[EM] Approval Voting and Long-term effects of voting systems

[Michael Ossipoff]

Regarding my done-with "discussion" with Robert, I don't want to sound
unfair to Condorcet in that discussion.

wv Condorcet is truncation-proof, and only burial can threaten a CWs.

But:

1. RP(margins) isn't wv Condorcet. Condorcet(margins) is vulnerable to
strategic or innocent (inadvertent, principled, hurried, etc.) truncation,
which can easily take the win away from a CWs.

Also, as a result, FBC is spoiled more easily with margins Condorcet.

2. Condorcetists seem to forget that, just because you like the CWs, that
doesn't mean that everyone does. Say the CWs is in your strong top-set, and
that the other wing is your strong bottom-set.

Then isn't most likely that the CWs is in the other wing's strong
bottom-set?

That means that they're pretty much indifferent between the CWs and the
candidates of your wing.

They really have nothing to lose by buring, and risking the election of
someone they like (negligibly) less than the CWs.

That could easily lead to the perpetual burial fiasco.

The good thing about that is that continual penalized burials by the
opposite wing will keep electing from your wing.

But let's not claim that Condorcet is sure to elect the CWs, as some
Condorcetists claim.

MAM is pretty good, and if continual penalized burial by the opposite wing
will keep electing from my wing, I have no problem with that.

But the possibility of a successful burial spoils FBC, in Condorcet.

And, unless a burial is countered by plumping by the CWs's voters, then the
burial works.

All rank methods are subject to burial strategy, and all are vulnerable to
un-deterred burial of a CWs whom the buriers don't like much more than the
opposite wing--maybe a CWs who is in their strong bottoom-set.

But:

Though MDDAsc isn't fully truncation-proof (because of the
symmetric-completion), and though refusal to rank or approve past the CWs
can't be counted on the prevent a burial from resulting in everyone being
majority-disqualified, MDDAsc has the extra line-of-defense of your
approvals. If you, and many like you, don't rank or approve past the CWs,
or past the candidates you like (maybe your strong top-set), then those
approvals, just as in Approval, can prevent the election of someone
disapproved by a majoriity, when the CWs is approved by a majority.

MDDAsc's approval largely fixes or avoids the pairwise-count problems.

About Approval:

Robert was insisting on holding to the belief that it's essential that we
choose _among_ our strong top-set, instead of just choosing that set over
the strong bottom-set.

As I've said, that insistence results in an increased probability of
electing from one's strong bottom-set.

So, all the strategy problems that Robert was bringing up were the result
of that insistence and goal. That goal isn't what Approval is for.

I tried to get it across that Approval is about a completely different kind
of voting.

Well, that's an example of something that I've been saying: A lot of people
want rankings. A lot of people (overcompromisers & rival parties) might
need rankings, to avoid their voting errors.

Anyway, I've quit that "discussion" because an angry flamewarrior-assertion
attack-rant isn't discussion, and it was evident that my effort for a
discussion there was futile.

Michael Ossipoff





On Thu, Nov 24, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Daniel--
>
> I'd said:
>
>
>> There are other reasons why Approval is the best:
>>>
>>> If you're a progressive (and everyone in the 99% would benefit
>>> tremendously from an honest, progressive government), then there are two
>>> blatantly, sharply-distinct sets of candidates: Progressives and
>>> Republocrats. It's a matter of honest & progressive, vs corrupt, dishonest
>>> and corporate-owned.
>>>
>>> That's an instance of what I call a "strong top-set" and a "strong
>>> bottom-set", defined as follows:
>>>
>>> A strong top-set and a strong bottom-set are two sets of candidates such
>>> that the merit difference _between_ the sets is incomparably more important
>>> than the merit difference _within_ the sets.
>>>
>>> In other words the merit difference within the sets is entirely
>>> negligible in comparison to the merit difference between the sets.
>>>
>>> Your goal, then, is just to elect from your strong top-set.
>>>
>>> That's innomparably more important than choosing among your strong
>>> top-set, or trying to keep one strong bottom-set member from winning
>>> instead of another strong bottom-set member.
>>>
>>> ...and of course it's the strong top-set that you prefer to the strong
>>> bottom-set.
>>>
>>> Approval could be called "Set-Voting". It's a perfect match for what you
>>> want to do: Maximize the probability of electing from your strong top-set.
>>>
>>> Approval asks the right question.
>>>
>>> For the person who has a strong top-set and a strong bottom-set, it's
>>> possible to say what the objective best method is: It's Approval.
>>>
>>
> You replied:
>
>
>>
>> What about for people who do not have such a clear distinction between
>> the top and bottom sets?
>>
>
> Yes, that situation could exist when we have democracy, and an authentic
> political system. Then, as I mentioned, members of the 99% likely wouldn't
> have a bottom-set, because the Republocrats would no longer be winnable,
> and would no longer be in the elections.
>
>
>> Where they draw the line is a harder decision and will probably factor in
>> the likelihood that various candidates will win.
>>
>
> Yes, if such information is available. But now, with our intentionally
> disinformational media, there isn't any predictive information that's any
> good.
>
> ...except for the few honest polls that aren't so blatantly avoidably
> sample-biased.
> I discussed one such in my previous reply. But few people ever hear of
> those polls, and, for most people, the mass-media are the
> information-source. For those people, it's definitely a 0-info election.
> That's why I'd urge people to just disregard purported predictive
> "information", if we were to somehow get Approval voting now.
>
> Say your preferences are A>B>C, and you have good reliable information
> that A won't be competitive, and that it will effectively be between only B
> & C.
>
> Then, if you don't have strong top & bottom sets, and therefore you're
> voting to maximize your expectation, then you'd of course approve both A &
> B.
>
> In general, absent strong top & bottom sets, you'd vote to maximize your
> expectation. Specifically, if you additionally have good predictive
> information, you'd use it, as described immediately above.
>
> But, for these days, forget about the election really being between two
> purported frontrunners.
>
> So then, what do you do when there's no good predictive information?
>
> For one thing, the merit differences between successive candidates in your
> ranking might not be the same.
>
> Say your merit ranking is A>B>>C, meaning that C is farther below B than B
> is below A. Then, given the more important distinction between B and C, as
> compared to between A & B. So, with 0-info, it would be natural to approve
> both A & B.
>
>
> Other ways of looking at 0-info strategy:
>
> With no strong top & bottom sets, you could still vote to maximize your
> expectation, with a 0-info strategy:
>
> Given some way (that I'll get to in a minute) to estimate what is the
> likely result-merit to expect, then you can maximize your expectation by
> approving down to that merit-level. Why that's so:
>
> If a certain merit is expected for the result, then of course if you
> approve someone better than that, you raise your expectation some. And if
> you approve someone worse than that, then you worsen your expectation.
>
> So you can maximize your expectation by approving (only) all of the
> candidates who are better than the expected result-merit.
>
> So how would you estimate the expected result-merit, in a 0-info election?:
>
> Several estimates are suggested, the choice depending on your assumption
> about how the candidate-distribution is related to the voter-distribution.
>
> It isn't certain whether your approval cutoff should the mean, the median,
> or the midrange of the candidates' merit.
>
> If you don't believe that the candidates' distribution is close to the
> voters' distribution (and if a 1-dimensional political spectrum is
> assumed), then it's probably best to approve down to the midrange of the
> candidates' merit.
>
> That's a rough estimate of the merit-level where the middle of the
> voting-population is, and is a rough estimate of your expected
> result-merit. ...the point that you want to approve down to.
>
> But, if there's some reason to believe that the candidate-distribution is
> similar to the voter-distribution, then the mean or median could be better.
>
> If voters & candidates are similarly distributed, candidates tending to be
> where voters are, then each candidate would have similar proximity to the
> same number of voters, makinig them all equally likelly to win. That's the
> assumption that justifies the candidate merit-mean as the expected
> result-merit and a good approval cutoff.
>
> It might not be easy to estimate the candidate merit-mean, in which case
> the median could be used. The median could be used as an estimate of the
> mean. Then, just approve the best half of the candidates.
>
> That's a reasonable estimate, because, if voters & candidates have the
> same distsribution, then the merit-region with half of the candidates could
> be expected to contain half of the voters.
>
> So that's how you could do expectation-maximization strategy in a 0-info
> election.
>
> But I emphasize that, in a 0-info election (or even in any election) it
> isn't necessary to do expectation-maximization strategy.
>
> Say, because there aren't strong top & bottom sets, it isn't as obvious
> where to put the approval-cutoff. If it's really uncertain whether (for
> example) you want to approve {A,B} against {C}, or to approve {A} against
> {B,C}.
>
> I point out that, if you don't know which is the set that you want to
> approve against the worse candidates, then _it doesn't matter_.  If you
> don't know which is better, then is either way of voting better than the
> other? I suggest no.
>
> So, if someone isn't interested in expectation-maximization strategy, then
> they needn't use it. The strategies that I discussed earlier are only for
> people who like them, who like strategy.
>
> ...because, if you don't know which way of voting is better, then neither
> is better than the other.
>
> You could flp a coin. If the method were Score (which is best regarded as
> Approval with fractional approvals allowed), then you could give candidate
> B half-maximum points. Flipping a coin is the probabilistic way to achieve
> that.   ...giving the same result when there are a lot of voters.
>
> Anyway, of course, when there are no strong top & bottom sets, then if you
> feel better about one way of approving (like approving only A, or approving
> A & B), then _that's_ the best way to approve. No need to question whether
> that's right or best. It's right & best.
>
>
>>
>>> Now, some people want to have it both ways. They want to elect from
>>> their strong top-set, but they also want the luxury of choosing _among_
>>> that set.
>>>
>>> It doesn't work that way. You can't have it both ways.
>>>
>>> If a voting-system allows you a choice between casting  an effective
>>> approval-set vote, or ranking the candidates in order of preference , and
>>> you choose the latter, then you're increasing the probability of electing
>>> from your strong bottom-set
>>>
>>
>> I assume you mean ranking candidates honestly.  So the choice with a
>> ranking system seems to come down to:
>>
>> 1. Rank honestly and risk electing from the strong bottom-set, or
>> 2. Rank strategically by ranking one of the leading candidates in the
>> top-set higher than your favorite, and risk that your favorite might not
>> win.
>>
>
> If you want to maximize the probability of electing from your strong
> top-set, then you should equal top-rank all of them, and bottom-rank (by
> not ranking them) your strong bottom-set.
>
>
>> But what happens if you can rank a leading candidate and your favorite
>> the same?  Then you avoid that dilemma, right?
>>
>
> Yes. Top-rank all of your strong top-set, to maximize the probability of
> electing one of them.
>
>
>> This is what happens, in part, with Approval Voting at least regarding
>> those two candidates.  So let me add this third alternative.
>>
>> 3. Rank one of your preferred leading candidates and your favorite
>> candidate the same, and avoid the above risks.
>>
>
> Yes. Top-rank all of your strong top-set.
>
>
>>
>> And if this is true, then my guess is that the same applies to all the
>> rest of the candidates you might otherwise rank lower.  In other words,
>> giving them all the same rank, as in Approval Voting, avoids the problems
>> of ranking them according to your honest preferences.
>>
>
> Yes, that's the best vote.
>
> [replying farther down] :
>
>
>>
>>
>>> So, rank methods don't improve on Approval. As I said, improvements on
>>> Approval are illusory.
>>>
>>> Well, the nearest thing to a "problem" that Approval has is the
>>> chicken-dilemma, and some rank methods can avoid the chicken-dilemma.
>>>
>>> That's the only genuine excuse to use a rank-method. There are methods
>>> that both avoid chicken-dilemma, and meet FBC. The best way to use such a
>>> method is to top-rank all of your strong top-set, and not rank any of your
>>> strong bottom-set.
>>>
>>> ...and, if there's a chicken-dilemma, then you can make use of that
>>> rank-method's way of deterring chicken-dilemma defection...as the only
>>> exception from voting as in Approval, by top-ranking your strong top-set.
>>>
>>> That's really the only justification for a rank method.
>>>
>>
>> Maybe the way to consider the chicken dilemma is in the context of what
>> happens over time.
>>
>
> Yes. But the immediately current election can be important too, aside from
> the obvious long-term incentives to not defect.
>
> Let me briefly re-state the chicken-dilemma:
>
> Its standard example is where a majority prefer A & B to C, and the
> size-order of the factions is: C>A>B, and the C voters are indifferent
> between A & B, and don't vote between them:
>
> In a current election, there are several ways that chicken dilemma can be
> mitigated or dealt with:
>
> 1. Maybe it's obvious to all that the A faction is most likely larger than
> the B faction. The A voters could say to the B voters:
>
> We're bigger, and so, between A & B, we're the rightful winner. You should
> therefore support A. For that reason, and to not encourage you to defect
> and take advantage of our co-operativeness, we're only approving A. If you
> defect, C will win. Support the larger of {A,B}, and help us to keep C from
> winning.
>
>
> 2. Or maybe it isn't obvious which of {A,B} is has a larger faction.
>
> The A voters could give B just the amount of vote that would be enough to
> enable A to beat C if the A faction is bigger than the B faction. They
> could point out to the B voters that they should do the same.
>
> Example:
>
> Say the best estimate available is that the C faction is 40% of the voters.
>
> The A voters could say to the B voters:
>
> C probably will get about 40%, as the best estimate.
>
> Suppose that the A & B factions are about equal. Suppose that you have
> 31%, and we have 29%.
>
> We're going to give you just enough votes to win.
>
> We're going to give you 10%. Then you'll have 41%, to C's 40%. You'll win.
>
> We'll do that by each of us giving you 10/29 of a vote.
>
> But, just in case it's we who have 31%, and you who have 29%, each of you
> should likewise give us 10/29 of a vote.
>
> With you having 31%, and us having 29%, then you're giving us:
>
> 31 X (10/29) = 10.69
>
> 29 + 10.69 = 39.69
>
> That's less than your 41%, and you win, with more votes than us and more
> votes than C.
>
> 3. If the B voters were organizing a defection, or even if a lot of B
> voters felt like defecting, either way it would be discussed, and would be
> overheard, and couldn't remain secret. So the A voters could say to the B
> voters, "We hear that you're considering defecting. So we won't approve B.
> So you should approve A, the larger, or at least the more honest, of the
> {A,B} factions, so that C
>
> But, as you suggested, the situation is better-still in the longterm
>
> 4. The B voters would know that if they defect, then they'll be out of
> luck next time they need help from the A voters. They won't be able to
> expect any help from the A voters.
>
> 5. In fact, the A voters could announce a specific strategy of
> "Tit-For-Tat":
>
> The A voters will start by co-operating, and then subsequently will do
> whatever the B voters did in the previous election (co-operate or defect).
>
>
> I would expect that repeated applications of Approval Voting will result
>> in having more candidates run who will appeal to many more voters.  We're
>> not used to thinking in terms of the broad appeal, such as what Bernie has
>> gotten, and he had a huge struggle just getting noticed, at first.
>>
>
> Not for any reason other than a media blackout. Emails between the DNC and
> the Hillary campaign established a common goal to, by whatever dirty tricks
> necessary, make sure that Bernie doesn't win the nomination.
>
> Bernie's media access & support was a tiny fraction of Hillary's.
>
> And it would be naive to believe that that the effort didn't include
> count-fraud.
>
> Most likely Bernie won the primary. It's pretty much agreed all-around
> that Bernie was the candidate who was popular enough to easily beat Donald
> in an honest count, and that Hillary was the only person who could lose to
> Donald in an honest count.
>
> So why would the Democrats nominate Hillary, the despised likely loser?
> There's no reason to call that an "error" or "mistake". Our rulers main
> purpose in an election is to avoid the election of someone honest, ethical
> and unbought. That's incomparably more important to ruling interest, than
> the matter of whether the winner is a Democrat or a Republican. Therefore,
> the nomination of likely-loser Hillary was the best strategy for the
> regime, whose only risk to continued rule would be the election of someone
> honest.
>
> Why would the regime have any intention of letting itself be voted out of
> power?
>
> Why should it leave that to chance, or to us, the voters?
>
> As for the Hillary-Donald election, who knows whether or not it was
> honestly-counted. It wouldn't & doesn't matter.
>
>
>
>
>> I expect more like Bernie will come out of the woodwork if they were
>> rewarded for doing so.
>>
>
> Yes, admittedly there isn't much reason for progressives to run now. And
> people know very well that they can't win   ...but not for the reason that
> they might think. Bernie or Jill could get 100% of the votes, and wouldn't
> "win"
> .
>
>
>>
>> Anyway, the result of having more candidates that most voters like is
>> that it won't matter so much that there are three candidates who are close
>> enough in popularity to possibly result in a surprising win by the slightly
>> less popular candidate.
>>
>
> It would be "harder" to choose, when there are no bad candidates, and so
> many good ones. That wouldn't be a bad thing.
>
>
>>
>> Then again, the chicken dilemma might be a motivation for cooperating
>> between similar candidates to pick one of them rather than letting all
>> run.  I.e. parties.
>>
>
> Sure, maybe there'd be come negotiation between the parties & factions, a
> sort of people's primary. But of course that wouldn't be nearly as
> necessary with Approval as it would be with Plurailty.
>
> If the count were honest, and the voting-system is Plurality, then the
> progressives' best strategy would be to all vote for the most popular &
> best-known progressive candidate.  That's Jill Stein. (Bernie has proved to
> be really a Hillary-promoter).
>
> This posting is already long, so I'll post it now, as Part 2.
>
> Part 3 will be along no later than tomorrow morning (Friday, November
> 25th).
>
> (I don't have a way to delete texts. All of my replies in this posting are
> above this point.)
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> But, for some electorates, maybe ours here, there's a _psychological_
>>> need for rankings. Some overcompromisers (as I said) would insist on
>>> approving Hillary, along with Jill.
>>>
>>> But some of those, if they had a rank-method, would be content to rank
>>> Hillary a little below Jill. For them, the rank method improved their
>>> voting. For that type of overcompromiser, a rank method softens their
>>> voting errors.
>>>
>>> Ranking can likewise soften the voting errors of rival parties who are
>>> so inimical (though close in policy proposals) that they'd refuse to
>>> approve eachother in Aproval.
>>>
>>>
>> Don't know if I care about such cases.  Maybe we should punish (or not
>> reward) all the rival parties who are so inimical even though they are
>> close in policy proposals.
>>
>> Again, I think it is useful to think where Approval Voting, or other
>> systems, are likely to take us.  What we have currently is widely
>> recognized as an aberration, which is, I believe, a repeated result of the
>> application of Plurality Voting, which creates two dominant parties that
>> concentrate more and more over time, as they increasingly ignore the rest
>> of the people until they can't stand it any longer.
>>
>> So we shouldn't judge Approval Voting, or other systems, strictly on how
>> they would respond to our current situation.
>>
>>
>>
>>> So rankings can soften voting errors, for rivals and for some
>>> overcompromisers.
>>>
>>> ...but not for all overcompromisers. Some overcompromisers are so
>>> overcompromising that the only thing that can keep them from voting
>>> Compromise over Favorite is if they have an opportunity to rank them both
>>> at top, with the assurance that top-voting Favorite can't possibly hurt
>>> Compromise. ....in other words, for them, the method must allow equal
>>> top-voting, and must meet FBC.
>>>
>>
>> As I suggested above.  Yeah!
>>
>>
>>
>>> So, what kind of method would meet the needs of both of those 2 kinds of
>>> overcompromisers? It would be a method that allows equal top-voting, meets
>>> FBC, but also allows ranking.   ...and preferably it should give good
>>> protection of higher-ranked candidates against lower-ranked ones.
>>>
>>
>>
>>> There are a number of good methods that have those attributes. Bucklin
>>> is the familiar one, During the Progressive Era, Bucklin was used in at
>>> leasts 39 cities.
>>>
>>> There are others too.
>>>
>>
>> I'll have to think about it some more, but I am not sure the complexity
>> of more than one level of ranking is worth the trouble and risk, especially
>> for the current level of society. But I wouldn't want to exclude it, if
>> there is value and it can be applied reliably.
>>
>>
>>
>>> But I've only been talking about the _psychological_ need for ranking.
>>> But I mentioned earlier that, disregarding that psychological need, there's
>>> really only one genuine practical use for a rank-method: Avoiding chicken
>>> dilemma.
>>>
>>> Chicken dilemma protection is very costly in terms of problems that come
>>> with it, to the detriment of other properties. ...especially to the
>>> detriment of the method's general protection of higher middle-ranked
>>> candidates against lower-ranked ones and unranked ones.
>>>
>>> But, because the chicken dilemma is a genuine reason to use rankings,
>>> and the only genuine reason, I'd prefer to have chicken dilemma
>>> protection,even at the cost of general protection of middle-ranked
>>> candidates.
>>>
>>
>> Again, I am not sure the chicken dilemma is necessarily as severe a
>> problem as you make it sound, once we stabilize around new political
>> patterns that result from years of Approval Voting, but I'll have to think
>> about it more.
>>
>>
>>> We've been discussing a few methods that meet FBC, have a way of
>>> avoiding chicken dilemma, and give as good a general protection to
>>> mid-ranked candidates as can be gotten in a method that meets FBC & avoids
>>> chicken dilemma.
>>>
>>> They're Simmons' method ( MDDA(pt/2) ), and MMPO(pt/2).
>>>
>>> MMPO(pt/2)'s chicken dilemma deterrence is automatic, but its general
>>> protection of middle-ranked candidates is uniformly questionable, chancy,
>>> something of a crapshoot.
>>>
>>> Simmons' method does a top job of that general protection for the
>>> middle-ranked candidates against whom you aren't using the chicken-dilemma
>>> defection-deterence measure (...which consists of denying them approval)..
>>>
>>> With that, I'll conclude this note.
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 1:08 AM, Daniel LaLiberte <
>>> daniel.laliberte at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> This message is about two related subjects:
>>>>
>>>> 1. Factoring in the long-term emergent effects of each voting system.
>>>> 2. An example of how Approval Voting results in better long-term
>>>> effects.
>>>>
>>>> Among the many criteria for evaluating voting systems (
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system#Evaluating_voti
>>>> ng_systems_using_criteria) I don't see any that address the long-term
>>>> effects of using each voting system.  In other words, the effect on one
>>>> election is certainly important, regarding the satisfaction of the election
>>>> results by voters and candidates.  But I would argue that it is even more
>>>> important to consider the long-term effects that emerge when applying a
>>>> voting system repeatedly over many elections.  A small bias one way or
>>>> another may not be very apparent if you only look at one election, but over
>>>> may elections, they can add up and perhaps compound the bias exponentially.
>>>>
>>>> There are many long-term effects to consider, but in particular, I am
>>>> thinking of one pernicious problem: the tendency for two major parties to
>>>> emerge and dominate all politics which results from the repeated
>>>> application of plurality voting.  This problem is fairly easy for most
>>>> people to understand, although I am surprised to see that there seems to be
>>>> a lot of denial about this effect as well.  Some would even defend having
>>>> only two major parties, or very few parties.  That is an interesting
>>>> subject to discuss, but regardless, I believe we should be aware of how our
>>>> choice of a voting system will affect things over time, how society is
>>>> likely to evolve based on the rules we lay down, and in fact, how it is
>>>> actually very likely that the dominant forces in society will quickly and
>>>> vociferously defend whatever rules resulted in their rise to dominance.
>>>>
>>>> But back to this one question, studies and long-term experience have
>>>> shown that other voting systems besides plurality, in particular IRV, also
>>>> result in the dominance of two major parties.  This may be more surprising
>>>> to people, but looking at the underlying cause, it seems we can make a
>>>> rather important simplifying argument about most voting systems regarding
>>>> this problem. I would assert that the underlying cause of this problem of
>>>> two-party dominance in any voting system is that it gives voters the
>>>> ability to rank or order at least one candidate higher than the rest.
>>>>
>>>> The reason this ability to rank candidates becomes a problem is the
>>>> spoiler effect, where voters will have a strong motivation to give their
>>>> highest rank to one of the leading candidates. If they don't, then they
>>>> weaken the chance of that candidate winning and therefore strengthen the
>>>> chance of the less preferred leading candidate.  Because one of the leading
>>>> candidates is likely to win, all the rest of the rankings of non-leading
>>>> candidates hardly matter at all.
>>>>
>>>> In any election, there will be two candidates who are the strongest in
>>>> terms of popular support, and thus the most likely to win. Consequently (to
>>>> grossly over-simplify the process) with any voting system that permits
>>>> ranking, groups of voters will tend to coalesce around support for these
>>>> two leading candidates to encourage everyone to support their preferred
>>>> leading candidate. Eventually two major parties arise, and everyone who
>>>> doesn't join one of these two major parties is excluded.
>>>>
>>>> So once voters and candidates figure this out, any such voting system
>>>> ends up devolving into the dominance of two major parties that we get with
>>>> simple plurality voting.  In fact, one might argue that plurality voting is
>>>> better just because it is simpler.
>>>>
>>>> But Approval Voting avoids this problem. Equal-rank approval votes mean
>>>> voters don't get the option to express their preferred ranking, but because
>>>> of that, they aren't at all motivated to bias their ranking dishonestly.
>>>> They only have to decide which candidates to approve, or where the cut-off
>>>> is between approval and disapproval.
>>>>
>>>> Given that there are, as before, two leading candidates, how does
>>>> Approval Voting affect whether one of those two leading candidates will
>>>> win?  One of the two leading candidates is likely to win even with Approval
>>>> Voting, so it would appear there is no benefit, but that would be a
>>>> short-sighted way to judge a voting system.  In subsequent elections, it
>>>> would seem likely that more candidates will run who have broader appeal to
>>>> ALL voters, not just a majority or plurality. Because the winning
>>>> candidates will be those who are most approved of by the most voters, there
>>>> will be no value in parties that typically focus on appealing to no more
>>>> than half of the voters.
>>>>
>>>> So I suspect the long-term use of Approval Voting would be
>>>> self-correcting toward better and better representation of ALL voters, not
>>>> just half the voters, because in each election, almost all of the voters
>>>> contribute to choosing the winning candidates, and that only gets better
>>>> over time as the candidates who decide to run get closer to receiving the
>>>> approval of all voters.
>>>>
>>>> Can any other voting system claim a similar long-term effect?  Even a
>>>> voting system with three ranks, e.g. Approve, Neutral, Disapprove, would
>>>> encourage voters to approve one of the leading candidates, and give neutral
>>>> or disapprove votes to the rest.  I wonder if Approval Voting might be the
>>>> ONLY system that has this long-term effect.
>>>>
>>>> What I am aiming for is a voting system that self-corrects over time.
>>>> No matter what voting system we choose, there is probably always going to
>>>> be at least some small bias, some inequities or incompleteness.  So we need
>>>> to understand this and deal with it.
>>>>
>>>> But one important question should not be overlooked: What do we want to
>>>> self-correct toward? That is, what is the long-term goal? I believe we
>>>> should want to move toward a closer or better representation of society as
>>>> a whole, but there are other ways to look at that.
>>>>
>>>> Looking forward to reading your feedback.
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Daniel LaLiberte
>>>> daniel.laliberte at gmail.com
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Daniel LaLiberte
>> daniel.laliberte at gmail.com
>>
>
>
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