[EM] SARA voting: easier-to-describe MAS

[Jameson Quinn]

My overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely measure
the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully and if
assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased measure we
have of that goodness. If you want to criticize it, propose an alternative
framework for evaluating voting systems.

2016-10-26 13:01 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>:

>
>
> On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 8:31 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are
>> more important than others.
>>
>
> A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in a
> small disutility.
>
>
>
>> As a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you. But
>> it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to build
>> that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting system
>> weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will
>> strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters will be
>> ignored.
>>
>
> Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a
> completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .
>
> I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
> along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
> Score.
>
> As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then
> you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that
> realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large
> disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility.
>
> Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their top-set.
> Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.
>
> In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some
> policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval
> would be fine for electing a candidate or party.
>
> But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here
> either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on
> now.
>
>
>
>> , but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long
>> run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did.
>>
>
> Could you reword that?
>
>
>
>> To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than
>> billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will (correctly)
>> weight the preferences of homeless people above those of billionaires.
>>
>
> Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without
> utopian altruism.
>
>
>> (And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people
>> into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the
>> billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about that.)
>>
>
> There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires'
> media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad
> policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at
> all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
> agenda-free.
>
> Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable
> vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and
> how they vote have any role in public policy..
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
> (I don't have a way to delete the text below)
>
>
>
> 's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more
> important
>
> Michael Ossipoff.
>>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 4:07 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes
>>>> in outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
>>>> "more than 50 points".
>>>>
>>>> Here's the latest wording, in 3 steps:
>>>>
>>>> Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) works as follows:
>>>>
>>>>    1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
>>>>    candidate. Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of
>>>>    "support" and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200
>>>>    points.*
>>>>       - *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
>>>>       "reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
>>>>       the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
>>>>       them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
>>>>       hoping for somebody better.*
>>>>    2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that
>>>>    leaves no candidates with over 50 points.*
>>>>       - *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
>>>>       majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
>>>>       at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
>>>>       majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
>>>>       example below).*
>>>>    3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
>>>>       - *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2016-10-22 18:24 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>:
>>>>
>>>>> Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>    - Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
>>>>>    candidate. Default is abstain.
>>>>>    - Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or
>>>>>    less and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are
>>>>>    acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
>>>>>    - Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point
>>>>>    for each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
>>>>> reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----
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>>>> info
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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