[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com

Date: Fri, June 23, 2017 9:57 pm

To: election-methods at electorama.com

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> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

>

>> but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to

>> be tactical, insincerely.

>>

>

> ...and even when *everyone* votes tactically, rated systems still

> outperform ranked systems.
i don't believe it.  and simulations will not persuade me.
>

> http://electology.org/sites/default/files/comparing_voting_m

> ethods_simplicity_group_satisfaction.png

>

> https://electology.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html

>

> "Tactical Score Voting may be, in practice, more likely to elect a

> Condorcet winner (when one exists) than real Condorcet methods."

> https://electology.org/tactical-voting-basics

>
yeah, i've heard that one before (perhaps even from Warren, whom i respect).  
as if the Anglicans will out-Catholic the Catholics.
>> if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only

>> sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what

>> disparate degree we like our candidates.

>

> Yes, it absolutely should.

 
that is a fundamental value statement that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's vote should count equally.
known as "One-person-one-vote".


> That's the fundamental flaw in ranked ballots:

> preference rankings can't be meaningfully compared between individuals. If

> there are 2 voters and 2 candidates, and the ballots are:

>

> 1: A > B

> 2: B > A

>

> you can't tell who the winner should be, but if their true feelings are

>

> 1. loves A and hates B

> 2. loves B and likes A

>

> the obviously correct winner is A.
no, if voter 1 prefers A and voter 2 prefers B, the two voters have equal franchise in a governmental election in a democracy.  we must not pigeon-hole voter 2 and ask them to reflect on the strength of their preference so that when the say
"oh, i only sorta like B over A a little", then the bossy, pushy, entitled voter 1 gets their way and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.  that's the problem with elections gone bad (like
Burlington Vermont's IRV of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted, there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to be more polarized.
> The goal of a voting system is to choose the candidate who best represents
> the population / whose opinions are closest to the centroid of the

> population's opinions
no.  the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect, and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal franchise.  letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for strategic voting.
>/ who, winning,
would maximize the happiness of the
> population. Ranked ballots destroy information that's needed to find this

> winner.
consider a two-candidate election.  it's just between A and B.
i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected when more voters prefer A.
Condorcet is the only natural way to extend the principle of equal franchise to each voter and
their preferences to a multi-candidate, single-winner election.
we do *not* want to trouble voters with a perceived need to vote tactically (because they know their opponents will vote tactically and they don't wanna be chumps). we don't even to trouble voters to *fairly* rate candidates.
 all we should ask them is "who do you wanna win?"  and then "if you can't get that candidate you want to win, *then* whom else would you want to win?"  it should be simple and fair.

--
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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