[EM] New election system in Hungary

Magosányi Árpád m4gw4s at gmail.com
Tue Jul 4 02:53:25 PDT 2017


Please help, it is really important!

We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary. A
strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high chance
that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be influental for the
future of our election system.

Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion between the
parties (most of them will be participating). It is designed to be not too
shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal system, for the following
tactical communication reasons:
 - show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
 - pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be
successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election
methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not accepting
the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most probably sizeable
factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal system as the core issue
we are fighting for.

Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system, with
proportional representation and no entry threshold.

I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal
system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as
preferential Condorcet for a commitee:
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system

Also, I would like to have easy ballots.

What I have came up with, and why:

Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs active
participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a government
office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties with the highest
number of nominations will be in the ballot.

There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of each

The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be
allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.

The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can
indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a 200-member

The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method, and
ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated by the
nominating party).

The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a pairwise
defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins over the
other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5

The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.

Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit more
constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency (10M) and
human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not change anything.

My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between range
voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As condorcet comes
with the above game theory results, and in range voting majority condorcet
is strategically forced, I feel that this method should also have the same
game theory results.

But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on
mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can build my
proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?
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