[EM] (3) MJ -- The easiest method to 'tolerate'

C.Benham cbenham at adam.com.au
Tue Sep 6 05:56:55 PDT 2016

On 9/6/2016 6:00 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> It's really hard to respond point-by-point as a third party in a 
> discussion like this. However, I'd like to say in general that I 
> believe that Majority Judgment, and more-generally, the class of 
> "median" or "graded Bucklin" systems which includes MJ, MCA, GMJ, ERB, 
> DA, etc., are the best non-delegated single-winner systems for a 
> potentially-strategic electorate, in terms of outcome. 

C: How are they better than IBIFA?  Or, say, Smith//Approval?


> To me, the toughest realistic election scenario is the chicken 
> dilemma. For instance, consider the following 900-voter scenario
> 300: A>B>>C
> 200: B>>A>C
> 400: C>>B>A
> (where ">>" indicates universal agreement, and ">" at bottom indicates 
> 90% agreement and 10% reversal)

C:  How is this a "chicken dilemma" scenario? In this context, I don't 
understand what the words "agreement" and "reversal" mean.

> DA: "Double Approval" or "Disqualify/Approve" voting. Voters can rate 
> each candidate preferred, neutral, or disqualified. (Both preferred 
> and disqualified is also legal and counted, though it's strategically 
> nonsensical.) Winner is the most-preferred among those not majority 
> disqualified. If all candidates are majority-disqualified, winner is 
> simply most-preferred. Any candidate who is majority-disqualified is 
> prohibited from appearing on the ballot for the same office in the 
> following election.
> Lately, I favor DA,

C: Why is rating a candidate both approved and "disqualified" "legal and 
counted"? What is the default rating?   The rule regarding "the 
following election" I consider arbitrary
and very undemocratic.

In all these Bucklin/MJ/MCA methods the strategic incentive for the 
voters to just cast approval-type votes (i.e. only use the top and 
bottom slots/grades) is in my view
far too strong.  The least bad of them is 3-slot MTA (where if more than 
one candidate exceeds the majority threshold in the second round the 
winner is the one of those with the
most Top Ratings), which is simple and slightly reduces the truncation 
incentive.  It didn't make your list.

All them absurdly fail Irrelevant Ballots independence and (unless you 
have a fetish for strict compliance with Later-no-Help) are completely 
dominated by IBIFA.
The IBIFA winner will always pairwise beat any different winner that any 
of these methods come up with.

Chris Benham

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