[EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Mon Apr 1 15:13:26 PDT 2019




 
While it's interesting that Score Voting requires too much information and evaluation from voters (in my opinion, voters are not the same as Winter Olympic judges) and Approval Voting requires too little information from voters, *both* Score and Approval impose upon voters the same
tactical burden of deciding what to do with their second-choice candidate.
Since voters don't want their contingency candidate to defeat their favorite candidate, how highly should voters score or even approve their second-choice?
Ranked-Choice ballots do not suffer this inherent
tactical-voting problem.  Voters know what to do with their favorite candidate and they know what to do with their second favorite candidate and they know what to do with the candidate they dislike the most.
r b-j



---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

From: "Toby Pereira" <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>

Date: Mon, April 1, 2019 3:04 pm

To: "steve bosworth" <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>

"EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------



> I don't think it's a terrible idea. However, I'm not sure it's necessarily to move beyond the simplicity of approval voting in this particular situation. And that's partly because tonight (for the second time) none of the options received a majority of
approvals. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47781009 And I don't think parliament would be happy using an option because it received the median rating slightly-less-awful rather than just plain-awful. If it was to be expected that several options would get over 50% approvals then MJ
might be quite a useful tool to distinguish between them, but at the moment a bigger concern is to simply get one thing that the majority of parliament is behind.
> Toby

>

>

>

>

From: steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>

> To: EM list <election-methods at electorama.com>

> Sent: Monday, 1 April 2019, 21:08

> Subject: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

>

> #yiv1934316841 P {margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0;}Originally, Gervase Lam suggested thatApproval style voting could be used in Brexit Vote in Parliament.  My response was to suggest instead thatMajority Judgment (MJ) provides the most Comprehensive, Simple, and  Informative Indicative
Voting Method. Please see below a more detailed explanation of how MJ works.I'm surprised that no-one has addressed my exact suggestion that Majority Judgment (MJ) would seem to provide a superior method. Instead, SCORE voting, using 0—100 was suggested by William. This suggestion
does not take into account that most people cannot distinguish between more than about 7 levels of desired human behavior. Balinski & Laraki discuss this (pp.171, 169, 283, 306, 310, & 389) with regard to G.A. Miller’s 1956 article: The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some
limits on our capacity for processing information.Psychological Review 63: 89-97.  This is why MJ’s use of only 6 grades from Excellent to Reject are more meaningful and discerning. Also, these grades are more meaningful than numbers 1—6. At the same time, unlike MJ,
APPROVAL and SCORE would not guarantee the discovery of a BREXIT option that is supported by an absolute majority of all the voters' highest grades.Please give any of your criticisms of MJ in this regard.From: steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 6:24 AM

> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com

> Subject: Comprehensive, simplist, and most informative Indicative Voting Yes, Approval would work, but unlike Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki,Majority Judgment (2010, MIT) Approval does not guarantee finding the option most supported by an absolute majority, nor would it inform us
how highly all the MPs grade each of the options.Majority Judgment would allow the Commons to decide on one of the many options by an absolute majority as a result of counting one ballot from each of the MPs.  Each MP is simply asked to “grade” as many of the options listed as
either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or “Reject”.  Each option not explicitly graded is counted as “Reject” by that voter.  The same grade can be given to more than one choice.As a result, all the options will have received the same number of
grades, but a different set.  The winner is the choice that has received an absolute majority of grades that are equal to, or higher than, the highestmedian-grade given to any of the choices.The median-grade of each option is found as follows:§ Place all the grades, high to low, top
to bottom, in side-by-side columns, the name of each option at the top of each of these columns.§ The median-grade for each option is the grade located half way down each column (i.e. in the middle if there is an odd number of voters, the lower middle if the number is even).If more than
one option has the same highest median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by removing (one-by-one) any grades equal in value to this grade from each tied option’s total until only one is currently found to retain the highest remaining median-grade.Also in contrast to ranking the options, the
above Majority Judgment method does not eliminate any option before the Absolute Majority winner is discovered.  Therefore, only Majority Judgment would guarantee that a majority winner would be found.
>

> What do you think?Steve

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r b-j                         rbj at audioimagination.com



"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

 
 
 
 
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