier to understand and encode into legal language that laypersons can read and understand. Also, we would be able to say to the IRV haters that this RP RCV is not IRV at all. However, we can't say that about BTR-STV because, after all, it *is* a form of Instant Runoff Voting, but and IRV method that *will* elect the Pairwise Champion (the term that I will use to denote the Condorcet Winner). But, given the circumstances (that an IRV proposal is in the works right now), I think this is the best action I can hope to take. I would have to admit that this Condorcet-compliant IRV is still IRV. The Progs won't mind and other naive RCV supporters won't mind, but the IRV haters, particularly those who hated the IRV winner in 2009 will always hate IRV or any RCV, but I would still rather be promoting an RCV that is *not* IRV (no runoff rounds). I am taking Kristofer's language suggestions and possibly modifying. I would like to see language suggestions from others. Either way, I will post what language I finally will submit to the Charter Change Committee. They will probably reject my submission, but I will tell them plainly that if they are offering RCV that is no different from the IRV that resulted in the 2009 failure and was repealed by voters the following year, that their proposed charter change will be rejected by the majority of voters on Town Meeting Day. And this will likely set back voting reform by another decade. > BR, Juho and also to you, Juho. i am appreciative of any help or language or analysis suggestions from you or anyone. -- r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." From electionmethods at votefair.org Tue Dec 3 16:25:36 2019 From: electionmethods at votefair.org (VoteFair) Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2019 16:25:36 -0800 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <2eb11c69-92ef-6324-e0aa-545628fe4d61@votefair.org> On 12/3/2019 2:56 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > ... I would like to see language suggestions from others. ... I'm jumping into the middle of this without having time to read about BTR-STV, so pardon my misunderstandings about what you are attempting. I suggest considering terminology such as: "If there is a candidate who is less popular than every one of the other candidates based on comparing each and every pair of candidates one pair at a time, eliminate that pairwise-losing candidate." This approach eliminates the need to mention the concept of a Condorcet winner. Also, this approach is not Condorcet compliant because it does not ALWAYS elect the Condorcet winner, so it cannot be criticized as "a Condorcet method." Of course the key word is "if" because sometimes there will not be a pairwise loser. Whenever there is not a pairwise loser, your existing words specify what to do. Here's a description of a method that repeats this pairwise elimination process and uses an upside-down version of IRV to resolve rock-paper-scissors-like cycles: https://democracychronicles.org/instant-pairwise-elimination/ I've called it Instant Pairwise Elimination, but the name is not important. It's the concept of "pairwise counting" that I think is important, and should be used in election counting methods. Richard Fobes From cbenham at adam.com.au Tue Dec 3 17:21:03 2019 From: cbenham at adam.com.au (C.Benham) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 11:51:03 +1030 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> I think that making sure that the voters can strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish is more important than making sure the method elects the voted Condorcet winner. I think that IRV/RCV? (with one-at-a-time elimination) that meets that requirement? has the most merit relative to its traction and comprehensibility. But if we do want to insist on compliance with the Condorcet criterion, necessarily at the expense of making the making the method vulnerable to Burying strategy and losing compliance with the (popular with IRV supporters) Later-no-Harm criterion, then I don't like Bottom-Two Runoff. It would be much better to check before each normal IRV-style elimination that the candidate you are considering eliminating doesn't pairwise-beat all the remaining candidates. If it does the process should stop and that candidate should win. That would be a quite good Condorcet method. Chris Benham On 4/12/2019 9:26 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > >> On December 3, 2019 5:13 PM Juho Laatu wrote: >> >> >> My simple thoughts on this: >> >> - You ask: Do you agree that in problematic situations, like what happened in 2009, the result should be different? >> - They answer: Yes. >> - You say: This is a problem that is fortunately quite easily to fix. The most straight forward way to enhance the method is to use the Bottom-Two Runoff. The losing candidate one of the two candidates with least votes will be eliminated. >> - They say: Ok, let's see if that would be our ideal solution. >> - You say: Ok, let's start from there. >> > Juho, this is **exactly** my strategy. But there is a little bit of an issue about "let's start from there". Here is the latest news regarding yesterday's Council meeting and RCV: > > https://vtdigger.org/2019/12/03/burlington-considers-instant-runoff-voting-for-most-city-races/ > > What has happened is that the Progs have "succeeded" in fending off an amendment to take more time and investigate alternatives to the IRV method of RCV. They want, really badly, to get this on the ballot for this coming Town Meeting Day in March 2020. The latest that the Council can decide to include this on the ballot is in 13 days. And in 6 days is when the Charter Change Committee will consider this proposed ballot item, fix any language, and recommend it to the Council on Dec 16. > > I am afraid that putting this on the ballot "half-baked", with effectively no change from what we had in 2009 and acknowledging no error from the 2009 election, will result in March in rejection by the majority of voters and will, again, set back voting reform for another decade. So I want to make a good effort at changing the language from regular-old IRV to BTR-STV. And hopefully get that change adopted by the Charter Change Committee and sent up to the Council to consider for inclusion on the ballot. Then we can tell voters that this IRV is different from the 2009 IRV and would have corrected the failure of IRV we had in 2009. > > I believe that Schulze is technically the best RCV, but since Schulze and Ranked-Pairs will elect the same candidate when the Smith set is 3 candidates or fewer, my favorite would be RP using margins for a governmental election because its method is easier to understand and encode into legal language that laypersons can read and understand. Also, we would be able to say to the IRV haters that this RP RCV is not IRV at all. > > However, we can't say that about BTR-STV because, after all, it *is* a form of Instant Runoff Voting, but and IRV method that *will* elect the Pairwise Champion (the term that I will use to denote the Condorcet Winner). But, given the circumstances (that an IRV proposal is in the works right now), I think this is the best action I can hope to take. I would have to admit that this Condorcet-compliant IRV is still IRV. The Progs won't mind and other naive RCV supporters won't mind, but the IRV haters, particularly those who hated the IRV winner in 2009 will always hate IRV or any RCV, but I would still rather be promoting an RCV that is *not* IRV (no runoff rounds). > > I am taking Kristofer's language suggestions and possibly modifying. I would like to see language suggestions from others. Either way, I will post what language I finally will submit to the Charter Change Committee. They will probably reject my submission, but I will tell them plainly that if they are offering RCV that is no different from the IRV that resulted in the 2009 failure and was repealed by voters the following year, that their proposed charter change will be rejected by the majority of voters on Town Meeting Day. And this will likely set back voting reform by another decade. > >> BR, Juho > and also to you, Juho. i am appreciative of any help or language or analysis suggestions from you or anyone. > > > -- > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info From rbj at audioimagination.com Wed Dec 4 00:18:11 2019 From: rbj at audioimagination.com (robert bristow-johnson) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 03:18:11 -0500 (EST) Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <1586683294.369193.1575447491301@privateemail.com> How does this look to you guys? This is the original language on the existing resolution to implement RCV that is not Condorcet compliant: ________________________________________________________ All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. ________________________________________________________ and here is the original languate modified to implement BTR-STV that is Condorcet compliant: ________________________________________________________ All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "remaining candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been eliminated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is eliminated and all candidates begin as remaining candidates. (4) In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever remaining candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein designated as "A" and "B", shall be compared in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support is eliminated in the same round. If the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B exceeds the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is eliminated, and A remains for the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A exceeds the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is eliminated, and B remains for the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measure of voter support between A and B is tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated in the same round. (5) This runoff re-tabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, is repeated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. (6) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. ________________________________________________________ Is this good language for BTR-STV? Can any of you think of a hole in this description? Can any of you make it better or more concise? Thank you. r b-j > On December 3, 2019 3:44 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > > > On 03/12/2019 16.54, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > ... > > > > I want to figure out some good language to change this from regular-old IRV to Bottom-Two Runoff, Single Transferable Vote, BTR-STV . If someone is good at writing legal language or if this BTR-STV has had legislative language written for it somewhere else, I would like to see it. > > > > The language that needs to be changed, to make this RCV Condorcet-compliant is: > > > > "... The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated ..." > > > > How can we clearly and concisely change that to Bottom-Two Runoff? > > My first stab would be: "After each round, of the two candidates with > the fewest votes, the candidate ranked below the other by the most > voters shall be eliminated". > > Alternatively "on the most ballots". Or "among the two candidates". Or > "of the two candidates with the fewest votes in that round". > > Presumably there has to be some tie-breaking language for the case where > more than one candidate is last or next-to-last. But I suppose there is > some similar language for IRV as is. > > If there is no equal-rank or truncation, you can also say "the candidate > ranked below the other by a majority of the voters". > > The strategy to turn IRV into BTR-IRV is probably the best one. Woodall > is better than BTR-IRV, and you could turn the method into Woodall by > checking for a CW before a round starts, but then you'd have to define > what a CW means in a way that doesn't confuse people who are unfamiliar > with Condorcet. > > Looking again at the language, point (3) is already rather convoluted. > Perhaps it would be better to split up the definition. Something like: > > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant > runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election > officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. > In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for > whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and > subsidiarily to determine what candidate to eliminate. After each round, > the two candidates with the fewest votes shall be considered for > elimination. Of these two candidates, the candidate ranked below the > other by the most voters shall be eliminated in that round. The counting > in rounds shall continue until only two candidates remain, with the > candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > > (Maybe also call it something else than "instant runoff re-tabulation" > because it's no longer IRV, but I can't think of a better name at the > moment.) > > I'm much less certain about Woodall. See below for something I cooked up. > > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in > order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first > preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant > runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election > officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds, > for which the counting shall be conducted according to the following > three points. > (4) If there exists a continuing candidate so that for every other > continuing candidate, the former candidate is ranked ahead of the latter > by a majority of the voters, the former candidate is elected. > (5) If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a > single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked > highest. The candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated, which > marks the end of the current round and the beginning of the next. > (6) The counting in rounds shall continue until a candidate is elected > or only one candidate remains, with the remaining candidate then being > elected. > (7) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with > this subsection to implement these standards. > > (Strictly speaking, the latter half of point 6 is redundant because when > only two candidates remain, the winner beats the loser pairwise and > would be elected by point 4. But a potentially infinite loop looks more > dangerous than a finite one.) > > I haven't written legislative language before, but maybe it can serve as > a starting point for others who have. > > -km -- r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." From voting at ukscientists.com Wed Dec 4 10:52:19 2019 From: voting at ukscientists.com (Richard Lung) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 18:52:19 +0000 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <1586683294.369193.1575447491301@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <1586683294.369193.1575447491301@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <9c30f182-77da-9433-b0bc-8090897b598d@ukscientists.com> The reason for all the controversy is the limitations of IRV. And political expedience over-looks scientific principle. From the latter point of view, the limitations are that single vacancies struggle to represent even half the voters. That's what you are all arguing about: how to do even that much. The other IRV limitation is that eliminations discard preferential information germane to the result. The obvious answer is STV, which elects the first preferences, nearly all of them with enough seats per district. That is the acid test, despite the residual short-comings of traditional STV or Meek method. (I have worked out how to further empower the transferable voting method: my oft-mentioned FAB STV.) A trouble with the US "choice voting" reform campaign is that IRV is not choice voting, it is, as the French say "faux pas de mieux" (for want of something better). Richard L On 04/12/2019 08:18, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > How does this look to you guys? This is the original language on the existing resolution to implement RCV that is not Condorcet compliant: > > ________________________________________________________ > > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > > ________________________________________________________ > > > and here is the original languate modified to implement BTR-STV that is Condorcet compliant: > > > ________________________________________________________ > > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "remaining candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been eliminated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is eliminated and all candidates begin as remaining candidates. > (4) In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever remaining candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein designated as "A" and "B", shall be compared in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support is eliminated in the same round. If the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B exceeds the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is eliminated, and A remains for the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A exceeds the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is eliminated, and B remains for the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measure of voter support between A and B is tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated in the same round. > (5) This runoff re-tabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, is repeated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (6) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > > ________________________________________________________ > > > Is this good language for BTR-STV? Can any of you think of a hole in this description? Can any of you make it better or more concise? > > Thank you. > > r b-j > > >> On December 3, 2019 3:44 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> >> >> On 03/12/2019 16.54, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > ... >>> I want to figure out some good language to change this from regular-old IRV to Bottom-Two Runoff, Single Transferable Vote, BTR-STV . If someone is good at writing legal language or if this BTR-STV has had legislative language written for it somewhere else, I would like to see it. >>> >>> The language that needs to be changed, to make this RCV Condorcet-compliant is: >>> >>> "... The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated ..." >>> >>> How can we clearly and concisely change that to Bottom-Two Runoff? >> My first stab would be: "After each round, of the two candidates with >> the fewest votes, the candidate ranked below the other by the most >> voters shall be eliminated". >> >> Alternatively "on the most ballots". Or "among the two candidates". Or >> "of the two candidates with the fewest votes in that round". >> >> Presumably there has to be some tie-breaking language for the case where >> more than one candidate is last or next-to-last. But I suppose there is >> some similar language for IRV as is. >> >> If there is no equal-rank or truncation, you can also say "the candidate >> ranked below the other by a majority of the voters". >> >> The strategy to turn IRV into BTR-IRV is probably the best one. Woodall >> is better than BTR-IRV, and you could turn the method into Woodall by >> checking for a CW before a round starts, but then you'd have to define >> what a CW means in a way that doesn't confuse people who are unfamiliar >> with Condorcet. >> >> Looking again at the language, point (3) is already rather convoluted. >> Perhaps it would be better to split up the definition. Something like: >> >> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant >> runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election >> officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. >> In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for >> whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and >> subsidiarily to determine what candidate to eliminate. After each round, >> the two candidates with the fewest votes shall be considered for >> elimination. Of these two candidates, the candidate ranked below the >> other by the most voters shall be eliminated in that round. The counting >> in rounds shall continue until only two candidates remain, with the >> candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. >> >> (Maybe also call it something else than "instant runoff re-tabulation" >> because it's no longer IRV, but I can't think of a better name at the >> moment.) >> >> I'm much less certain about Woodall. See below for something I cooked up. >> >> (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in >> order of preference. >> (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first >> preferences, that candidate is elected. >> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant >> runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election >> officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds, >> for which the counting shall be conducted according to the following >> three points. >> (4) If there exists a continuing candidate so that for every other >> continuing candidate, the former candidate is ranked ahead of the latter >> by a majority of the voters, the former candidate is elected. >> (5) If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a >> single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked >> highest. The candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated, which >> marks the end of the current round and the beginning of the next. >> (6) The counting in rounds shall continue until a candidate is elected >> or only one candidate remains, with the remaining candidate then being >> elected. >> (7) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with >> this subsection to implement these standards. >> >> (Strictly speaking, the latter half of point 6 is redundant because when >> only two candidates remain, the winner beats the loser pairwise and >> would be elected by point 4. But a potentially infinite loop looks more >> dangerous than a finite one.) >> >> I haven't written legislative language before, but maybe it can serve as >> a starting point for others who have. >> >> -km > -- > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info From markus.schulze8 at gmail.com Wed Dec 4 12:06:50 2019 From: markus.schulze8 at gmail.com (Markus Schulze) Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2019 21:06:50 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner Message-ID: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> Dear Robert Bristow-Johnson, the best possible election method according to the underlying heuristic of instant-runoff voting will always be instant-runoff voting. Therefore, I don't think that any supporter of instant-runoff voting will be convinced by a hybrid of Condorcet voting and instant-runoff voting. Bottom-two runoff violates monotonicity and reversal symmetry. Therefore, when you promote bottom-two runoff, you cannot use these criteria against instant-runoff voting. Bottom-two runoff violates independence of clones while instant-runoff voting satisfies independence of clones. Therefore, this criterion will be used against bottom-two runoff. When you promote bottom-two runoff and fail to convince the audience about the importance of the Condorcet criterion, you don't have any arguments anymore against instant-runoff. I strongly recommend that you should promote the Schulze method because of the following reasons: (1) The Schulze method satisfies not only the Condorcet criterion, but also monotonicity, reversal symmetry, independence of clones and many other criteria. Therefore, the Schulze method is a very good method even when there is no Condorcet winner or when you fail to convince the audience about the importance of the Condorcet criterion. (2) The Schulze method is currently the most wide-spread Condorcet method. (3) The Schulze method has been published in an important peer-reviewed journal: Markus Schulze, "A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and Condorcet-consistent single-winner election method", Social Choice and Welfare, volume 36, issue 2, pages 267-303, 2011, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 Here are some useful links: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/BR8397842/br-external/SchulzeMarkus-e.pdf Markus Schulze From electionmethods at votefair.org Wed Dec 4 13:01:27 2019 From: electionmethods at votefair.org (VoteFair) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 13:01:27 -0800 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <1586683294.369193.1575447491301@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <1586683294.369193.1575447491301@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <304c6865-dfd5-441c-9a34-dda5f2e8586f@votefair.org> On 12/4/2019 12:18 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > How does this look to you guys? ... Item 4 needs some serious surgery. It needs to be split into two or even three parts, which I'll refer to here as 4a and 4b and 4c. Notice that there is no provision for how to count a ballot on which the voter ranks more than one candidate at the same preference level! To fix this serious unfairness I suggest the following wording for 4a (which uses the same first sentence): 4a: In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever remaining candidate the voter has ranked highest. If a voter ranks two or more remaining candidates at the same currently-highest preference level then that single vote shall be split into equal-weight two-digit decimal numbers that add up to no more than a single vote. Specifically if a ballot ranks three remaining candidates at the same currently-highest preference level then each of those three candidates will each receive 0.33 portion of a vote during the current round. (Grammar: "currently-highest" would not normally use a hyphen because of the "ly" ending, but including the hyphen makes the meaning less ambiguous in this legal usage.) The remaining portion of item four could be used for item 4b, BUT please consider the following fairer wordings for items 4b and 4c, which might be as easy to understand as the existing wording: 4b: In each elimination round each remaining candidate is compared to each other remaining candidate one pair at a time to determine whether there is a "pairwise-losing" candidate that is ranked lower on more than half the ballots in each and every pairwise comparison. If there is a pairwise-losing candidate who loses all its pairwise contests against all the other remaining candidates then that candidate is eliminated. 4c: If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate then the candidate who receives the fewest votes is eliminated in that round. If there is a tie for fewest votes and the tie affects which candidate can win, then a recount shall be done and if the recount also results in a tie that affects who wins then a court shall determine how to resolve the tie. The longer wording for 4c is needed because the current wording fails to explain how to resolve an IRV tie. The method described above is NOT Condorcet compliant, but it is so close to being Condorcet compliant that any exception would also involve bigger unfairness issues (such as a very small turnout). Regardless of whether you can use the recommended pairwise wording, at least make sure that the wording explains what to do when a voter ranks more than one candidate at the same preference level. Note that tossing out that ballot is NOT a valid option! If someone in your group insists that it should be tossed out, then at least stop ignoring the ballot when there is a round in which only one "remaining" candidate is ranked at that same preference level. Good luck! You're doing great work!!! Richard Fobes On 12/4/2019 12:18 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > How does this look to you guys? This is the original language on the existing resolution to implement RCV that is not Condorcet compliant: > > ________________________________________________________ > > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > > ________________________________________________________ > > > and here is the original languate modified to implement BTR-STV that is Condorcet compliant: > > > ________________________________________________________ > > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "remaining candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been eliminated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is eliminated and all candidates begin as remaining candidates. > (4) In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever remaining candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein designated as "A" and "B", shall be compared in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support is eliminated in the same round. If the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B exceeds the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is eliminated, and A remains for the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A exceeds the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is eliminated, and B remains for the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measure of voter support between A and B is tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated in the same round. > (5) This runoff re-tabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, is repeated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (6) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > > ________________________________________________________ > > > Is this good language for BTR-STV? Can any of you think of a hole in this description? Can any of you make it better or more concise? > > Thank you. > > r b-j > > >> On December 3, 2019 3:44 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: >> >> >> On 03/12/2019 16.54, robert bristow-johnson wrote: >>> > ... >>> >>> I want to figure out some good language to change this from regular-old IRV to Bottom-Two Runoff, Single Transferable Vote, BTR-STV . If someone is good at writing legal language or if this BTR-STV has had legislative language written for it somewhere else, I would like to see it. >>> >>> The language that needs to be changed, to make this RCV Condorcet-compliant is: >>> >>> "... The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated ..." >>> >>> How can we clearly and concisely change that to Bottom-Two Runoff? >> >> My first stab would be: "After each round, of the two candidates with >> the fewest votes, the candidate ranked below the other by the most >> voters shall be eliminated". >> >> Alternatively "on the most ballots". Or "among the two candidates". Or >> "of the two candidates with the fewest votes in that round". >> >> Presumably there has to be some tie-breaking language for the case where >> more than one candidate is last or next-to-last. But I suppose there is >> some similar language for IRV as is. >> >> If there is no equal-rank or truncation, you can also say "the candidate >> ranked below the other by a majority of the voters". >> >> The strategy to turn IRV into BTR-IRV is probably the best one. Woodall >> is better than BTR-IRV, and you could turn the method into Woodall by >> checking for a CW before a round starts, but then you'd have to define >> what a CW means in a way that doesn't confuse people who are unfamiliar >> with Condorcet. >> >> Looking again at the language, point (3) is already rather convoluted. >> Perhaps it would be better to split up the definition. Something like: >> >> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant >> runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election >> officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. >> In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for >> whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and >> subsidiarily to determine what candidate to eliminate. After each round, >> the two candidates with the fewest votes shall be considered for >> elimination. Of these two candidates, the candidate ranked below the >> other by the most voters shall be eliminated in that round. The counting >> in rounds shall continue until only two candidates remain, with the >> candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. >> >> (Maybe also call it something else than "instant runoff re-tabulation" >> because it's no longer IRV, but I can't think of a better name at the >> moment.) >> >> I'm much less certain about Woodall. See below for something I cooked up. >> >> (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in >> order of preference. >> (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first >> preferences, that candidate is elected. >> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant >> runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election >> officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds, >> for which the counting shall be conducted according to the following >> three points. >> (4) If there exists a continuing candidate so that for every other >> continuing candidate, the former candidate is ranked ahead of the latter >> by a majority of the voters, the former candidate is elected. >> (5) If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a >> single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked >> highest. The candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated, which >> marks the end of the current round and the beginning of the next. >> (6) The counting in rounds shall continue until a candidate is elected >> or only one candidate remains, with the remaining candidate then being >> elected. >> (7) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with >> this subsection to implement these standards. >> >> (Strictly speaking, the latter half of point 6 is redundant because when >> only two candidates remain, the winner beats the loser pairwise and >> would be elected by point 4. But a potentially infinite loop looks more >> dangerous than a finite one.) >> >> I haven't written legislative language before, but maybe it can serve as >> a starting point for others who have. >> >> -km > > -- > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info > From km_elmet at t-online.de Wed Dec 4 15:34:38 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 00:34:38 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> References: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <64db3ddf-9346-3075-1cdd-5c4638b3a016@t-online.de> On 04/12/2019 21.06, Markus Schulze wrote: > Dear Robert Bristow-Johnson, > > the best possible election method according to the > underlying heuristic of instant-runoff voting will > always be instant-runoff voting. Therefore, I don't > think that any supporter of instant-runoff voting > will be convinced by a hybrid of Condorcet voting > and instant-runoff voting. I think the point is to convince people who support IRV but also recognize the failure of Burlington 2009 as genuine. From such a position, it makes sense to advocate for a small change that fixes the problem of Condorcet noncompliance, instead of replacing IRV with Schulze. In the category of smaller changes, I would prefer Benham (which I got confused with Woodall earlier), but even that might be too large a change (as I said in my initial mail to Robert). Does Benham pass independence of clones? On a longer term, I agree that Schulze is better than Woodall or Benham (perhaps with the exception if the voters are very strategic), but it doesn't seem Robert has the luxury of going for one of the advanced Condorcet methods. From rbj at audioimagination.com Wed Dec 4 17:50:04 2019 From: rbj at audioimagination.com (robert bristow-johnson) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 20:50:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> References: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1420786298.383659.1575510604383@privateemail.com> Lotsa people to respond to. I feel I must begin with Markus because, as a signal processing algorithmist, I have so much respect for Markus and for the Schulze method. I think I understand the Schulze beatpath method and agree with the consensus of the geeks that, technically, it is simply the best currently-known RCV method. Most immune to all of these voting strategies. But I consider cycles to be an extremely rare outcome of any Condorcet-compliant ranked choice system. And, while it's uncommon (perhaps happened only with Burlington a decade ago) for an STV or Hare or whoever IRV to not elect the Condorcet winner, we found out that it can happen at least once. Appears to be the only RCV election held by a government that did not elect the Condorcet winner, but my concern is that a voting system that does not always elect the Condorcet winner may become law again in the very city where this IRV failure occurred. If I had my druthers, I would perhaps plug Ranked Pairs because RP will always elect the same winner as Schulze in the case of a Smith set of 3 or less. A cycle in a governmental election will be rare, but a cycle involving more than 3 candidates happening in a governmental election is, I think, virtually astronomically unlikely. Ranked Pairs is, for me, so much easier to describe than beatpaths. Markus, to be totally honest with you, I just don't think that Schulze has an ice-cube's chance in getting adopted for a governmental election. But maybe another, simpler-to-describe Condorcet-compliant method can. So if I had my druthers, it would not be BTR-STV. But here I am in Burlington Vermont of all places. At least in this town, we should be aware of how election reform was set back a generation (assuming it takes another decade to finally get RCV to return to this 3-party town) when this IRV hiccup occurred a decade ago. Now the Progs are actively trying to get the same-old IRV, repackaged as "RCV", but no different than what failed us in 2009. They have already submitted language for how the question will appear on the ballot. They sorta left this to the last minute to try to punch it through without argument to get on the ballot. The city council must make the inclusion decision in 12 days. If they do not put the question on the ballot, it will delay the decision for a year, but charter change is also state law, so it will take another year to get enacted. And they want this in place for the next mayoral election. That's why the current push on this legislation. My only hope and my only intention is to try to persuade some skeptical people in the Vermont Progressive Party that their submitted language can be changed without breaking RCV. I know they will come back and say my language is too complicated and theirs is simpler. I will tell them that theirs is simpler and wrong and point out exactly why in what happened in 2009 (I can post that letter to the list, if people are interested in how I do politiking). But I want to show them language that is the least amount of change from their language, but will result in a Condorcet-compliant method. I will feel like I succeeded and gained something if **any** Condorcet-compliant RCV method is adopted, but if they don't change the language, I will hold my nose and still support the old, crappy IRV, if that is what gets on the ballot. That would be better than electing Mayor 41% and that is what we are potentially in danger of now. So I can't have Schulze, I can't have Tideman, I can't have FAB-STV (and I don't think that Richard's 4a, 4b, 4c is an improvement), I can't have Instant Pairwise Elimination. I can't expect to, in 5 days, walk into the room where the Charter Change Committee meets and tell them to totally replace their entire language with something completely different (except for the ranked ballot). The best I can hope for is language that changes how the candidate is eliminated in STV, so that the Condorcet winner is never eliminated. That's what BTR-STV is good for; it is a political increment (when RCV becomes Condorcet-compliant) and sometimes increments in reform is all we can hope for. So, for reasons of political practicality, it's gotta be BTR-STV or it goes back to Hare STV. And that will also be a fight. RCV might lose in either case and we continue with FPTP with 40% minimum. But also a bad outcome would be if the same IRV was returned to statute and we had another failure like we had in 2009. Then voting reform will be set back for a lot more than a generation. At least if we can get an IRV that is Condorcized, we won't have a repeat of 2009 and the repeal that happened the year after. So the only thing that helps is good, concise language for BTR-STV that retains the form of the original language that I posted, has one part that is different, and I get to defend that one part that is different. That's all I can get away with. Thanks, y'all for your attention and comments. So far, I am sticking with my language, but I can be convinced that some other is better, if the suggestion comes from understanding what political and time constraints I have at the moment. bestest, robert > On December 4, 2019 3:06 PM Markus Schulze wrote: > > > Dear Robert Bristow-Johnson, > > the best possible election method according to the > underlying heuristic of instant-runoff voting will > always be instant-runoff voting. Therefore, I don't > think that any supporter of instant-runoff voting > will be convinced by a hybrid of Condorcet voting > and instant-runoff voting. > > Bottom-two runoff violates monotonicity and reversal > symmetry. Therefore, when you promote bottom-two > runoff, you cannot use these criteria against > instant-runoff voting. > > Bottom-two runoff violates independence of clones > while instant-runoff voting satisfies independence > of clones. Therefore, this criterion will be used > against bottom-two runoff. > > When you promote bottom-two runoff and fail to > convince the audience about the importance of the > Condorcet criterion, you don't have any arguments > anymore against instant-runoff. > > I strongly recommend that you should promote the > Schulze method because of the following reasons: > > (1) The Schulze method satisfies not only the > Condorcet criterion, but also monotonicity, > reversal symmetry, independence of clones and many > other criteria. Therefore, the Schulze method is a > very good method even when there is no Condorcet > winner or when you fail to convince the audience > about the importance of the Condorcet criterion. > > (2) The Schulze method is currently the most > wide-spread Condorcet method. > > (3) The Schulze method has been published in an > important peer-reviewed journal: > > Markus Schulze, "A new monotonic, clone-independent, > reversal symmetric, and Condorcet-consistent > single-winner election method", Social Choice and > Welfare, volume 36, issue 2, pages 267-303, 2011, > DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 > > Here are some useful links: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method > > https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/BR8397842/br-external/SchulzeMarkus-e.pdf > > Markus Schulze > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info -- r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." From cbenham at adam.com.au Wed Dec 4 17:52:42 2019 From: cbenham at adam.com.au (C.Benham) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 12:22:42 +1030 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <64db3ddf-9346-3075-1cdd-5c4638b3a016@t-online.de> References: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> <64db3ddf-9346-3075-1cdd-5c4638b3a016@t-online.de> Message-ID: <9eba801a-1031-8c1e-4396-31777f20cd0d@adam.com.au> > Does Benham pass independence of clones? Yes. > On a longer term, I agree that Schulze is better than Woodall or Benham > (perhaps with the exception if the voters are very strategic), but it > doesn't seem Robert has the luxury of going for one of the advanced > Condorcet methods. Benham? is more resistant to Burial than Schulze.?? A candidate who is top-ranked on more than a third of the ballots can't be successfully Buried. Say sincere is 43: A 03: A>B 44: B? (or B>A) 10: C A is the sincere CW:? A>B 46-44,? A>C 46-10? (or 90-10). With the ballots cast thus all Condorcet methods and also IRV elect A. But say the B supporters Bury against A: 43: A 03: A>B 44: B>C (sincere is B or B>A) 10: C Now A>B 46-44, ?? B>C 47-10,????? C>A 54-46. Now Schulze? (or Ranked Pairs or Smith//MinMax) using either the normally advocated Winning Votes or Margins reward the strategists by electing B.? I think Losing Votes (especially if we don't allow above-bottom equal-ranking) is much better and it still elects A. Benham in this example elects the sincere CW.? It just sees that C has the fewest first-preference votes and is pairwise defeated (by B) and so eliminates C and elects A. Chris Benham On 5/12/2019 10:04 am, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 04/12/2019 21.06, Markus Schulze wrote: >> Dear Robert Bristow-Johnson, >> >> the best possible election method according to the >> underlying heuristic of instant-runoff voting will >> always be instant-runoff voting. Therefore, I don't >> think that any supporter of instant-runoff voting >> will be convinced by a hybrid of Condorcet voting >> and instant-runoff voting. > I think the point is to convince people who support IRV but also > recognize the failure of Burlington 2009 as genuine. From such a > position, it makes sense to advocate for a small change that fixes the > problem of Condorcet noncompliance, instead of replacing IRV with Schulze. > > In the category of smaller changes, I would prefer Benham (which I got > confused with Woodall earlier), but even that might be too large a > change (as I said in my initial mail to Robert). > > Does Benham pass independence of clones? > > On a longer term, I agree that Schulze is better than Woodall or Benham > (perhaps with the exception if the voters are very strategic), but it > doesn't seem Robert has the luxury of going for one of the advanced > Condorcet methods. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info From juho.laatu at gmail.com Wed Dec 4 18:50:31 2019 From: juho.laatu at gmail.com (Juho Laatu) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 04:50:31 +0200 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> Message-ID: Ok, I guess you need an easy to understand and clear (to make it acceptable in short time) alternative proposal that would address the problems of 2009. Here's one more possible wording (and resulting method) in addition to the already presented wordings and methods. It basically adds one more criterion in section (3). I however had to modify and rearrange the text quite a bit to fit that criterion (more or less) nicely in. Text in square brackets might or might not be included. You know better how much text is needed to make the proposal easy to understand. (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, if one of the continuing candidates is preferred [in the ranked ballots] over any other continuing candidate [more often than the other way around] [, when that candidate is compared to every other continuing candidate one by one], then that candidate will be elected. If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and the candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated. BR, Juho > On 04 Dec 2019, at 00:56, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > > >> On December 3, 2019 5:13 PM Juho Laatu wrote: >> >> >> My simple thoughts on this: >> >> - You ask: Do you agree that in problematic situations, like what happened in 2009, the result should be different? >> - They answer: Yes. >> - You say: This is a problem that is fortunately quite easily to fix. The most straight forward way to enhance the method is to use the Bottom-Two Runoff. The losing candidate one of the two candidates with least votes will be eliminated. >> - They say: Ok, let's see if that would be our ideal solution. >> - You say: Ok, let's start from there. >> > > Juho, this is **exactly** my strategy. But there is a little bit of an issue about "let's start from there". Here is the latest news regarding yesterday's Council meeting and RCV: > > https://vtdigger.org/2019/12/03/burlington-considers-instant-runoff-voting-for-most-city-races/ > > What has happened is that the Progs have "succeeded" in fending off an amendment to take more time and investigate alternatives to the IRV method of RCV. They want, really badly, to get this on the ballot for this coming Town Meeting Day in March 2020. The latest that the Council can decide to include this on the ballot is in 13 days. And in 6 days is when the Charter Change Committee will consider this proposed ballot item, fix any language, and recommend it to the Council on Dec 16. > > I am afraid that putting this on the ballot "half-baked", with effectively no change from what we had in 2009 and acknowledging no error from the 2009 election, will result in March in rejection by the majority of voters and will, again, set back voting reform for another decade. So I want to make a good effort at changing the language from regular-old IRV to BTR-STV. And hopefully get that change adopted by the Charter Change Committee and sent up to the Council to consider for inclusion on the ballot. Then we can tell voters that this IRV is different from the 2009 IRV and would have corrected the failure of IRV we had in 2009. > > I believe that Schulze is technically the best RCV, but since Schulze and Ranked-Pairs will elect the same candidate when the Smith set is 3 candidates or fewer, my favorite would be RP using margins for a governmental election because its method is easier to understand and encode into legal language that laypersons can read and understand. Also, we would be able to say to the IRV haters that this RP RCV is not IRV at all. > > However, we can't say that about BTR-STV because, after all, it *is* a form of Instant Runoff Voting, but and IRV method that *will* elect the Pairwise Champion (the term that I will use to denote the Condorcet Winner). But, given the circumstances (that an IRV proposal is in the works right now), I think this is the best action I can hope to take. I would have to admit that this Condorcet-compliant IRV is still IRV. The Progs won't mind and other naive RCV supporters won't mind, but the IRV haters, particularly those who hated the IRV winner in 2009 will always hate IRV or any RCV, but I would still rather be promoting an RCV that is *not* IRV (no runoff rounds). > > I am taking Kristofer's language suggestions and possibly modifying. I would like to see language suggestions from others. Either way, I will post what language I finally will submit to the Charter Change Committee. They will probably reject my submission, but I will tell them plainly that if they are offering RCV that is no different from the IRV that resulted in the 2009 failure and was repealed by voters the following year, that their proposed charter change will be rejected by the majority of voters on Town Meeting Day. And this will likely set back voting reform by another decade. > >> BR, Juho > > and also to you, Juho. i am appreciative of any help or language or analysis suggestions from you or anyone. > > > -- > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info From rbj at audioimagination.com Wed Dec 4 19:26:28 2019 From: rbj at audioimagination.com (robert bristow-johnson) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 22:26:28 -0500 (EST) Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <14240495.384166.1575516388949@privateemail.com> > On December 4, 2019 9:50 PM Juho Laatu wrote: > > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, if one of the continuing candidates is preferred [in the ranked ballots] over any other continuing candidate [more often than the other way around] [, when that candidate is compared to every other continuing candidate one by one], then that candidate will be elected. If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and the candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated. > The language in the brackets "more often than the other way around" needs to be different. Juho, if you could take the following original and graft your (3) into it, that makes it something to compare to. Here is their (non-Condorcet RCV) original: ________________________________________________________ NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that, for the purpose of placing a charter change question on the March 3, 2020 town meeting election ballot, the City Council hereby refers the following question amending City Charter ? 5 to its Charter Change Committee for review and recommendation to the full City Council by its December 16, 2019 meeting, in order to reintroduce ranked choice voting for the election of the City?s mayor, city councilors, and school commissioners: ? 5 Election to be by ballot; method of election: All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. ________________________________________________________ Here is my latest BTR-STV stab at it: ________________________________________________________ NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that, for the purpose of placing a charter change question on the March 3, 2020 town meeting election ballot, the City Council hereby refers the following question amending City Charter ? 5 to its Charter Change Committee for review and recommendation to the full City Council by its December 16, 2019 meeting, in order to reintroduce ranked choice voting for the election of the City?s mayor, city councilors, and school commissioners: ? 5 Election to be by ballot; method of election: All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "remaining candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been eliminated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is eliminated and all candidates begin as remaining candidates. (4) In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever remaining candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein designated as "A" and "B", shall be compared in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support is eliminated in the current round. If the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B exceeds the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is eliminated, and A remains for the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A exceeds the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is eliminated, and B remains for the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measure of voter support between A and B is tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated in the current round. (5) This runoff retabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, is repeated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. (6) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. ________________________________________________________ -- r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." From electionmethods at votefair.org Wed Dec 4 20:50:19 2019 From: electionmethods at votefair.org (VoteFair) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 20:50:19 -0800 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <14240495.384166.1575516388949@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <14240495.384166.1575516388949@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <3d5b4a1d-af86-8465-11d3-234b8abcb392@votefair.org> On 12/4/2019 7:26 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: >> On December 4, 2019 9:50 PM Juho Laatu wrote: >> ... In each round, if one of the continuing candidates is preferred [in the ranked ballots] over any other continuing candidate [more often than the other way around] [, when that candidate is compared to every other continuing candidate one by one], then that candidate will be elected. ... One way to simplify the wording when pairwise counting is involved -- as it is here -- is to refer to "more than half the ballots." Accordingly, here is an alternate wording for the above sentence: In each round, if there is a not-yet-eliminated candidate who is ranked higher on more than half the ballots when that candidate is compared to each and every one of the other not-yet-eliminated candidates on a pairwise (one-on-one) basis, then that pairwise-winning candidate shall be elected. I'll again repeat my point that the wordings being proposed do not specify what to do with ballots that rank more than one candidate at the same preference level. If voting will be done electronically then this issue will only affect the few ballots submitted by mail (such as from people overseas in military service), but otherwise this gap will allow many, many ballots to be discarded as "spoiled" even though they are marked in a reasonable way. Again, good luck getting at least some improvements. Richard Fobes On 12/4/2019 7:26 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > >> On December 4, 2019 9:50 PM Juho Laatu wrote: >> >> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, if one of the continuing candidates is preferred [in the ranked ballots] over any other continuing candidate [more often than the other way around] [, when that candidate is compared to every other continuing candidate one by one], then that candidate will be elected. If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and the candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated. >> > > The language in the brackets "more often than the other way around" needs to be different. > > Juho, if you could take the following original and graft your (3) into it, that makes it something to compare to. > > Here is their (non-Condorcet RCV) original: > > ________________________________________________________ > > NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that, for the purpose of placing a charter change question on the March 3, 2020 town meeting election ballot, the City Council hereby refers the following question amending City Charter ? 5 to its Charter Change Committee for review and recommendation to the full City Council by its December 16, 2019 meeting, in order to reintroduce ranked choice voting for the election of the City?s mayor, city councilors, and school commissioners: > > ? 5 Election to be by ballot; method of election: > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a > ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > ________________________________________________________ > > > Here is my latest BTR-STV stab at it: > > ________________________________________________________ > > NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that, for the purpose of placing a charter change question on the March 3, 2020 town meeting election ballot, the City Council hereby refers the following question amending City Charter ? 5 to its Charter Change Committee for review and recommendation to the full City Council by its December 16, 2019 meeting, in order to reintroduce ranked choice voting for the election of the City?s mayor, city councilors, and school commissioners: > > ? 5 Election to be by ballot; method of election: > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "remaining candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been eliminated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is eliminated and all candidates begin as remaining candidates. > (4) In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever remaining candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein designated as "A" and "B", shall be compared in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support is eliminated in the current round. If the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B exceeds the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is eliminated, and A remains for the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A exceeds the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is eliminated, and B remains for the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measure of voter support between A and B is tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated in the current round. > (5) This runoff retabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, is repeated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (6) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > ________________________________________________________ > > > > > -- > > > > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > > > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info > From rbj at audioimagination.com Wed Dec 4 21:09:04 2019 From: rbj at audioimagination.com (robert bristow-johnson) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 00:09:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <3d5b4a1d-af86-8465-11d3-234b8abcb392@votefair.org> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <14240495.384166.1575516388949@privateemail.com> <3d5b4a1d-af86-8465-11d3-234b8abcb392@votefair.org> Message-ID: <1952988880.384810.1575522544158@privateemail.com> > On December 4, 2019 11:50 PM VoteFair wrote: > > > > In each round, if there is a not-yet-eliminated candidate who is ranked > higher on more than half the ballots when that candidate is compared to > each and every one of the other not-yet-eliminated candidates on a > pairwise (one-on-one) basis, then that pairwise-winning candidate shall > be elected. need to define the "pairwise-winning candidate". > I'll again repeat my point that the wordings being proposed do not > specify what to do with ballots that rank more than one candidate at the > same preference level. Even though for a pure Condorcet, equal ranking is allowed, this does not work for IRV because, when a single candidate is promoted to a voter's effective (contingency) first choice, IRV would not know which of the equally-ranked candidates to promote. That was clear in previous implementations of IRV. I am not sure that this languages needs to be on the ballot where voters consider and approve (or reject) IRV. But it must be on the Instructions to Voters on each ballot. > If voting will be done electronically then this > issue will only affect the few ballots submitted by mail (such as from > people overseas in military service), but otherwise this gap will allow > many, many ballots to be discarded as "spoiled" even though they are > marked in a reasonable way. I believe our paper-scan IRV software in 2009 was able to handle gaps in the ranking. You could rank #1, #2, then #5 and if no other ranks are marked, the #5 rank is effectively #3. All unranked candidates are tied for last place. > Again, good luck getting at least some improvements. Thank you. We shall see. Just now I sent the working language I had to the city councilors for consideration. Dunno if they'll listen. -- r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com "Imagination is more important than knowledge." From electionmethods at votefair.org Wed Dec 4 22:44:11 2019 From: electionmethods at votefair.org (VoteFair) Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 22:44:11 -0800 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <1952988880.384810.1575522544158@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <14240495.384166.1575516388949@privateemail.com> <3d5b4a1d-af86-8465-11d3-234b8abcb392@votefair.org> <1952988880.384810.1575522544158@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <8c8d4acb-701c-dd2b-9e09-0fc10e20b1cf@votefair.org> On 12/4/2019 9:09 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > need to define the "pairwise-winning candidate". Would this work? In each round, if there is a not-yet-eliminated candidate who is ranked higher on more than half the ballots when that candidate is compared to each and every one of the other not-yet-eliminated candidates on a pairwise (one-on-one) basis, then this candidate shall be identified as the pairwise-winning candidate, and this pairwise-winning candidate shall be elected. > Even though for a pure Condorcet, equal ranking is allowed, this > does not work for IRV ... I concede that this issue of equal ranking is not worth your efforts in this situation. However, to participants in this forum I want to clarify that IRV can use fractional votes. Such IRV software would need to look through the ballots after each elimination round to determine how much weight (such as 0.25 if there are still 4 candidates ranked at the same preference level) is given to each candidate. The sum of the votes, including fractional votes, determines which candidate gets the fewest votes. BTW "fractional" votes does not refer to using fractions, but rather refers to splitting a three-way equal ranking into decimal equivalents such as 0.33 for one candidate and 0.33 for a second candidate and 0.33 for a third candidate. (Using actual fractions in software would be a nightmare.) I agree that fractional votes in STV (rather than IRV) would be a much bigger problem -- but even then I believe there are ways to avoid tossing out a ballot that uses equal rankings. Yes, such software requires more work, but it only needs to be done once by one person. Credibility for this opinion is based on my experience writing IRV counting code for use at VoteFair.org for comparison with VoteFair ranking results. Yes, IRV calculations are very messy when they are done right. (Using a "look-ahead" approach even ties can be handled nicely.) Yet IMO laziness is not a valid excuse when developing good software. Robert, thank you for considering my wording suggestions. Richard Fobes On 12/4/2019 9:09 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > >> On December 4, 2019 11:50 PM VoteFair wrote: >> >> >> >> In each round, if there is a not-yet-eliminated candidate who is ranked >> higher on more than half the ballots when that candidate is compared to >> each and every one of the other not-yet-eliminated candidates on a >> pairwise (one-on-one) basis, then that pairwise-winning candidate shall >> be elected. > > need to define the "pairwise-winning candidate". > >> I'll again repeat my point that the wordings being proposed do not >> specify what to do with ballots that rank more than one candidate at the >> same preference level. > > Even though for a pure Condorcet, equal ranking is allowed, this does not work for IRV because, when a single candidate is promoted to a voter's effective (contingency) first choice, IRV would not know which of the equally-ranked candidates to promote. That was clear in previous implementations of IRV. I am not sure that this languages needs to be on the ballot where voters consider and approve (or reject) IRV. But it must be on the Instructions to Voters on each ballot. > >> If voting will be done electronically then this >> issue will only affect the few ballots submitted by mail (such as from >> people overseas in military service), but otherwise this gap will allow >> many, many ballots to be discarded as "spoiled" even though they are >> marked in a reasonable way. > > I believe our paper-scan IRV software in 2009 was able to handle gaps in the ranking. You could rank #1, #2, then #5 and if no other ranks are marked, the #5 rank is effectively #3. All unranked candidates are tied for last place. > >> Again, good luck getting at least some improvements. > > Thank you. We shall see. > > Just now I sent the working language I had to the city councilors for consideration. Dunno if they'll listen. > > -- > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > From tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk Thu Dec 5 03:57:44 2019 From: tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk (Toby Pereira) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 11:57:44 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <1420786298.383659.1575510604383@privateemail.com> References: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> <1420786298.383659.1575510604383@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <713276326.6528727.1575547064528@mail.yahoo.com> I think the biggest problem with Schulze, more than that it is complicated to explain, is that you're basically asking people to take it on trust that it is even a method at all. From the Wikipedia article: "It can be proven that?{\displaystyle p[X,Y]>p[Y,X]}?and?{\displaystyle p[Y,Z]>p[Z,Y]}?together imply?{\displaystyle p[X,Z]>p[Z,X]}.[1]:?4.1?Therefore, it is guaranteed (1) that the above definition of "better" really defines a?transitive relation?and (2) that there is always at least one candidate?{\displaystyle D}?with?{\displaystyle p[D,E]\geq p[E,D]}?for every other candidate?{\displaystyle E}." "It can be proven". Well thanks. And also?https://rangevoting.org/SchulzeComplic.html "If the strongest path from L to W, is stronger than, or at least as strong as, the strongest path from W to L, and if this is?simultaneously?true for?every?L, then W is a "Schulze winner." Schulze proved the theorem that such a W always exists (at least using "margins"; I am confused re the "winning-votes" enhancement)." Even less convincing. I know I'm going a bit off-topic, but what is the estimated probability that Schulze and Ranked Pairs would give a different result in a real-life election? I'd be surprised if it was more than about 1 in 10,000, and where there was a different winner between them, neither winner would be so much obviously the "right" winner that it would cause protests in the streets if the other one were to win. On Thursday, 5 December 2019, 01:50:13 GMT, robert bristow-johnson wrote: Lotsa people to respond to.? I feel I must begin with Markus because, as a signal processing algorithmist, I have so much respect for Markus and for the Schulze method. I think I understand the Schulze beatpath method and agree with the consensus of the geeks that, technically, it is simply the best currently-known RCV method.? Most immune to all of these voting strategies. -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From juho.laatu at gmail.com Thu Dec 5 05:04:59 2019 From: juho.laatu at gmail.com (Juho Laatu) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 15:04:59 +0200 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <14240495.384166.1575516388949@privateemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <14240495.384166.1575516388949@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <91A922DD-765D-463A-905A-B1343C657762@gmail.com> I used the formulation in your first mail as a basis. It seems to be the same as the original in the mail below, except that it uses twice word "re-tabulation" instead of "retabulation". Technically I kept all the text identical (starting from "All elections of mayor ...", including all the four sections), except that there were some changes in section (3). My intention was to keep as much of the original text as possible to make your job of explaining the differences easy, and to make it easy to accept the new proposal. Also in section (3) the beginning part of the text is the same as before, and only the end (starting from "each voter?s ballot shall count ..." in the original version) has been rearranged, and some text added. The changed part starts with "if one of the continuing candidates is preferred ...". The only change to the original proposal below is thus to replace section (3) with the proposed new section (3). (and maybe to use term "retabulation") > The language in the brackets "more often than the other way around" needs to be different. I tried to keep the text as short as possible. If that optional part of text is needed, maybe there is some better formulation. If a longer and more straight forward version is needed, maybe something like "in more ballots than the other candidate is preferred over this candidate". If you need even more text, then that whole sentence ("In each round ... ... will be elected.") could be replaced with something like: "In each round every continuing candidate is compared separately to every other continuing candidate. if a candidate is ranked higher in higher number of ballots than the other candidate is ranked higher than this candidate, then this candidate is said to be preferred over the other candidate. If one continuing candidate is preferred over all other continuing candidates, then that candidate will be elected." In my proposal I used also text "[, when that candidate is compared to every other continuing candidate one by one]" instead of a possible short expression "[, in pairwise comparisons]". I note this just because you commented use of term "pairwise" in another mail. BR, Juho > On 05 Dec 2019, at 05:26, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > > >> On December 4, 2019 9:50 PM Juho Laatu wrote: >> >> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff re-tabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff re-tabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, if one of the continuing candidates is preferred [in the ranked ballots] over any other continuing candidate [more often than the other way around] [, when that candidate is compared to every other continuing candidate one by one], then that candidate will be elected. If there is no such candidate, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest, and the candidate with the fewest votes shall be eliminated. >> > > The language in the brackets "more often than the other way around" needs to be different. > > Juho, if you could take the following original and graft your (3) into it, that makes it something to compare to. > > Here is their (non-Condorcet RCV) original: > > ________________________________________________________ > > NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that, for the purpose of placing a charter change question on the March 3, 2020 town meeting election ballot, the City Council hereby refers the following question amending City Charter ? 5 to its Charter Change Committee for review and recommendation to the full City Council by its December 16, 2019 meeting, in order to reintroduce ranked choice voting for the election of the City?s mayor, city councilors, and school commissioners: > > ? 5 Election to be by ballot; method of election: > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a > ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in rounds. In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with the fewest votes after each round shall be eliminated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (4) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > ________________________________________________________ > > > Here is my latest BTR-STV stab at it: > > ________________________________________________________ > > NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that, for the purpose of placing a charter change question on the March 3, 2020 town meeting election ballot, the City Council hereby refers the following question amending City Charter ? 5 to its Charter Change Committee for review and recommendation to the full City Council by its December 16, 2019 meeting, in order to reintroduce ranked choice voting for the election of the City?s mayor, city councilors, and school commissioners: > > ? 5 Election to be by ballot; method of election: > > All elections of mayor, city councilors and school commissioners shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked choice voting without a separate runoff election. The chief administrative officer shall implement a ranked choice voting protocol according to these guidelines: > (1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. > (2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected. > (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "remaining candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been eliminated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is eliminated and all candidates begin as remaining candidates. > (4) In each round, each voter?s ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever remaining candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein designated as "A" and "B", shall be compared in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support is eliminated in the current round. If the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B exceeds the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is eliminated, and A remains for the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots having B ranked higher than A exceeds the number of ballots having A ranked higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is eliminated, and B remains for the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measure of voter support between A and B is tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated in the current round. > (5) This runoff retabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, is repeated until only two candidates remain, with the candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes being elected. > (6) The city council may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards. > ________________________________________________________ > > > > > -- > > > > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > > > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info From km_elmet at t-online.de Thu Dec 5 05:36:36 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 14:36:36 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <713276326.6528727.1575547064528@mail.yahoo.com> References: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> <1420786298.383659.1575510604383@privateemail.com> <713276326.6528727.1575547064528@mail.yahoo.com> Message-ID: On 05/12/2019 12.57, Toby Pereira wrote: > I think the biggest problem with Schulze, more than that it is > complicated to explain, is that you're basically asking people to take > it on trust that it is even a method at all. From the Wikipedia article: > > "It can be proven that?{\displaystyle p[X,Y]>p[Y,X]}p[X,Y] > > p[Y,X]?and?{\displaystyle p[Y,Z]>p[Z,Y]}p[Y,Z] > p[Z,Y]?together > imply?{\displaystyle p[X,Z]>p[Z,X]}p[X,Z] > p[Z,X].^[1] > > ^:?4.1 ?Therefore, it is guaranteed (1) that the above definition of > "/better/" really defines a?transitive relation > ?and (2) that there > is always at least one candidate?{\displaystyle D}D?with?{\displaystyle > p[D,E]\geq p[E,D]}{\displaystyle p[D,E]\geq p[E,D]}?for every other > candidate?{\displaystyle E}E." > > "It can be proven". Well thanks. And > also?https://rangevoting.org/SchulzeComplic.html Wikipedia makes it unnecessarily complex. A beatpath from X to Y is measured by the strength of its weakest link, and the path is constructed so that the weakest link is as strong as possible. If p[X,Y] is the strength of the beatpath from X to Y, and there's a cycle from X to Y to W to X, then that means that - the strongest path from X to W is weaker than the strongest path from W to X (since W beats X by beatpath), but also - the strongest path from X to W through Y is stronger than the strongest path from W to X (since X beats Y by beatpath, and Y beats W by beatpath). That's a contradiction, because "the strongest path from X to W" must be at least as strong as the one through Y. So cycles can't happen, so beatpaths are transitive. Still complex, but not nearly as daunting as Wikipedia's "it can be proven" makes it out to be. > "If the strongest path from L to W, is stronger than, or at least as > strong as, the strongest path from W to L, and if this > is?/simultaneously/?true for?/every/?L, then W is a "Schulze winner." > Schulze proved the theorem that such a W always exists (at least using > "margins"; I am confused re the "winning-votes" enhancement)." > > Even less convincing. That kind of follows from the transitivity. If there are no cycles, you can imagine running a sorting algorithm with "is p[X,Y] greater than or equal to p[Y,X]" as the >= operator, and you'd get an unambiguous order up to ties. Suppose it's a descending sort; then whoever is first in the sorted list beats or ties everybody else in that list by beatpath. > I know I'm going a bit off-topic, but what is the estimated probability > that Schulze and Ranked Pairs would give a different result in a > real-life election? I'd be surprised if it was more than about 1 in > 10,000, and where there was a different winner between them, neither > winner would be so much obviously the "right" winner that it would cause > protests in the streets if the other one were to win. It's low, although I couldn't quantify it because I don't know the distribution of a real-life election after people have become used to Condorcet. Even the question "would there be lots of Condorcet cycles" is unknown, and just extrapolating from current elections leads into the IRV trap (IRV works well on current elections, but then Burlington happens). I'd probably say RP is better than Schulze, at least as a stepping stone to proportional representation. It passes LIIA and can thus be used as a base method for elimination in an STV method that reduces to RP itself in the single-winner case, yet obeys Droop proportionality in the multiwinner case. The drawback is that ties are much messier, and any recount would need to know just how pairwise ties were broken the first time. But perhaps that doesn't matter with a very large election; the chance of a perfect pairwise tie between any pair of candidates could well vanish to zero. And Schulze is more well known, inasfar as any Condorcet method is well known :-) From km_elmet at t-online.de Thu Dec 5 05:39:48 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 14:39:48 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <9eba801a-1031-8c1e-4396-31777f20cd0d@adam.com.au> References: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> <64db3ddf-9346-3075-1cdd-5c4638b3a016@t-online.de> <9eba801a-1031-8c1e-4396-31777f20cd0d@adam.com.au> Message-ID: On 05/12/2019 02.52, C.Benham wrote: >> Does Benham pass independence of clones? > Yes. > >> On a longer term, I agree that Schulze is better than Woodall or Benham >> (perhaps with the exception if the voters are very strategic), but it >> doesn't seem Robert has the luxury of going for one of the advanced >> Condorcet methods. > > Benham? is more resistant to Burial than Schulze.?? A candidate who is > top-ranked on more > than a third of the ballots can't be successfully Buried. That's why I added the strategy exemption. I know that the methods that generalize Minmax are easier to strategize against than are the Smith-IRV hybrids -- Green-Armytage's paper is clear enough about that, and that the main reason is burial. I've been trying to construct a voting method that is just as resistant (or nearly so) while also being monotone (and Smith). I'm pretty sure what it would look like with three candidates without equal-rank (fpA-fpC), but I've been completely stumped on four and more. But recently I've had somewhat of a break: now I know, at least, how to go about the process instead of fumbling my way by brute force. Now if I just had the time, I could perhaps write a paper of my own about it. But there's quite a bit of work to do yet before I have a method, and I suspect its implementation will look very strange due to the way the construction works. From greg.dennis at voterchoicema.org Thu Dec 5 18:50:43 2019 From: greg.dennis at voterchoicema.org (Greg Dennis) Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 21:50:43 -0500 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> Message-ID: Agreed. It seems like a bit of revisionist history to portray the cause of the repeal to be the failure to elect the Condorcet candidate. As has been noted, the repeal effort was led by the Republican Wright and his allies who felt that he should have won because he had the most first choices. Among the three leading candidates Wright was the Condorcet _loser_; his supporters wanted a plurality result, a result even further removed from any sense of majority. By electing Kiss, at least IRV chose a candidate in the smallest mutual majority set. Wright supporters didn't like the idea of a winner who in their mind "came in second," and you wouldn't have placated them by electing someone who (again, in their mind) "came in third." If anything, you probably would have been in a more precarious political situation. Let's also remember that there was _not_ widespread displeasure with the result in the immediate aftermath of the election. The Republicans were not happy, sure, but it was only after Kiss' Burlington Telecom scandal that the broader public turned against him. Burlington lacked a mayoral recall process, and Wright and his supporters were able to successfully make the IRV repeal effort into a referendum on the mayor. It was an insincere but savvy political hit job at a time where IRV was still perceived as new and exotic to many. For what it's worth, there have been about 250 IRV elections in the US since San Francisco started using it in 2004, many of which were highly contested between three or more candidates, and that Burlington 2009 race remains the one and only one where the Condorcet candidate was not elected. It seems to me that if you care about the Condorcet candidate winning, IRV is a big step forward to that end. Greg On Tue, Dec 3, 2019, 8:21 PM C.Benham wrote: > I think that making sure that the voters can strictly rank from the top > however many candidates they wish is more important > than making sure the method elects the voted Condorcet winner. > > I think that IRV/RCV (with one-at-a-time elimination) that meets that > requirement has the most merit relative to its traction and > comprehensibility. > > But if we do want to insist on compliance with the Condorcet criterion, > necessarily at the expense of making the making the method vulnerable to > Burying > strategy and losing compliance with the (popular with IRV supporters) > Later-no-Harm criterion, then I don't like Bottom-Two Runoff. > > It would be much better to check before each normal IRV-style > elimination that the candidate you are considering eliminating doesn't > pairwise-beat all the > remaining candidates. If it does the process should stop and that > candidate should win. > > That would be a quite good Condorcet method. > > Chris Benham > > > On 4/12/2019 9:26 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > > > >> On December 3, 2019 5:13 PM Juho Laatu wrote: > >> > >> > >> My simple thoughts on this: > >> > >> - You ask: Do you agree that in problematic situations, like what > happened in 2009, the result should be different? > >> - They answer: Yes. > >> - You say: This is a problem that is fortunately quite easily to fix. > The most straight forward way to enhance the method is to use the > Bottom-Two Runoff. The losing candidate one of the two candidates with > least votes will be eliminated. > >> - They say: Ok, let's see if that would be our ideal solution. > >> - You say: Ok, let's start from there. > >> > > Juho, this is **exactly** my strategy. But there is a little bit of an > issue about "let's start from there". Here is the latest news regarding > yesterday's Council meeting and RCV: > > > > > https://vtdigger.org/2019/12/03/burlington-considers-instant-runoff-voting-for-most-city-races/ > > > > What has happened is that the Progs have "succeeded" in fending off an > amendment to take more time and investigate alternatives to the IRV method > of RCV. They want, really badly, to get this on the ballot for this coming > Town Meeting Day in March 2020. The latest that the Council can decide to > include this on the ballot is in 13 days. And in 6 days is when the > Charter Change Committee will consider this proposed ballot item, fix any > language, and recommend it to the Council on Dec 16. > > > > I am afraid that putting this on the ballot "half-baked", with > effectively no change from what we had in 2009 and acknowledging no error > from the 2009 election, will result in March in rejection by the majority > of voters and will, again, set back voting reform for another decade. So I > want to make a good effort at changing the language from regular-old IRV to > BTR-STV. And hopefully get that change adopted by the Charter Change > Committee and sent up to the Council to consider for inclusion on the > ballot. Then we can tell voters that this IRV is different from the 2009 > IRV and would have corrected the failure of IRV we had in 2009. > > > > I believe that Schulze is technically the best RCV, but since Schulze > and Ranked-Pairs will elect the same candidate when the Smith set is 3 > candidates or fewer, my favorite would be RP using margins for a > governmental election because its method is easier to understand and encode > into legal language that laypersons can read and understand. Also, we > would be able to say to the IRV haters that this RP RCV is not IRV at all. > > > > However, we can't say that about BTR-STV because, after all, it *is* a > form of Instant Runoff Voting, but and IRV method that *will* elect the > Pairwise Champion (the term that I will use to denote the Condorcet > Winner). But, given the circumstances (that an IRV proposal is in the > works right now), I think this is the best action I can hope to take. I > would have to admit that this Condorcet-compliant IRV is still IRV. The > Progs won't mind and other naive RCV supporters won't mind, but the IRV > haters, particularly those who hated the IRV winner in 2009 will always > hate IRV or any RCV, but I would still rather be promoting an RCV that is > *not* IRV (no runoff rounds). > > > > I am taking Kristofer's language suggestions and possibly modifying. I > would like to see language suggestions from others. Either way, I will > post what language I finally will submit to the Charter Change Committee. > They will probably reject my submission, but I will tell them plainly that > if they are offering RCV that is no different from the IRV that resulted in > the 2009 failure and was repealed by voters the following year, that their > proposed charter change will be rejected by the majority of voters on Town > Meeting Day. And this will likely set back voting reform by another decade. > > > >> BR, Juho > > and also to you, Juho. i am appreciative of any help or language or > analysis suggestions from you or anyone. > > > > > > -- > > > > r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com > > > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list > info > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From km_elmet at t-online.de Fri Dec 6 01:42:13 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2019 10:42:13 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> Message-ID: On 06/12/2019 03.50, Greg Dennis wrote: > Agreed. > > It seems like a bit of revisionist history to portray the cause of the > repeal to be the failure to elect the Condorcet candidate. As has been > noted, the repeal effort was led by the Republican Wright and his allies > who felt that he should have won because he had the most first choices. > Among the three leading candidates Wright was the Condorcet _loser_; his > supporters wanted a plurality result, a result even further removed from > any sense of majority. By electing Kiss, at least IRV chose a candidate > in the smallest mutual majority set. > > Wright supporters didn't like the idea of a winner who in their mind > "came in second," and you wouldn't have placated them by electing > someone who (again, in their mind) "came in third." If anything, you > probably would have been in a more precarious political situation. On the other hand, when the method fails to elect the CW, it gives opponents a group of allies almost immediately: namely, the majority who preferred the CW to whoever *was* elected. If the CW is elected, there is no such majority (by definition), and anti-repeal forces would have to compose multiple majorities together. The point that the recall was a "hit job" kind of reinforces the point. If Montroll was a better liked candidate in the Condorcet sense, then it would presumably have been harder to arrange a hit against him. > For what it's worth, there have been about 250 IRV elections in the US > since San Francisco started using it in 2004, many of which were highly > contested between three or more candidates, and that Burlington 2009 > race remains the one and only one where the Condorcet candidate was not > elected. It seems to me that if you care about the Condorcet candidate > winning, IRV is a big step forward to that end. A Condorcetist would probably say that this only supports his point. If the chance that IRV is repealed is lower whenever the CW is elected, then it's important to elect the CW, so why not ensure that the CW is elected whenever he exists? (There are two not very complex ways of doing so, as this thread has shown: Benham and BTR-IRV. So I don't really see the reason not to. Is this about later-no-harm?) From voting at ukscientists.com Fri Dec 6 03:38:24 2019 From: voting at ukscientists.com (Richard Lung) Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2019 11:38:24 +0000 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <1420786298.383659.1575510604383@privateemail.com> References: <5de811fd.1c69fb81.bc081.1488@mx.google.com> <1420786298.383659.1575510604383@privateemail.com> Message-ID: <1465a640-af5d-39fe-6eb0-e72253c8006d@ukscientists.com> No, of course you "can't have FAB STV", which is no more than a blueprint of a book at present and quite likely for my life-time (as with Meek). You've mixed this Richard (Lung of FAB STV) with the other Richard, Richard Fobes:? "(and I don't think that Richard's 4a, 4b, 4c is an improvement)". My (Richard L's) contribution to the debate, such as it is, is to see the bigger picture. Going thru the posts, I think it fair to say they are generally about elimination methods. But these generally are about safest ways of getting rid of losing candidates, and that sacrifices preferential information. The objective should be to make the most use of the information. This is what my old statistics lecturer told me about statistics fifty years ago. (FAB STV is a statistical election method.) Even more broadly speaking, the attitude of finding a winner is what Mill called maiorocracy, the tyranny of the majority, not democracy. I know you are dealing with practical politics, I don't want to get in the way of that (apologies if needed) but do you know your ultimate destination? Not IRV, with or without CW, surely? Richard L. On 05/12/2019 01:50, robert bristow-johnson wrote: > Lotsa people to respond to. I feel I must begin with Markus because, as a signal processing algorithmist, I have so much respect for Markus and for the Schulze method. > > I think I understand the Schulze beatpath method and agree with the consensus of the geeks that, technically, it is simply the best currently-known RCV method. Most immune to all of these voting strategies. > > But I consider cycles to be an extremely rare outcome of any Condorcet-compliant ranked choice system. And, while it's uncommon (perhaps happened only with Burlington a decade ago) for an STV or Hare or whoever IRV to not elect the Condorcet winner, we found out that it can happen at least once. Appears to be the only RCV election held by a government that did not elect the Condorcet winner, but my concern is that a voting system that does not always elect the Condorcet winner may become law again in the very city where this IRV failure occurred. > > If I had my druthers, I would perhaps plug Ranked Pairs because RP will always elect the same winner as Schulze in the case of a Smith set of 3 or less. A cycle in a governmental election will be rare, but a cycle involving more than 3 candidates happening in a governmental election is, I think, virtually astronomically unlikely. Ranked Pairs is, for me, so much easier to describe than beatpaths. Markus, to be totally honest with you, I just don't think that Schulze has an ice-cube's chance in getting adopted for a governmental election. But maybe another, simpler-to-describe Condorcet-compliant method can. > > So if I had my druthers, it would not be BTR-STV. But here I am in Burlington Vermont of all places. At least in this town, we should be aware of how election reform was set back a generation (assuming it takes another decade to finally get RCV to return to this 3-party town) when this IRV hiccup occurred a decade ago. Now the Progs are actively trying to get the same-old IRV, repackaged as "RCV", but no different than what failed us in 2009. They have already submitted language for how the question will appear on the ballot. They sorta left this to the last minute to try to punch it through without argument to get on the ballot. The city council must make the inclusion decision in 12 days. If they do not put the question on the ballot, it will delay the decision for a year, but charter change is also state law, so it will take another year to get enacted. And they want this in place for the next mayoral election. That's why the current push on this legislation. > > My only hope and my only intention is to try to persuade some skeptical people in the Vermont Progressive Party that their submitted language can be changed without breaking RCV. I know they will come back and say my language is too complicated and theirs is simpler. I will tell them that theirs is simpler and wrong and point out exactly why in what happened in 2009 (I can post that letter to the list, if people are interested in how I do politiking). But I want to show them language that is the least amount of change from their language, but will result in a Condorcet-compliant method. > > I will feel like I succeeded and gained something if **any** Condorcet-compliant RCV method is adopted, but if they don't change the language, I will hold my nose and still support the old, crappy IRV, if that is what gets on the ballot. That would be better than electing Mayor 41% and that is what we are potentially in danger of now. > > So I can't have Schulze, I can't have Tideman, I can't have FAB-STV (and I don't think that Richard's 4a, 4b, 4c is an improvement), I can't have Instant Pairwise Elimination. I can't expect to, in 5 days, walk into the room where the Charter Change Committee meets and tell them to totally replace their entire language with something completely different (except for the ranked ballot). The best I can hope for is language that changes how the candidate is eliminated in STV, so that the Condorcet winner is never eliminated. That's what BTR-STV is good for; it is a political increment (when RCV becomes Condorcet-compliant) and sometimes increments in reform is all we can hope for. > > So, for reasons of political practicality, it's gotta be BTR-STV or it goes back to Hare STV. And that will also be a fight. RCV might lose in either case and we continue with FPTP with 40% minimum. But also a bad outcome would be if the same IRV was returned to statute and we had another failure like we had in 2009. Then voting reform will be set back for a lot more than a generation. At least if we can get an IRV that is Condorcized, we won't have a repeat of 2009 and the repeal that happened the year after. > > So the only thing that helps is good, concise language for BTR-STV that retains the form of the original language that I posted, has one part that is different, and I get to defend that one part that is different. That's all I can get away with. > > Thanks, y'all for your attention and comments. So far, I am sticking with my language, but I can be convinced that some other is better, if the suggestion comes from understanding what political and time constraints I have at the moment. > > bestest, > > robert > >> On December 4, 2019 3:06 PM Markus Schulze wrote: >> >> >> Dear Robert Bristow-Johnson, >> >> the best possible election method according to the >> underlying heuristic of instant-runoff voting will >> always be instant-runoff voting. Therefore, I don't >> think that any supporter of instant-runoff voting >> will be convinced by a hybrid of Condorcet voting >> and instant-runoff voting. >> >> Bottom-two runoff violates monotonicity and reversal >> symmetry. Therefore, when you promote bottom-two >> runoff, you cannot use these criteria against >> instant-runoff voting. >> >> Bottom-two runoff violates independence of clones >> while instant-runoff voting satisfies independence >> of clones. Therefore, this criterion will be used >> against bottom-two runoff. >> >> When you promote bottom-two runoff and fail to >> convince the audience about the importance of the >> Condorcet criterion, you don't have any arguments >> anymore against instant-runoff. >> >> I strongly recommend that you should promote the >> Schulze method because of the following reasons: >> >> (1) The Schulze method satisfies not only the >> Condorcet criterion, but also monotonicity, >> reversal symmetry, independence of clones and many >> other criteria. Therefore, the Schulze method is a >> very good method even when there is no Condorcet >> winner or when you fail to convince the audience >> about the importance of the Condorcet criterion. >> >> (2) The Schulze method is currently the most >> wide-spread Condorcet method. >> >> (3) The Schulze method has been published in an >> important peer-reviewed journal: >> >> Markus Schulze, "A new monotonic, clone-independent, >> reversal symmetric, and Condorcet-consistent >> single-winner election method", Social Choice and >> Welfare, volume 36, issue 2, pages 267-303, 2011, >> DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 >> >> Here are some useful links: >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method >> >> https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ERRE/Brief/BR8397842/br-external/SchulzeMarkus-e.pdf >> >> Markus Schulze >> >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info > -- > > r b-jrbj at audioimagination.com > > "Imagination is more important than knowledge." > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - seehttps://electorama.com/em for list info > From fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com Fri Dec 6 04:48:57 2019 From: fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com (fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com) Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2019 07:48:57 -0500 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> Message-ID: <5673-1575636564-297739@sneakemail.com> On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 9:50 PM Greg Dennis wrote: > It seems like a bit of revisionist history to portray the cause of the > repeal to be the failure to elect the Condorcet candidate. As has been > noted, the repeal effort was led by the Republican Wright and his allies > who felt that he should have won because he had the most first choices. > The repeal effort was supported by both Republicans (who would win under FPTP) and Democrats (who would win under Condorcet), no? "We waited to bring in the signatures because we didn't want this to be about [Republican] Kurt Wright losing after being ahead, or [Democrat] Andy Montroll *who had more first and second place votes and didn't win*. We wanted this to be about IRV." https://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/burlington-residents-seek-repeal-of-instant-runoff-voting/Content?oid=2177125 > For what it's worth, there have been about 250 IRV elections in the US > since San Francisco started using it in 2004, many of which were highly > contested between three or more candidates, and that Burlington 2009 race > remains the one and only one where the Condorcet candidate was not elected. > It seems to me that if you care about the Condorcet candidate winning, IRV > is a big step forward to that end. > But in how many of those elections were there more than two strong candidates? IRV electing the Condorcet winner in a bunch of uncontested elections isn't especially impressive. On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 10:54 AM robert bristow-johnson wrote: > I want to figure out some good language to change this from regular-old > IRV to Bottom-Two Runoff, Single Transferable Vote, BTR-STV . If someone > is good at writing legal language or if this BTR-STV has had legislative > language written for it somewhere else, I would like to see it. > Has BTR-STV been used in the real world or analyzed academically? There are only two sentences about it on Electowiki. I know Nanson/Baldwin methods have both going for them, and they're Condorcet and relatively simple to explain to someone familiar with IRV: "Instead of eliminating the candidate with the least number of first-preference votes (which results in vote-splitting and discards some voters' preferences), you eliminate the candidate with the worst average ranking." "In contrast to the Borda rule, our experiments with Baldwin?s and Nanson?s rules demonstrate that both of them are often more difficult to manipulate in practice. These results suggest that elimination style voting rules deserve further study." http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.005 -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From km_elmet at t-online.de Fri Dec 6 15:09:08 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 00:09:08 +0100 Subject: [EM] BTR-like phrasing of Benham Message-ID: <0d2818a3-30eb-67b2-19bb-ed5768543632@t-online.de> Here's a BTR-IRV-like phrasing of Benham. The ballot counters would probably not appreciate the extra work, but there's a benefit that it can easily be used in STV as well: - When choosing a candidate to eliminate, consider the two candidates A and B with fewest first preference votes (A having fewer than B). If A wins a runoff against every other remaining candidate, eliminate B; otherwise, eliminate A. This works because if, after some eliminations, X is the CW among the remaining candidates, then X will never be eliminated after that point. Thus the candidate who remains until the end is the Benham winner. It works in STV as well because as long as the election and surplus distribution based on first preferences work the way they do in STV, the method passes Droop proportionality, no matter what candidates are eliminated. Similarly, transplanting the BTR elimination mechanism onto STV will preserve Droop proportionality. I think Rob suggested that the eliminated candidate for STV-ME (BTR-IRV's STV analog) should be the loser of a Condorcet method's election among the (s+1) candidates with the fewest votes, where s is the number of seats remaining to elect candidates to. That strikes me as a little too complex, though. Just basing the method on globally preserving the CW is easier, although it might produce somewhat of a centrist bias within each solid coalition. Then again, it might not, given how the surplus distribution works. E.g. the first solid coalition would elect a global CW if there is one among it; but then everybody who voted for this global CW in first place after eliminations would be deweighted, so that later "CWs" would be biased in the opposite direction, somewhat. It's hard to tell. Even if it's centrist-biased, that might not be a bad thing. See e.g. arguments for deliberately giving the center greater weight in an otherwise proportional system to limit unfair kingmaker scenarios. From km_elmet at t-online.de Fri Dec 6 15:22:30 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 00:22:30 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <5673-1575636564-297739@sneakemail.com> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> <5673-1575636564-297739@sneakemail.com> Message-ID: <8dd6b5fe-4eee-cb80-56c1-8442e27e0302@t-online.de> On 06/12/2019 13.48, fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com wrote: > Has?BTR-STV been used in the real world or analyzed academically?? There > are only two sentences about it on Electowiki. Warren has written a bit about it here: https://rangevoting.org/BtrIrv.html (He states that every Condorcet method fails mono-add-top, which I don't think is true, but his example does show that BTR-IRV fails mono-add-top.) On a funny note, a dance contest program on TV here uses a judging method that could be seen as a variant of BTR-IRV (if you're willing to be very generous). It works like this: At the end of each program, the judges provide their rating of the contestants, and then the callers provide their rating by number of calls and web votes. Those are combined to produce an overall rating, and then the two bottom contestants do a repetition of their dances, during which the callers vote on who gets to continue on to the next program and who is eliminated. It's "like" BTR-IRV since there's a ranking, and the bottom two are subject to a runoff, and the loser of the runoff is eliminated. But it's a real runoff (not instant), and the initial "round" (program)'s ranking is based on ratings, not on first preferences. I don't think BTR-IRV has been used in public elections anywhere, unlike Borda-elimination (as you point out below). > I know Nanson/Baldwin methods have both going for them, and they're > Condorcet and relatively simple to explain to someone familiar with IRV: > "Instead of eliminating the candidate with the least number of > first-preference votes (which results in vote-splitting and discards > some voters' preferences), you eliminate the candidate with the worst > average ranking." > > > "In contrast to the Borda rule, our experiments with Baldwin?s and > Nanson?s rules demonstrate that both of them are often more difficult to > manipulate in practice. These results suggest that elimination style > voting rules deserve further > study."?http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.005 James Green-Armytage's paper on strategic resistance seems to put Nanson/Baldwin around the same manipulability level as Minmax. http://jamesgreenarmytage.com/strategy-utility.pdf page 18. From voting at ukscientists.com Sat Dec 7 03:22:59 2019 From: voting at ukscientists.com (Richard Lung) Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 11:22:59 +0000 Subject: [EM] BTR-like phrasing of Benham In-Reply-To: <0d2818a3-30eb-67b2-19bb-ed5768543632@t-online.de> References: <0d2818a3-30eb-67b2-19bb-ed5768543632@t-online.de> Message-ID: <6ace1ecc-23e1-761a-7998-be22612cd234@ukscientists.com> I see you are still eliminating. It reminds of the Daleks: "Exterminate, Exterminate! EXTERMINATE!" (It's not democracy.) Richard L. On 06/12/2019 23:09, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > Here's a BTR-IRV-like phrasing of Benham. The ballot counters would > probably not appreciate the extra work, but there's a benefit that it > can easily be used in STV as well: > > - When choosing a candidate to eliminate, consider the two candidates A > and B with fewest first preference votes (A having fewer than B). If A > wins a runoff against every other remaining candidate, eliminate B; > otherwise, eliminate A. > > This works because if, after some eliminations, X is the CW among the > remaining candidates, then X will never be eliminated after that point. > Thus the candidate who remains until the end is the Benham winner. It > works in STV as well because as long as the election and surplus > distribution based on first preferences work the way they do in STV, the > method passes Droop proportionality, no matter what candidates are > eliminated. > > Similarly, transplanting the BTR elimination mechanism onto STV will > preserve Droop proportionality. I think Rob suggested that the > eliminated candidate for STV-ME (BTR-IRV's STV analog) should be the > loser of a Condorcet method's election among the (s+1) candidates with > the fewest votes, where s is the number of seats remaining to elect > candidates to. That strikes me as a little too complex, though. > > Just basing the method on globally preserving the CW is easier, although > it might produce somewhat of a centrist bias within each solid > coalition. Then again, it might not, given how the surplus distribution > works. E.g. the first solid coalition would elect a global CW if there > is one among it; but then everybody who voted for this global CW in > first place after eliminations would be deweighted, so that later "CWs" > would be biased in the opposite direction, somewhat. It's hard to tell. > > Even if it's centrist-biased, that might not be a bad thing. See e.g. > arguments for deliberately giving the center greater weight in an > otherwise proportional system to limit unfair kingmaker scenarios. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info > From km_elmet at t-online.de Sat Dec 7 06:55:02 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 15:55:02 +0100 Subject: [EM] BTR-like phrasing of Benham In-Reply-To: <6ace1ecc-23e1-761a-7998-be22612cd234@ukscientists.com> References: <0d2818a3-30eb-67b2-19bb-ed5768543632@t-online.de> <6ace1ecc-23e1-761a-7998-be22612cd234@ukscientists.com> Message-ID: <18230ac2-f180-d5dc-a89f-b1a7a293d690@t-online.de> On 07/12/2019 12.22, Richard Lung wrote: > I see you are still eliminating. > It reminds of the Daleks: "Exterminate, Exterminate! EXTERMINATE!" > > (It's not democracy.) Tell that to the IRVists :-) I have plenty of non-elimination methods too. (And your quote reminds me of a snarky robot sidekick from a game; he says that in jest at one point.) From voting at ukscientists.com Sat Dec 7 10:32:00 2019 From: voting at ukscientists.com (Richard Lung) Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 18:32:00 +0000 Subject: [EM] BTR-like phrasing of Benham In-Reply-To: <18230ac2-f180-d5dc-a89f-b1a7a293d690@t-online.de> References: <0d2818a3-30eb-67b2-19bb-ed5768543632@t-online.de> <6ace1ecc-23e1-761a-7998-be22612cd234@ukscientists.com> <18230ac2-f180-d5dc-a89f-b1a7a293d690@t-online.de> Message-ID: "Tell that to the IRVists" is not an argument. You could say that about any system partisans. Richard L. On 07/12/2019 14:55, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 07/12/2019 12.22, Richard Lung wrote: >> I see you are still eliminating. >> It reminds of the Daleks: "Exterminate, Exterminate! EXTERMINATE!" >> >> (It's not democracy.) > Tell that to the IRVists :-) I have plenty of non-elimination methods too. > > (And your quote reminds me of a snarky robot sidekick from a game; he > says that in jest at one point.) > From km_elmet at t-online.de Sat Dec 7 12:22:06 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 21:22:06 +0100 Subject: [EM] BTR-like phrasing of Benham In-Reply-To: References: <0d2818a3-30eb-67b2-19bb-ed5768543632@t-online.de> <6ace1ecc-23e1-761a-7998-be22612cd234@ukscientists.com> <18230ac2-f180-d5dc-a89f-b1a7a293d690@t-online.de> Message-ID: On 07/12/2019 19.32, Richard Lung wrote: > "Tell that to the IRVists" is not an argument. You could say that about > any system partisans. It's not an argument against the claim "elimination is bad". It's an explanation of the context. At this point, I think the best way to highlight that context is simply to quote Robert: > So if I had my druthers, it would not be BTR-STV. But here I am in Burlington Vermont of all places. In other words, if you have to choose a method in a vacuum, it should not be BTR-STV. If you have to choose a method in a vacuum and the electorate is strategic and you want to use Benham, you should not use my language to implement it. The whole point of the language is to produce something that is close enough to IRV to be acceptable to the partisans or partisan-friendly. If you didn't have that constraint, you wouldn't need to do that. But for people who are in that situation, my language could be useful. (Now, if I were to argue in favor of or against elimination as a mechanism, I would've said something entirely different :-) From voting at ukscientists.com Sat Dec 7 14:01:56 2019 From: voting at ukscientists.com (Richard Lung) Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 22:01:56 +0000 Subject: [EM] BTR-like phrasing of Benham In-Reply-To: References: <0d2818a3-30eb-67b2-19bb-ed5768543632@t-online.de> <6ace1ecc-23e1-761a-7998-be22612cd234@ukscientists.com> <18230ac2-f180-d5dc-a89f-b1a7a293d690@t-online.de> Message-ID: <87ecb3a6-aa3e-c006-0bf8-f3daae8cfff4@ukscientists.com> Alright, fair point. Thankyou for troubling to explain. I think American electoral reform is going adrift, in preference without proportion, as others go adrift in the other direction (proportion without preference). An either a vote reform or a count reform will not solve the problem of representation. Richard L. On 07/12/2019 20:22, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 07/12/2019 19.32, Richard Lung wrote: >> "Tell that to the IRVists" is not an argument. You could say that about >> any system partisans. > It's not an argument against the claim "elimination is bad". It's an > explanation of the context. At this point, I think the best way to > highlight that context is simply to quote Robert: > >> So if I had my druthers, it would not be BTR-STV. But here I am in Burlington Vermont of all places. > In other words, if you have to choose a method in a vacuum, it should > not be BTR-STV. If you have to choose a method in a vacuum and the > electorate is strategic and you want to use Benham, you should not use > my language to implement it. > > The whole point of the language is to produce something that is close > enough to IRV to be acceptable to the partisans or partisan-friendly. If > you didn't have that constraint, you wouldn't need to do that. But for > people who are in that situation, my language could be useful. > > (Now, if I were to argue in favor of or against elimination as a > mechanism, I would've said something entirely different :-) > From cbenham at adam.com.au Sat Dec 7 18:27:23 2019 From: cbenham at adam.com.au (C.Benham) Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2019 12:57:23 +1030 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <8dd6b5fe-4eee-cb80-56c1-8442e27e0302@t-online.de> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> <5673-1575636564-297739@sneakemail.com> <8dd6b5fe-4eee-cb80-56c1-8442e27e0302@t-online.de> Message-ID: <91b0fb4c-de07-8a13-23bb-5474b60b8d6d@adam.com.au> > Warren has written a bit about it here: https://rangevoting.org/BtrIrv.html > > (He states that every Condorcet method fails mono-add-top, which I don't > think is true, but his example does show that BTR-IRV fails mono-add-top.) All Smith methods fail mono-add-top, but? MinMax Margins meets both Condorcet and mono-add-top. (One of it's alternative algorithms is just elect the candidate who needs the fewest extra bullet votes to be the CW.) But looking at that link I saw something different: > Like IRV, it suffers from "add-top failure > ." Of course IRV meets mono-add-top.? A candidate can only be eliminated by having a shortage of top-rankings. No ballot's lower rankings can have any bearing on the result until the higher-ranked candidates have been eliminated. So if X is winning and then we add some ballots with X voted top, X cannot possibly be harmed if the method is IRV. Chris Benham On 7/12/2019 9:52 am, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 06/12/2019 13.48, fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com wrote: > >> Has?BTR-STV been used in the real world or analyzed academically?? There >> are only two sentences about it on Electowiki. > Warren has written a bit about it here: https://rangevoting.org/BtrIrv.html > > (He states that every Condorcet method fails mono-add-top, which I don't > think is true, but his example does show that BTR-IRV fails mono-add-top.) > > On a funny note, a dance contest program on TV here uses a judging > method that could be seen as a variant of BTR-IRV (if you're willing to > be very generous). It works like this: > > At the end of each program, the judges provide their rating of the > contestants, and then the callers provide their rating by number of > calls and web votes. Those are combined to produce an overall rating, > and then the two bottom contestants do a repetition of their dances, > during which the callers vote on who gets to continue on to the next > program and who is eliminated. > > It's "like" BTR-IRV since there's a ranking, and the bottom two are > subject to a runoff, and the loser of the runoff is eliminated. But it's > a real runoff (not instant), and the initial "round" (program)'s ranking > is based on ratings, not on first preferences. > > I don't think BTR-IRV has been used in public elections anywhere, unlike > Borda-elimination (as you point out below). > >> I know Nanson/Baldwin methods have both going for them, and they're >> Condorcet and relatively simple to explain to someone familiar with IRV: >> "Instead of eliminating the candidate with the least number of >> first-preference votes (which results in vote-splitting and discards >> some voters' preferences), you eliminate the candidate with the worst >> average ranking." >> >> >> "In contrast to the Borda rule, our experiments with Baldwin?s and >> Nanson?s rules demonstrate that both of them are often more difficult to >> manipulate in practice. These results suggest that elimination style >> voting rules deserve further >> study."?http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.005 > James Green-Armytage's paper on strategic resistance seems to put > Nanson/Baldwin around the same manipulability level as Minmax. > http://jamesgreenarmytage.com/strategy-utility.pdf page 18. > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: From cbenham at adam.com.au Sun Dec 8 00:48:13 2019 From: cbenham at adam.com.au (C.Benham) Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2019 19:18:13 +1030 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> Message-ID: <07b0036d-2166-dbdd-2d59-632e135bc8b6@adam.com.au> >> For what it's worth, there have been about 250 IRV elections in the US >> since San Francisco started using it in 2004, many of which were highly >> contested between three or more candidates, and that Burlington 2009 >> race remains the one and only one where the Condorcet candidate was not >> elected. It seems to me that if you care about the Condorcet candidate >> winning, IRV is a big step forward to that end. > A Condorcetist would probably say that this only supports his point. If > the chance that IRV is repealed is lower whenever the CW is elected, > then it's important to elect the CW, so why not ensure that the CW is > elected whenever he exists? > > (There are two not very complex ways of doing so, as this thread has > shown: Benham and BTR-IRV. So I don't really see the reason not to. Is > this about later-no-harm?) Obviously if we are only? (or perhaps just mainly) interested in electing the CW, then a Condorcet method is a bigger advance over FPP than? IRV. Later-no-harm is a big part of pro-IRV propaganda, but I don't put a big value on it in single-winner elections.? In single-winner elections I put a much bigger value on Later-no-Help, beacuse meeting that means that the method isn't vulnerable to Burial strategy. Compliance with Mono-add-Top is also nice. And I repeat that I think making sure that voters can (at least strictly) rank however many candidates they wish is more important than IRV versus Benham. Using some sort of ratings (or grading) ballot that limits the number of ranking/rating levels (to maybe as few as four) may be acceptable for some Condorcet methods, but never limiting the absolute number of candidates the voter is allowed to vote above bottom (or equal-bottom). Some people here don't like the Australian practice of declaring ballots that include any above-bottom equal-ranking to be "invalid" and not counting them towards the result. I repeat this is my recommended way of handling above-bottom equal-rankings in IRV or Benham: In any given round first we determine the fractional totals of each candidate. So ballots that equal-top rank (among remaining candidates) A and B? contribute half a vote to each of A and B. Those that vote equal-top A and B and C conrtibute a third of a vote to each of A and B and C (and so on). Then the ballots that equal top-rank more than one candidate are assigned in full to the one of those with the highest fractional total. The candidate with the lowest thus-derived total is eliminated. The point of this is to make Pushover strategising more difficult, and also it is consistent? with the "sincere STV" idea that the voter is anxious to maximise the chance that one of his/her favourites (among remaining candidates) should make it into the next round. Chris Benham On 6/12/2019 8:12 pm, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: > On 06/12/2019 03.50, Greg Dennis wrote: >> Agreed. >> >> It seems like a bit of revisionist history to portray the cause of the >> repeal to be the failure to elect the Condorcet candidate. As has been >> noted, the repeal effort was led by the Republican Wright and his allies >> who felt that he should have won because he had the most first choices. >> Among the three leading candidates Wright was the Condorcet _loser_; his >> supporters wanted a plurality result, a result even further removed from >> any sense of majority. By electing Kiss, at least IRV chose a candidate >> in the smallest mutual majority set. >> >> Wright supporters didn't like the idea of a winner who in their mind >> "came in second," and you wouldn't have placated them by electing >> someone who (again, in their mind) "came in third." If anything, you >> probably would have been in a more precarious political situation. > On the other hand, when the method fails to elect the CW, it gives > opponents a group of allies almost immediately: namely, the majority who > preferred the CW to whoever *was* elected. If the CW is elected, there > is no such majority (by definition), and anti-repeal forces would have > to compose multiple majorities together. > > The point that the recall was a "hit job" kind of reinforces the point. > If Montroll was a better liked candidate in the Condorcet sense, then it > would presumably have been harder to arrange a hit against him. > >> For what it's worth, there have been about 250 IRV elections in the US >> since San Francisco started using it in 2004, many of which were highly >> contested between three or more candidates, and that Burlington 2009 >> race remains the one and only one where the Condorcet candidate was not >> elected. It seems to me that if you care about the Condorcet candidate >> winning, IRV is a big step forward to that end. > A Condorcetist would probably say that this only supports his point. If > the chance that IRV is repealed is lower whenever the CW is elected, > then it's important to elect the CW, so why not ensure that the CW is > elected whenever he exists? > > (There are two not very complex ways of doing so, as this thread has > shown: Benham and BTR-IRV. So I don't really see the reason not to. Is > this about later-no-harm?) From km_elmet at t-online.de Sun Dec 8 01:30:06 2019 From: km_elmet at t-online.de (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2019 10:30:06 +0100 Subject: [EM] Burlington VT reconsidering IRV 10 years after IRV failed to elect the Condorcet Winner In-Reply-To: <91b0fb4c-de07-8a13-23bb-5474b60b8d6d@adam.com.au> References: <1045225659.350573.1575352858713@privateemail.com> <1a77a5d6-4ef6-e162-7b6b-c13e9c5e8a35@t-online.de> <391679008.359594.1575388487238@privateemail.com> <8523B178-8AD5-47C5-8A17-A9CEEDD92FFB@gmail.com> <927991628.365312.1575413774422@privateemail.com> <537562a2-ee0a-0c01-fd93-5bbc86ca44b0@adam.com.au> <5673-1575636564-297739@sneakemail.com> <8dd6b5fe-4eee-cb80-56c1-8442e27e0302@t-online.de> <91b0fb4c-de07-8a13-23bb-5474b60b8d6d@adam.com.au> Message-ID: On 08/12/2019 03.27, C.Benham wrote: >> Warren has written a bit about it here: https://rangevoting.org/BtrIrv.html >> >> (He states that every Condorcet method fails mono-add-top, which I don't >> think is true, but his example does show that BTR-IRV fails mono-add-top.) > > All Smith methods fail mono-add-top, but? MinMax Margins meets both > Condorcet and mono-add-top. IIRC, it's an open question whether Smith is compatible with mono-add-top. Smith plus Plurality is incompatible with mono-add-top, though. (https://electowiki.org/wiki/Mono-add-top_criterion)