[EM] EM: IRV et al v. EPR-Steve's reply to James
stevebosworth at hotmail.com
Tue Jul 17 17:22:42 PDT 2018
Jim, please see below for Steve's answer.
From: Faran, James <jjfaran at buffalo.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2018 3:56 PM
To: steve bosworth; election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Fw: Steve's reply: IRV et al v. EPR
Consider the following possibility. 7 seats to be filled, 70 voters, 36 of which rate candidate A as Excellent, the greatest number of Excellent ratings. Does candidate A then get at least 36 of 70 votes on the council? In that case, candidate A has complete control over any council action requiring a simple majority. The other 34 voters do not have their vote count then as regards such council actions.
Have I misinterpreted the method?
The difficulty with giving council members different weights on their votes is that those different weights are not proportional to power on votes within the council.
Endnote 8 addresses this unlikely but possible result. Its relevant part reads as follows:
[I]f any very popular elected candidate receives more affirmed evaluations than allowed, she is required to transfer her extra affirmed evaluations to the weighted votes of one or more of her trusted fellow councilmembers to avoid any single member having the voting power to dictate to the council. These are the two ways in which EPR incorporates the use of ‘Asset Voting’ after the count by the algorithm has been completed. Of course, these uses of Asset Voting could slightly modify the weighted votes that some of the councilmembers would receive.
[The unpublished but longer version of this endnote adds the following:
However, to prevent any member from having the ability to dictate to the council, no member must retain more than 20% (i.e. 14) of all the weighted votes in the council. Consequently, member A is required to transfer 4 of her 18 affirmed evaluations to at least one of her fellow members. Similarly, member E must transfer one of his 15 affirmed evaluations. This endnote reports that A gave her 4 extra votes to member B, while E gave his extra vote to C.
In these ways, each EPR citizen can guarantee that his or her vote, directly or indirectly, will continue fully to count in the deliberations of the council -– no citizen’s vote need be wasted.
What do you think?
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