[EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods - guidelines?

[Toby Pereira]

As I was saying before, while Droop proportionality has gained a lot of currency as a criterion, it's just a special case of proportionality for solid coalitions. We could just as easily talk about Hare proportionality. For example, the Sainte-Laguë party list method doesn't obey Droop proportionality, but is seen as more mathematically proportional than D'Hondt, which does obey it. But Sainte-Laguë does obey proportionality for solid coalitions more generally. The point is that Droop proportionality itself is not a deal breaker for a method, and I find it slightly overused.

      From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
 

Perhaps Droop proportionality isn't the exact proportionality measure 
one would want - for instance, for my Bucklin methods, I've tried to 
base them on divisor methods rather than on hard quotas - but I think 
the concept that "some voters who broadly agree on a group of candidates 
should see one of them elected" is a good one. That is, that a group of 
voters can have "their" seat without having to agree on a strategy.


   
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