[EM] MDDA(symmetric completion example)

[Forest Simmons]

Chris,



Here’s an example that you asked me to look at from last month.



You wrote ….



43: A

03: A>B

44: B>C  (sincere is B or B>A)

10: C



C>A  54-46,    A>B  46-44,   B>C 47-10.



Here A is the sincere CW and supported by the largest of the three

factions of voters, but Winning Votes rewards the buriers by electing B.



Benham and  LV(erw)SME   easily elect  A.    Smith//Approval (equivalent

here to Max Covered Approval) and Approval Sorted Margins elect C.



[end quote]



Let’s look at this example from the point of view MDDA(symmetric
completion):


With symmetric completion every candidate is 50% plus defeated, so nobody
is disqualified, and the approval winner is elected.


If the default is to approve only top, then A is elected.  If the default
is to approve all ranked candidates, then C is elected.


Neither case rewards the buriers.


If the 44 buriers were more conservative in their burial by not approving C
…


43: A

03: A>B

44: B>>C  (sincere is B or B>A)

10: C



… then A would win without regard to the convention of the default approval
cutoff.


So far so good!


Forest


P.S.


Monkey Puzzle,


I'll write a definition and brief explanation of MDDA(symmetric completion)
and its relation to MDDTR, ICA, and ICT tomorrow.  It looks like I won't
have enough time today.


But briefly it is a cross between ICA and ICT, where the voters can decide
where the approval cutoff is on their ballot.  If they put it just under
Top, then their ballot is counted as in ICT.  If they put it just above
Bottom, then their ballot is counted as in ICA.


MDDTR(pt/2) and ICT are the same.


Gotta go!


Forest
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