[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Wed Jul 5 01:06:47 PDT 2017








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Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Richard Lung" <voting at ukscientists.com>

Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am

To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <km_elmet at t-online.de>

Cc: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

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>

> No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.

> An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if

> it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in

> Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve

> anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of

> monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.

> Democracy and science are about consensus.
democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible permanent residents).  so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in some virtual room and decide, with
some algorithm that is a function of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best expresses the will of these voters.
 
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine.  Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?




--
r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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