[EM] MMPO objections (hopefully better posted)

[Michael Ossipoff]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
Date: Sep 17, 2016 12:52 PM
Subject: MMPO objections
To: <t at gmail.com>
Cc:

Though NEO, so far, to me at least, seems to show promise, it hasn't been
thoroughly checked out enough to be a proposal.

But it's different with MMPO. We've heard people's best arguments against
MMPO, & it can be said to have  already been well-discussed.

No rank method's result will always look right. All will sometimes do
something ridiculous.

A method optimized for 1 purpose or standard can't do well by other
standards.

MMPO achieves what it achieves by looking only at pairwise unpreferredness.

It isn't a positional method, & so you can find an example in which it does
terribly, positionally.

In Kevin's bad-example, it chooses someone twice as bottom-voted as the
other candidates, & nearly not top-voted at all.

It certainly isn't a positional method

MMPO isn't a pairwise-defeats method. So you can find an example where it
does terribly by pairwise defeats.

In Kevin's example, it elects the Condorcet loser, who pairwise loses to
the others by 1000 to 1, if X = 1000.

It certainly isn't a pairwise defeats method.

We've been looking at pairwise defeats methods for so long that we tend,
maybe subconsciously, to evaluate by pairwise defeats standards.

A "beats-diagram" shows
an "=" sign between A & B. They have no defeat, but C has one.

But look under that "=" sign. Half the voters bottom-vote A, & the other
half bottom-end vote B.

Say two groups both despise eachother. Does that mutual despising cancel
out, making both groups un-despised?

But that's the fallacy that the beats-diagram & its "=" sign allows you to
believe.

If the A voters voted among themselves, between B & C, they'd choose C.

If the B voters voted among themselves, between A & C, they'd choose C.

C is the compromise preferred by the A voters, & by the C voters, to
eachother's candidates.

Yes, it's natural to reject a low-favoriteness compromise. Rob Richie would
be proud.

Of course this bad-example makes that compromise as little top-voted as
possible.

I've told, here, why the bad-example isn't as bad as you think.

It doesn't look good by standards other than the one by which it achieves
the elusive goal of MAM-like strategy, without chicken-dilemma.

Distinguish between a harmless election of a low favoriteness compromise, a
compromise outcome that looks bad to an outside observer vs an actual
practical problem, one that will routinely
make strategy problems for voters, and give tangibly (not just
aesthetically) bad results.

When proposing better voting to a community of jurisdiction, of whatever
size, offer them a list of methods, telling the objections to each, & their
answers.   ...& telling the advantages of each.

It would be irresponsible to leave out one with an impressive, unique,
powerful combination of strategy advantages.

Let the community, jts voters &/or the initiative proposal committee choose
for themselves. It isn't necessary to make decisions for them.

Michael Ossipoff
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