[EM] Minmax ranked method

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Thu Nov 9 10:44:48 PST 2017

As posted here many times, my method of Binomial STV averages a rational 
election count with a rational exclusion count, respectively of the most 
prefered and the most unprefered (reverse) ways of counting the ranked 
choice of  candidates.
For example, the ballot paper would record the number of candidates, say 
42. Suppose you are usually a non-voter but there is one candidate who 
you definitely do not want elected. Otherwise, you sink back into supine 
apathy. You simply put the number 42 beside the despised aspirant and 
leave it at that (if you like). This will definitely adversely affect 
that candidate thru his resulting changed keep value. The other 
forty-one blank preferences count towards a none-of -the-above-quota. 
Returning a wholly blank paper would count as one vote towards an 
unoccupied seat quota.

Richard Lung.

On 05/11/2017 08:24, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Minmax approval is meant to be a method that minimizes maximum 
> disapproval. In colloquial terms, it elects a council that pisses off 
> the one most pissed off the least, which is useful when a small 
> minority (or any voter) has a veto.
> Do you know of any ranked minmax methods (in this sense)? I have some 
> ranked user preference data over various items, and I would like to 
> find a collection of items where everybody can find something he likes 
> in that collection.
> -km
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Richard Lung.
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