[EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

C.Benham cbenham at adam.com.au
Sat Sep 10 18:26:44 PDT 2016

On 9/11/2016 5:02 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> 43: A
> 24: B>C
> 23: C>B
> 10: D
> Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
> don't get it.
> Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
> they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!

  C: A very good example!   Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores 
to break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.

U/P's under-use of  the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on 
its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.

Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified 
and B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified 
and  (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.

This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the 
three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.

Chris Benham

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