[EM] 3-slot Condorcet//Top Ratings
cbenham at adam.com.au
Sat Sep 24 18:08:48 PDT 2016
You claim to be concerned about the "chicken dilemma" scenario and
you've typed that you think a method
should "tend to respect Majority Condorcet". while making it plain that
you aren't ready to die in a ditch for
FBC compliance (and presumably that also applies to Later-no-Help).
Also you say that practical reform proposals should be able to be easily
explained and justified to the non-expert
"man in the street" (although the method you currently advocate, U/P,
only just fills that bill if you omit some
"fine print" that contains some complicated arbitrary rules about
> If you leave all three ratings blank for a candidate, that usually
> means the same as rating them "acceptable". There are two exceptions.
> First, if you made a mark to rate some candidates "acceptable", then
> the ones you didn't make any mark for are counted as "unacceptable".
> And second, if the two most-preferred candidates both can't win,
> because more than half of voters marked them "unacceptable", then
> candidates with no mark count as "unacceptable".
Not in the spirit of Ockham's Razor.
C: As Mike Ossipoff recently explained, U/P (along with IBBIFA, MTA,
MCA, MJ) fails the Chicken Dilemma criterion. And U/P fails the
So as something that better fits your stated aims, I suggest simply
3-slot Condorcet//Top Ratings:
*Voters give the candidates one of 3 ratings (say Top, Middle, Bottom).
Default rating is bottom-most.
Inferring ranking from these ratings, any candidate that pairwise beats
all the others wins.
Otherwise the candidate with highest Top Ratings score wins.*
Smith//Top Ratings would be technically a bit better, but the "Smith
set" part would probably make the method harder to explain.
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