[EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods - guidelines?

Toby Pereira tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk
Mon Jun 5 10:23:52 PDT 2017


I think that's wrong actually. Forget that last post!

      From: Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>
 To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>; VoteFair <electionmethods at votefair.org>; "election-methods at lists.electorama.com" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> 
 Sent: Monday, 5 June 2017, 18:19
 Subject: Re: [EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods - guidelines?
   
By the way, a sensible Hare version of proportionality for solid coalitions would be that for a faction to be guaranteed s seats, then they should need s - 0.5 Hare quotas (or just over), rather than s Hare quotas. In the single-winner case, this would translate to 50% of the vote. This is what Sainte-Laguë guarantees.

      From: Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk>
 To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>; VoteFair <electionmethods at votefair.org>; "election-methods at lists.electorama.com" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com> 
 Sent: Monday, 5 June 2017, 18:09
 Subject: Re: [EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods - guidelines?
  
As I was saying before, while Droop proportionality has gained a lot of currency as a criterion, it's just a special case of proportionality for solid coalitions. We could just as easily talk about Hare proportionality. For example, the Sainte-Laguë party list method doesn't obey Droop proportionality, but is seen as more mathematically proportional than D'Hondt, which does obey it. But Sainte-Laguë does obey proportionality for solid coalitions more generally. The point is that Droop proportionality itself is not a deal breaker for a method, and I find it slightly overused.

      From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
 

Perhaps Droop proportionality isn't the exact proportionality measure 
one would want - for instance, for my Bucklin methods, I've tried to 
base them on divisor methods rather than on hard quotas - but I think 
the concept that "some voters who broadly agree on a group of candidates 
should see one of them elected" is a good one. That is, that a group of 
voters can have "their" seat without having to agree on a strategy.


   

   

   
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