[EM] smith/schwartz/landau

Curt accounts at museworld.com
Sun Mar 25 00:12:56 PDT 2018

> On Mar 24, 2018, at 9:21 PM, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
> ---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
> From: "Curt" <accounts at museworld.com <mailto:accounts at museworld.com>>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > A: “elect a Condorcet Winner if one exists”
> > B: “elect a winner other than the Condorcet Winner”.
> > [within A: ]
> > C: identify a “candidate or candidates that would defeat all other candidates head to head”
> > D: “elect a single winner that is not a Condorcet Winner if a CW does not exist”.
> >[…]
> > Group D is “decisive” where Group C is not. In these cases I would argue decisiveness is overvalued.
> well, organizations and governments have to move on.  they *need* answers and elections are held to provide answers.
> for a single-seat (usually executive) office, what would you suggest?  a runoff?
Appropriate remedies might be a runoff after another period of consideration, or a power-sharing agreement. But this ties into what it means to have a multi-candidate Smith Set.
> > What do you believe the Smith Set signifies? Is it meaningless to you other than something from which a winner should be algorithmically selected? 
> it's not meaningless.  it just need not be a concept coded in election law. 
But I'm honestly curious what you believe the multi-candidate Smith Set signifies or means.
> remember (i am not sure you got this point), Ranked-Pairs and Schulze do **not** select a winner from the Smith set. 
Is this a semantic argument, or are you saying that ranked-pairs and schulze can elect single winners that are not in the Smith Set? Can you produce an example ballot set? I’m currently under the impression that is incorrect, as Wikipedia says both are Smith-compliant. I would love to be corrected if Wikipedia is wrong. I would not regard a method as Condorcet-compliant if it is not Smith-compliant.

At any rate, I am not here to lobby for a particular term for the methods in Group D. Only to argue that a distinction between groups C and D should exist, and without it, we do a disservice to Condorcet Methods by allowing them to be describe as “flawed” in ways that only group D is. I am open to suggestions.

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