[EM] Approval Voting and Long-term effects of voting systems

[robert bristow-johnson]

>>

>> I don't see any reason why IRV results in the dominance of the two major

>> parties.

>>

>

> ...except that IRV's national track record is one of 2-party dominance.

>
the national 2-party dominance exists independently of IRV.  in Burlington, we may have a 2-party dominance, but the GOP is not one of the two.  and occasionally a GOP candidate is elected mayor and in 2009 there was a legitimate 3-way (or 4-way if you include an Independent)
race between candidates of whom none were dominant.
 
>> The problem that IRV suffers is that sometimes IRV does not elect the
>> Condorcet Winner and then voters feel that the election failed when a

>> candidate is elected despite that more voters marked their ballots that

>> they preferred a specific different candidate. Then this cascades into

>> other problems like spoiler and later harm..

>>

>

> That well characterizes what happened in Burlington, but IRV doesn't

> violate Later-No-Harm. ...or Later-No-Help either.
well, note that there were no caps.  i wasn't referring to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Later-no-harm_criterion but i *was* referring to 1500 voters who were promised that they could vote for their favorite candidate without
worrying about helping elect their least favorite candidate and found out after the election that this was not true.  the promise of IRV had failed.  these voters' political interests were harmed by their expression of their most favorite candidate.
> IRV is a good method. But
don't advocate or adopt it unless you understand,
> accept and want its problem, and its unique offering and tradeoffs. IRV

> isn't for everyone.
no, no, no, no...
we don't go to the general public and say that.  we, instead, try to deliver to them a means of electing a candidate out of a field of many, in such a way that, given one-person-one-vote weighting, these voters are **relieved** of worry
about "understanding" how using or failing to use tactics will harm their political interests.
that's what you don't get, Mike.
 
 

>

> In Burlington, you repealed it because you didn't like its elimination of a

> CWv. Then why did you adopt it???
 
> You didn't know that it could do that?

> Did FairVote assure you that it would never happen?
yes, FairVote assured the citizens of Burlington that they could vote for their favorite candidate without worry of electing their least favorite candidate.  but 1500 voters for the GOP (that also hated the Prog) found out that they
could have prevented the election of the Prog had they insincerely elevated the Dem to first choice.  but that would not have happened with Condorcet.
<<gobbledigook deleted>>
> As I said, IRV's longterm national track-record is one of 2-party
> domination.

 
has nothing to do with IRV.  it's 2-party domination **despite** IRV.  there is some inertia to Duverger's Law.  voters discover the pain of a Spoiler and that does not change habits right away.  they're still afraid to vote their favorite and vote for the major
party candidate they dislike least for fear of electing the major party candidate they hate the worst.

>

>> > In fact, one might argue that plurality voting is

>> > better just because it is simpler.

>>

>> THAT does happen.

>>

>> > But Approval Voting avoids this problem.

>>

>> No, it just creates more trouble. It's Approval Voting that devolves into

>> Plurality Voting once voters start wondering whether or not they should

>> Approve their second-choice candidate (or whether they should Approve their

>> third-choice).

>>

> Approve only your favorite if s/he's the only candidate you like.
well, the voter will generally Approve their favorite, that's not the question...


> Approve only your favorite if you insist on voting tactically (based on

> predictive information) and if it looks as if your favorite has a win.

>

> Is that a problem to you?
**what** predictive information??  the polls???  have you learned nothing in the last two weeks?
voters shouldn't have to worry about "predictive information" in casting their vote.  they should not have to face tactical voting in
the polls in any common case.  they should simply be able to say "Candidate A is my favorite choice."  and if Candidate A is not available, they should be able to say "Then Candidate B is my next favorite choice." and so on.  WITHOUT worrying about what the chances
are that their vote for Candidate B will actually help defeat Candidate A.  both Score and Approval *fail* in that and present the voter an immediate tactical decision about what to do with Candidate B.
 

>

> Ii suggest that if you're a progressive, then there are a large set of

> candidates whom you so much prefer to the alternatives, that your best

> strategy is to approve them all.
that is not the fact.  how can you tell that to a naive voter, "just approve them all"???




>> Voters don't want their second-choice to beat their first-choice. How do

>> they stop that from happening? (By bullet-voting their first choice, and

>> that devolves Approval into Plurality.)

>>

>

> You're worrying too much about voting _among_ the best candidates.
the voter shouldn't have to worry AT ALL.  let the voter just inform the poll what their contingency votes are.
 
 
>If

> there's a set of candidates who are qualitatively the best, incomparably

> better than the rest, then your best strategy is to maximize the

> probability that one of them will win. That doesn't include voting _among_

> them. Just vote _for_ them.
and maybe the voter will find out they helped their less-preferred candidate beat their more-preferred candidate.  sure, that'll make the voter feel like their vote is effective!


> In any case, I don't recommend tactical voting (voting based on predictive

> information)...partly because the corporate mass-media's predictive

> information is disinformational,
no shit.  but that still does nothing to relieve the voter of the tactical pressure because they **want** their favorite candidate to win, they don't want their contingency candidate to beat their favorite.  but they also want their contingency
candidate to beat their most-hated candidate if the election comes down to that.  Approval does **nothing** to help them express that contingency.
>in the service of the people who "own" the
> mass media.

>

> ...but also partly because it's most to your advantage to just approve the

> whole set of candidates that's qualitatively, incomparably, better than the

> alternatives. ...to maximize the probability that one of that strong

> top-set will win.

>

> (But until we have verifiable vote-counting, of course the voting system is

> irrelevant, as is the voting.)
totally different topic.  (everyone should adopt optical-scan paper ballots.)
precinct summability is necessary.  IRV and Bucklin don't have it, but Condorcet (as well as Plurality) do have it.


>

>

>

>

>

>> > Equal-rank approval votes mean

>> > voters don't get the option to express their preferred ranking, but

>> because

>> > of that, they aren't at all motivated to bias their ranking dishonestly.

>>

>> That's baloney. They may very-well not Approve of their second-choice

>> candidate (whom they do actually approve of) to protect their first-choice

>> candidate.

>>

> If they strongly approve of their 2nd choice, but not their 3rd choice,

> then they'll approve their 2nd choice.
unless they worry about their 2nd choice beating their 1st choice.
> In our actual candidate lineup, the

> merit differences among the progressives are negligible in comparison to

> the big gulf of a merit difference between them and the Republocrats.

>

> Don't worry about it so much. Just approve all of the best.
you're repeated assurances are hollow.  just like Rob Richie.
 


>

>

>

>>

>> > They only have to decide which candidates to approve, or where the

>> cut-off

>> > is between approval and disapproval.

>>

>> No. That is a falsehood.

>>

>> They have to consider whether or not their second-choice candidate has a

>> chance of beating their first-choice. And they have to consider whether or

>> not their third-choice has a chance of beating either their second-choice

>> or their first-choice. And then they have to decide if that risk is worth

>> it to Approve their second or third choices.

>>

> No, they don't have to do any of that. They don't have to try to vote

> tactically.
bullshit.  you have no right to tell a voter what his or her interests are.  they **may** have to consider voting tactically because they want their favorite candidate to win.  but, if their favorite is a poor showing, they also don't want their contingency
candidate to lose to their hated candidate.
telling them "You don't have to try to vote tactically" is hollow.  it's like saying "Don't worry.  Any of the candidates are okay."
 
> Partly because there's no reliable information on which to
base
> tactical voting,
which is just one reason we should relieve voters of that burden.  tactical voting is **not** a perk.  it's a burden.  no one feels good about it.
> and partly because their best strategy is just to approve

> all of the set that is incomparably, qualitatively better than the other

> candidates.
says YOU.
you cannot tell voters what their best strategy is and they find out later that following your glib assurance screwed them.  that is what FairVote did with Burlington and there was a city that was quite pissed.  we called it the "IRV Happy
Talk".
you are no authority to advise voters what their best strategy is.  the best we can do is give them an voting system that normally requires no strategy of voters nor benefits voters from using strategy.  after a few generations, Duverger's Law will be forgotten and they
can confidently simply vote their political expression.

>

>>

>>

>>

>> Robert says:

>>

>

>

> I think most of your gushing for Approval voting is not well-founded. What

> if the voter prefers Candidate A as their favorite, but suspects that

> Candidate B and Candidate C are the leading candidates? How should that

> voter vote with an Approval ballot? Please answer that question with

> specifics.

>

> [endquote]

>

> We'd need better "specifics" about the situation that you've incompletely

> described. It depends on how much you like A better than B & C, and how

> much you like A & B better than C.

>
NO, we DON'T.  that is your failure.  you cannot force voters to research these "specifics".
All the voter knows is that he/she prefers A above all others.  If he/she can't get A, then they'll take B.  If they can't get A or B, then they'll settle for
C.  But this voter really doesn't want to help candidate D at all.  The only ballot that expresses the will of this voter is the Ranked Ballot.  Approval does not gather enough information (forcing the voter to vote tactically) and Score requires too much information (also forcing the
voter to score tactically).  With the exceptions of goofy things coming out of a cycle (which would be rare), only Condorcet resolves that election in exactly the same manner as would a Simple Majority race between two candidates with equal weighting for all voters.  Only Condorcet does
that.
 
> You don't mention any set's qualitative or incomparable better-ness,and you
> suggest that there's good predictive information that the winner will be B

> or C.
i am saying the voters should not be required to have "good predictive information" for them to vote their interests.  And no political group should benefit from "good predictive information".  That's the Duverger issue. It's because, with plurality
voting, "good predictive information" tells voters that one of the two major party candidates is expected to win, so that their vote for third-party or independent is wasted.

> So, if you don't have a strong top or bottom set, and the merit differences

> between your successive choices are uniform, and if there's reliable

> predictive information that the winner will be B or C, then of course

> approving {A,B} is a good way to vote.
But you DON'T necessarily know that and you shouldn't burden the voter with that tactical need.  They shouldn't have to be thinking "Hmmmm, what would be a good way to vote to benefit my political interest?"  That's your problem
and you do NOTHING to address it.

> But in our actual political lineup, the media have people believing that

> there are 2 parties that always must and will win. Say your favorite is

> Jill Stein, and that the other 2 candidates are Hillary & Donald. You're

> told that only Hillary &I Donald are well-liked by everyone enough so that

> one of those two beloved and popular candidates is sure to win.

>

> For one thing, you should find something fishy about such a claim,
You are expecting too much from voters.  Voting should not be a political science exam.  It's a **service** to voters, not a **burden** for voters.  Or at least it should be.
> given

> what is known about those 2 candidates being the most despised presidential

> candidates in this country's history.

>

> For another thing, the merit of Jill is so much greater than that of

> Hillary or Donald that, no matter what your'e told or believe about

> predictive information, your best strategy is to vote for the only

> acceptable, honest and progressive, genuinely pro-people candidate.

>

> That latter interpretation of your scenario is the one that you probably

> intended, because it's the one that actually obtains in elections here.
with your own words, you are making it clear that voters will have to explicitly consider strategy when voting in an Approval system.
Again, you cannot simply answer the question: "What should the voter do
with their second-favorite candidate?"
With Ranked-Choice Voting, the answer is clear (they mark their second-favorite with a "2").
With Approval Voting, the voter has a tactical burden deciding whether or not to approve their second-choice.  And with Score Voting,
the voter has a tactical burden deciding how much to score their second-choice.
Mike, you did nothing but verify my objections to Approval voting for governmental elections.

--
 


r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
 


"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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